INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY SELECT U.S. HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978 VOLUME III Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41-372 0 WASHINGTON: 1979 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the Assassination of Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. John F Kennedy WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio (II) CONTENTS September 18, 1978: Page Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel................... 1 Testimony of Sr. Eusebio Azcue Lopez, former Cuban Consul in Mexico City................................................................ 126 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of Eusebio Azcue--(Resumed) ...............................147 Testimony of St. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz ...............................173 September 19, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel ........................195 Testimony of Insp. Thomas J. Kelley, assistant director of protective operations in Washington, D.C .....................................323 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of James J. Rowley ........................................356 September 20, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .......................457 Testimony of James R. Malley .......................................462 Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .......................512 Testimony of James H. Gale .........................................513 September 21, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .......................559 Testimony of former President Gerald R. Ford .......................561 Testimony of John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy ................599 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of J. Lee Rankin, former general counsel of the Warren Commission.........................................................612 612 Testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States ...........................................................642 (III) INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D. C. The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee), presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, Fauntroy, Thone, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Cuba was an important concern of John F. Kennedy during his brief administration. It prompted the occasion of his "darkest hour"--the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. In the missile crisis, it also brought the United States--and the world--to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Understandably, therefore, among the many efforts to understand the assassination, those that include a Cuban element have been very prominent. Indeed, no less a figure than President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his private view that John F. Kennedy might well have been the victim of the Cuban plot. The Warren Commission explored the Cuban element in the assassination of the President from two perspectives. First, it considered the extent to which Oswald "might have been motivated in the assassination by a desire to aid the Castro regime, which President Kennedy so outspokenly criticized." In the months preceding the assassination, left-wing literature to which Oswald subscribed--chiefly "The Militant" and "The Worker"--reflected an extremely critical attitude toward the Kennedy administration's policy toward Cuba. Indeed, much of what appeared in these papers seemingly called for violent solutions to Cuban problems with the United States. The possibility that Oswald may have been influenced by this literature seems real. Apparently in all seriousness, he told Michael Paine, the individual in whose home Marina was then living, that "You could tell what they wanted you to do * * * by reading (1) 2 between the lines." Ultimately, however, the Warren Commission decided that it could not ascribe to Oswald any one motive or a group of motives. Second, the Commission considered the extent to which Oswald's trip to Mexico in late September and early October 1963--a trip during which Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate in Mexico City--may somehow have been related to the assassination. Based largely on the testimony of Sylvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban consulate, the Commission concluded the following about the visit. Oswald first visited the Cuban consulate on September 27, 1963. He requested an in-transit visa to permit him to visit Cuba en route to the Soviet Union. He was informed he could not obtain a visa to Cuba unless he first got one to enter the Soviet Union, and he was told at the Soviet Embassy he should not expect an answer to his visa application for about 4 months. He carried with him newspaper clippings and other documents, some authentic and some forged, in an attempt to demonstrate he was a "friend of Cuba." He used these documents, his previous residence in the Soviet Union, and his marriage to a Soviet national to curry favor at the Cuban consulate. He persisted in his demand for a Cuban visa, resulting in a bitter argument between him and the Cuban Consul, Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Eventually, his request was denied, and he left, apparently in anger. Ultimately, the Warren Commission expressed its satisfaction with the Duran account, noting that it had-- Reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran, as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy, were genuinely upset upon receiving the news of President Kennedy's death. It also indicated that- * * * confidential sources of extremely high reliability * * * establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects. The Commission also checked out a number of specific conspiracy allegations stemming from Oswald's trip to Mexico City, most of which alleged that he had been enlisted by Cuban agents in a plot to carry out the assassination. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded: Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, * * * History has not permitted so simple a resolution of the complex questions surrounding the assassination, Cuba, and Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Ironically, too, it was the Premier of Cuba, not the President of the United States, who was revealed and documented in Senate Intelligence Committee hearings in 1976 as the target of deadly serious assassination schemes. Between 1960 and early 1963, the committee concluded, the CIA conspired with known underworld figures to assassinate Premier Castro. Following the missile crisis in October 1962, the CIA-Mafia plots were brought to an end, or so we are told. But other assassination plots continued. Indeed, on November 22, 1963, a CIA case 3 officer was planning the killing of Castro with an official of the Cuban Government. The revelation in 1976 that the Premier of Cuba was the target of an unsuccessful assassination planned by the United States served to fuel the fires of speculation that Cuba had been the perpetrator of the successful effort against the President of the United States in 1963. It was recalled that Premier Castro himself, in an interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker on September 7, 1963, seemed to be warning that U.S. leaders who approved terrorist attacks on Cuban leaders could themselves be vulnerable. The AP story was carried in the New Orleans Times Picayune on September 9. Consequently, it could have been read by Lee Harvey Oswald himself. But the evidence of Cuban intentions may be interpreted in various ways. The Cuban delegate to the United Nations was in contact on September 5, 1963 with William Atwood, a U.S. delegate, to begin talks with the view toward starting the process of normalizing relations. And Jean Daniel, a French journalist, was with Premier Castro on November 22. He described Castro's reaction to the news of the Kennedy assassination as one of genuine surprise and deep regret. The critics of the Warren Commission, too, have persisted in their questioning of its conclusions, offering the theory that Oswald met with Cuban agents and various additional allegations. The most serious is the charge that it was, in fact, not Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate, but an imposter. Critics cite as evidence a photograph published by the Commission and thought by the critics to have been taken by a surveillance camera outside the Cuban consulate. It shows a burly man who bears no resemblance to Oswald, but who was identified as the individual who visited the consulate at the time Oswald was supposed to have done so. Mark Lane, in his "Rush to Judgment," raised the issue of the mysterious photograph and asked, "Was someone posing as Oswald?" Another widely circulated story after the Warren report was published is that Oswald, in a burst of anger on learning at the Cuban consulate that he could not secure a visa to visit Cuba, expressed an intention to assassinate President Kennedy. The select committee has sought to explore a number of questions in connection with Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Committee members and staff made two separate trips to both Cuba and Mexico. The cooperation of the Governments of Cuba and Mexico was sought and secured. The committee and the staff expresses its thanks to each government and those officials and citizens of each country that helped the committee in its investigation. Comment, however, must be made on the lack of cooperation by the Soviet Government. The select committee, both informally and through personal contacts and formally through the State Depart- ment, sought the cooperation of the Soviet Government, not only on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City where he is supposed to have visited the Soviet Embassy, but also in the period of time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. Various documents and files not made available to the Warren Commission but which the commit- 4 tee had a reasonable basis to believe existed were requested. The most important were the KGB surveillance files on Oswald. It was hoped that these files particularly might have been assistance to the committee in the crucial area of trying to ascertain Oswald's motive in the assassination. Ironically the KGB may well have the most complete file in the world on this crucial aspect of Oswald's personality. In addition, a request was made to interview officials and Soviet citizens who had contact with Oswald. The Soviet Government denied any relationship with Oswald or complicity in President Kennedy's death but declined to be of assistance, saying that it would be inappropriate for a great power to put itself in the position of having to defend itself against possible suspicion of complicity in the death of the leader of another country. The committee posed to itself in its investigation in this area, that is, Oswald's trip to Mexico, as the following: Was the man who visited the Cuban consulate in fact the man later accused of assassinating President Kennedy? When did the man alleged to be Oswald visit the Cuban consulate? What transpired at each visit? Who were the Cuban officials who dealt with him? Did he in fact express an intent to assassinate the President? Did the man alleged to be Oswald have any companions in Mexico City? The first witness who had been scheduled to be heard on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City was Sylvia Tirado Bazan, previously Sylvia Tirado Duran. Ms. Tirado was employed in September 1963 as secretary to the Cuban consul in Mexico City. Ms. Tirado was born November 22, 1937, in Mexico City. She is presently employed by the Mexican Social Security Office. Mr. Chairman, I understand that it has not been possible to secure the appearance of Senora Tirado. I understand, however, with your permission, Mr. Cornwell has a short presentation on her testimony. Chairman STOKES. The Chair will recognize Counsel Gary Cornwell. Mr. CORNWELL. I might state, Mr. Chairman, that through the assistance of the Mexican Government, three members of the staff did interview Sylvia Tirado, whose present name is Sylvia Tirado Bazan, on June 6, 1978. The Mexican Government thereafter agreed that she could come to the United States and testify at these hearings today. Mrs. Tirado Bazan also agreed to come. However, an unexpected busi- ness engagement of hers prevented her appearance here today. There is a photo which was made of her at the time of the interview, which is being displayed on the easel and marked JFK exhibit F-433, and we also have a transcript of the interview marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-440A, and a tape recording of excerpted portions of that interview which we have marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-439. Although the tape recording was not made for the purpose of playing it at these hearings--it was simply at the time intended as 5 a record of her statements--the staff has learned over the course of the investigation that it is often possible to gain a better understanding of a witness' testimony if you can hear or speak to the witness. Thus, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time each of those exhibits be admitted into evidence, and that we play for the committee selected portions of her statement. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point, and you may proceed to play the recording. [The tape recording mentioned above, JFK exhibit F-439, is being retained in committee files.] [The information follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-433 6 JFK Exhibit F-440A KENNEDY 9/18/78 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Name: Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date: June 6, 1978 Time:______________ Address:____________________ Place:____________________ ____________________ Interview: Cornwell: Would you like to state your name? Tirado: Silvia Tirado Bazan. Cornwell: And where's your present home address? Tirado? Avenida Universidad 1900 Edificio 12 Departmento 402 Colonia Numero De Terrenos Cornwell: For the record, my name is Gary Cornwell, and with me here is Ed Lopez, Harold Leap and Dan Hardway. We represent the House Select Committee on assassinations of the Congress of the United States. Also with us here today representing the Mexican Goverment is Honorio Escondon, Dr. Alfonso Orozco Contreras. Today is June 6, 1978 and the time is approximately 5:45 in the afternoon. Would you tell us what your date and place of birth is? Tirado: 22nd of November, 1937. Cornwell: You speak English so if you like my questions Interviewer Signature______________________________________ Typed Signature: Gary Cornwell Date Transcribed: br 6-19-78 7 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 2. translated we'll be happy to, and likewise, if you'd like to answer in English that would be fine, or if you'd rather answer in Spanish, we'll translate it. Tirado: I try to speak in English. Cornwell: All right. If you have any question about the what I phrase something or you don't understand it, simply ask and Mr. Lopez will translate it for you. Your name in 1963 was what? Tirado: Silvia Tirado de Duran. Cornwell: And your husband at that time was who? Tirado? Horacio Duran. Cornwell: Are you presently employed? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Where's that? Tirado: Social Security. Cornwell: Prior to that, what jobs did you hold? Tirado: A long while, Social Security. I used to write. Cornwell: And any other jobs? Have you held any other jobs? Tirado: No. Cornwell: At one time you worked for the Cuban Consulate. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Is that the only other job you ever held? Tirado: No. 8 Page 3. Cornwell: Well, let's say back since about 1960, could you tell us what the history of your employment is? Have you had many jobs? Tirado: I don't remember exactly, but uh, I used to work for the Olympic Games. I was a translator for two months. And uh, another three months I used to work for the, I don't know, it was an Exhibit of Hispanic Art that was, I don't know he went all over the world and I helped him to choose the pieces and as translator. I was married in 1960. I separate in '68, July '68 and I start working. Cornwell: During 1963, did you hold any jobs during that year other than your employment at the Cuban Consulate? Tirado: No. Cornwell: When did you first obtain the job at the Consulate and how did you obtain it. Tirado: Well, because I was uh, coordinating the Cuban, the Mexican-Cuban institute, the cultural Institute in '62, I think, and that's where I met some people. Yes. Cornwell: That was a private organization, is that correct? Tirado: It's not exactly private I don't know because all the countries have--there is the American Institute, there is the Russian Institute, there is the French Institute. It's cultural relations between the countries. Cornwell: Was that associated with the Mexican government? 9 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 4. Tirado: I don't know exactly, but I think--you know that. (Asks Orozco) (Translation) The objective is to present culturally the different embassies of and consulates that are in Mexico. Orozco Cornwell: What was you job with that organization? Tirado: Coordinator. Cornwell: And in connection with that, did you know any of the employees at the Cuban Consulate? Tirado: Yes, at the Cultrual Attache. Cornwell: And what were the names of those persons? Tirado: Teresa Proenza and Luis Alberu. Cornwell: And who? Tirado: Luis Alberu Cornwell: Did you in any other way know any of t he other employees at the Consulate? Tirado: Yes, well I knew Azcue, Eusebio Azcue who was a consul, and uh, Maria Carman Olivari -- she's dead. Cornwell: She, in the summer of 1963, was a secretary. Is that correct? (If you nod you head, the recorder will not make any record of what your answer is.) Tirado: Yes. 10 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. Cornwell: Would you then explain to us how it was that you obtained the job at the Consulate? Tirado: Because my friend Maria Carman, she was dead--she had an accident, and during the funeral I told Azcue that if he wants me to help him, for some people come from Cuba, just to help him. And of course he says yes. They need some people they can trust, and I'd been working in the Institute. So... Cornwell: How was it that you knew Eusebio Azcue by this time? Tirado: I don't remember, because he was uh, he was an Architect and he knew a lot of people, friends of ours, I mean my husband and I. Cornwell: Had he lived in Mexico for a long period of time? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: And, because of his occupation, he would have known your husband. Is that correct? Tirado: Yeah, more or less. Cornwell: Your husband Horatio was also an architect at that time. Tirado: Industrial designer. Yes, sir. Cornwell: Approximately when was it that you first obtained the job? Tirado: the end of July or August, early August. I don't 11 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 5. remember exactly. Cornwell: And for how long did you continue to work there? Tirado: Three or four months. Cornwell: How long after the assassination of President Kennedy did you work there? Tirado: Only two days. Cornwell: During that period of time what were the hours of operation of the consulate? Tirado: It was about 9:30 or 10:00 to 2:00 and in the afternoon about 5:00 to 8:00 or something. If we have a lot of work, we stayed longer. Cornwell: The hours were 10:00 to 2:00 and then 5:00 to 8:00. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes, that's true. Cornwell: Was the Consulate open for visitors during both of those sets of hours? Tirado: No, it was just in the morning. Cornwell: Would you mind sketching for us what the physical layout of the Consulate looked like at that time? (pause) You have drawn a rectangular shape. What formed the outside of it? Was it a solid wall around the outside? Was the outside of the premises a wall? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All right. And we'll just mark it the way you 12 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 7. drew it. In the lower left-hand corner, there is a small box you drew. What is that? Tirado: The consular. Cornwell: That's the consulate's office? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a one in that box, so we'll know that's the consulate's office. Then, the door was... where, on the corner?..you remember the name of the streets, still today? Tirado: This is Tacubayo. this is Francisco Marquez. You want me to write it down? Cornwell: If you remember, yes. Tirado: Here were the houses. Cornwell: All right. You've labeled three sides of the building with street names and on the fourth side which on the top of the drawing, you said they are houses. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What is in the long triangular shape on the drawing above the Consular office? Tirado: It was the commercial office. Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a two in there. That's.. Tirado: And here was the cultural office. Cornwell: And behind that, we'll mark it with a three, was the cultural office. In the center of the drawing 13 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. is what? Tirado: The Embassy. Cornwell: All right. We'll put a four in that. That's the Embassy. And what's the small box in the lower right-hand corner? Tirado: I don't know how to say it in English. Cornwell: An entryway? Lopez: Housekeeper. Cornwell: Oh, a housekeeper? Okay. We'll put a five in there. What is all the rest of the space inside the premises? Tirado: Garden, it was garden. And here was the entrance for the cars. Cornwell: And where you indicated there was an entrance for cars, we'll mark that seven. And all the interior space which was garden, we'll mark with an eight. Tirado: Down here there was a movie room. Cornwell: Where, behind the...? Tirado: Behind the cultural room? Cornwell: Want to draw that? Tirado: No, because this is the first floor. Cornwell: Oh, it was on the second floor. Tirado: Yeah. On the first floor was a projection...movies 14 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 9. Cornwell: Were the space which we marked one, two, three and also four, were they all two-story? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Okay. And above the space marked one, what was there? Tirado: The Consulate. Cornwell: So it was on two floors. Tirado: No, there was another floor over here but it was belongs to the commercial... Only on the first floor was the Consultae. Cornwell: I see. What would be behind the Consulate on the first floor? In this area marked two? Tirado: I don't remember. Cornwell: You don't remember. So, where we marked two, that was a second story in that area. Correct? Tirado: Warehouse perhaps. Cornwell: Just a storage area or something like that, perhaps, in the lower area marked two. In the space marked number one, which was the Consular's office, who all occupied that area? Tirado: Well, Consul, the Vice Consul and the secretary. Cornwell: Which was you. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: During the time that we're interested in. 15 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 10. The Consul's name of course was Eusebio Azcue. The Vice Consul's name was what? Tirado: I don't remember. Cornwell: All right. Tirado: This was Consulate. Cornwell: All right. You have divided the area that we originally marked number one into two units. The smaller unit indicates where the Consul sat and you sat in a larger reception area in the front? All right. And then, behind the Consul's office, was there another door? You marked that with a heavier area, and that would be where he could walk out into the courtyard. Is that corret. So if you wanted to get into the Consul's office, including the reception area from the courtyard, you needed to walk through the Consul's office. Is that accurate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now, what kind of a door was at the corner, the lower left-hand corner here, so that if one were to walk from your office to the street, what kind of door was that? Glass, wood, solid, could you see through it? Tirado: No, it was solid. I don't remember exactly, but perhaps I was wood. But it was solid. 16 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 11. Cornwell: You don't remember being able to see out on the street? Tirado: No, no. Cornwell: Okay. Lopez: You enter the Consulate right, in here? Tirado: Uh huh. Lopez: And your office would be right around here. Right? Tirado: My desk was here. Cornwell: You have drawn a small box now inside the larger half of the area we originally marked area number one, that's where our desk was? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: From where you sat to the entrance into the office where you were, where would the entrance into the office be? Not into the whole consulate, but just into your office? Tirado: It was open. Lopez. Okay, it was open. Tirado: You would enter here. Here was the stairs for the second floor, No?--and here I think there were chairs, or something like that. For the people who were waiting. And the desk was here. Lopez: Okay. Where would the entrance to your office be? Tirado: Here, or here. Lopez: Just to your office, not to the Consul's office. 17 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 12. It would be at the same entrance? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: And from where you sat, you couldn't see outside at all? Tirado: No. Lopez: You couldn't see any area in the yard? There was no glass. Tirado: No. I can remember glass, a window, yeah. I can remember windows here, and perhaps here, but I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. There may have been windows for you to see out in the street? Tirado: Yeah, but I couldn't see outside because perhaps they were very high. Cornwell: While Mr. Lopez was asking you questions, he drew a diagonal line across your office space. Does that represent anything? That line should not have been drawn, is that correct? Tirado: yeah. (Laughs.) Cornwell: Now, did you know a Teresa Proenza? Was she employed at the Consulate or the Embassy. Tirado: The Embassy. She was the Cultural Attache. Cornwell: She would have worked in the area marked number four? Is that correct? Tirado: Well, yes. But this was, this construction was uh, afterwards. This was the Embassy and the Consulate and building was under construction, 18 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 13. constructed. A building. Cornwell: Constructed? Tirado: Later. It was the old building. Cornwell: Did she work there during the same period of time you did? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At the period where did she work? What area? Tirado: Here. Cornwell: That's the area we marked number three on the diagram. Did you know a Louisa Calderon? Tirado: Louisa? Yes, she was in the commercial... Cornwell: And where would that be on the diagram? In the area we marked number two? Tirado: I think her office was exactly above mine. She was a secretary. And I think it was above. Cornwell: Either above the area we marked one, or the area marked two, but on the second level. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know the names of any other employees who worked there at the time? Tirado: No, I don't remember. Cornwell. The man named Mirabal, he was to replace Eusebio Azcue, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. 19 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 14. Cornwell: And do you recall aproximately when he arrived in Mexico city and began to learn the job so he could take it over from Eusebio Azcue? Tirado: I didn't understand, what did you say please? Cornwell: Do you remember approximately when he arrived? And began to learn the work from Azcue. Tirado: No, some weeks earlier, I don't remember. cornwell: Would it be accurate to state that your best memory as you told us when we spoke to you informally before we turned the tape recorders on, that he was already there when you met the man you later identified as Oswald? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now. Tirado: But he wasn't there when I started working at the Embassy, at the Consulate. Cornwell: Okay. So he much have arrived in late summer or perhaps September, or something like that. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now, were there telephones in the office? Tirado: Here. Cornwell: You had one at your desk? Tirado: this is the desk and here was a little table. I think it was the telephone. Here was the 20 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 15. safe box. And here was the Archivo. Lopez: Archives. Cornwell: So you've drawn two smaller boxes next to your desk. One of them was like a filing cabinet, or for storage of records? Tirado: Yes. This one. The Files. Cornwell: And the other one was a table. Tirado: No, here was the safe box. Cornwell: Oh, a safe. I see, a safe. And there was a phone at the desk? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And did Azcue also have a telephone? Tirado: Yes, it was the same but with an extension. Cornwell: Extension. Tirado: Here was the door. Cornwell: All right. 1963, where were you living? Did you have more than one residence? Tirado: Yes. Constituyentes 143. Cornwell: And during what part of 1963 was that? Tirado: When I moved there? Before i started working, at the embassy. But just a few weeks... Cornwell: So sometime in the summer of 1963. Did you have 21 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 16. a telephone at your home? Tirado: Not at the moment that Oswald came. Because we had just moved. I think we moved in July because we were separated in July, also, July '68 and it is when the contract finished. So perhaps... Cornwell: I see. Your rent contract ran out in July of '68? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: About the same time that you and Horatio were divorced? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you, you say that because of your move, it took some time to get a telephone in your home? Tirado: Yes. cornwell: And do you remember approximately when it was that you finally got that in? Tirado: At the assassination we had, a, let me see, we didn't have telephone--days later. Cornwell: It was sometime after the assassination that you first got a telephone in this residence. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And do you by any chance recall the telephone number at the Consulate? Tirado: Oh, so many times I write it down. Perhaps it was 11-28-45, perhaps? 22 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 17. Cornwell: Could it have been 11-28-47? Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: When were you first advised that we wanted to speak to you? Tirado: Last week. Cornwell: And since that time, of course, last Wednesday, I believe it was, we spoke to you informatlly, and told you basically what we were interested in. And learned most of what you could remember about the events we were interested in. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Apart from that, have you had any other oportunities to read anything, or speak to anyone, in order to refresh your memory about the events? Tirado: Yes. In October of '76 some journalist from the Washington Post came to interview me. Cornwell: We are familiar with the story that appeared in the Washington Post at approximately that time. Apart from that have you for instance read the Warren Commission Report? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: When did you last have an occasion to read that? Tirado: Oh, when Horacio told me you were coming, I was writing, and I try to remember exactly and I'm starting saying that again, the nightmare came, and so on 23 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 18. and so on, and I wanted to check the dates. Cornwell: So, last week sometime, you had a chance to read it over again? Tirado: No, not everything just the one little thing. Cornwell: Just the part that dealt with Mexico city and your testimony and that sort of thing. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Let me ask you, when you read that, was there any part of it that seemed to you to be inaccurate? Tirado: Inaccurate? Cornwell: Not correct. Tirado: Not correct? Yes, but with the warren Commission, I get angry when I start reading it because they make some afirmacionnes (ph). Lopez: Allegations or conclusions. tirado: Yes. I don't like it. So I tried to erase it. Cornwell: Okay. What specifically about the report was it that makes you angry? Tirado: That I was a--let me see how to say it--, I don't remember exactly, but uh, I did more to Oswald when he was here than was my job, that it was extra. Cornwell: You mean part of the report that suggests that you went beyond your duties at that Consulate, that you exceeded your authority, and you thought that you did not do so. Is that correct? 24 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 19. Tirado: Correct. Cornwell: Is there anything else about the Warren Commission Report's resume of the facts that you felt was inaccurate, that made you mad? Tirado: I cannot answer that because I only read at that time two pages. I didn't read the whole thing. Cornwell: Okay. In addition to looking at that in order to refresh you memory, have you had a chance to speak to any one else? Tirado: No, it was just for checking my writing. Cornwell: What writing was that? Tirado: Well, I was trying to remember everything that happened in the interrogatory. It was not hard, I mean, what I felt, but uh, what the police had done to me, so it was my but I'm writing, I'm writing an autobiographia how do you say that, and this is a chapter. Cornwell: I see. Tirado: (Laughs.) Cornwell: Directing your attention than to approximately late September of 1963, as we learned from you the other day, a man came to the Consulate, a man who you later associated with pictures in the newspaper and a name in the newspaper of the alleged assassin of the President. Is that correct? 25 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 20 Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember how many times he came to the Consulate? Tirado: Three times. Cornwell: Do you remember the date or dates upon which those three visits occurred? Tirado: No, I saw the application. You showed me the other day, and in the Warren Commission was September 27, but I didn't remember, of course, until I read it. Cornwell: All right. Do you have a recollection whether it was all on one day or on separate days. Tirado: The same day. Cornwell: On the very first visit, would you describe to us what the man said and did, and what you said in response? tirado: Yes, he, well, he enter and he ask me if I speak english and I say yes, and then he start asking me about requirements to go to Cuba, to get a visa to go to cuba, and I explain it. Cornwell: What did you explain? Tirado: Well, that he needed to, he said that a transit visa so that he needs a visa to the country that he was going, from, if it was a Socialist country, the visa was given, as soon 26 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 21. as he gets the other visa, and uh... Cornwell: When he first asked about the requirements for a visa, did he tell you that his objective was to go to cuba or to another country? Tirado: To the Soviet Union. Cornwell: Did you ever suggest to him that there was any alternative means to acquire a visa other than the in-transit visa requirement which you just described? Tirado: I don't remember, I mean I hardly remember. But what used to say is if you want to go to Cuba, you need or you have to have friends in Cuba, so they may, what do you say, take responsibility, if you get the visa. That was one way, no? And the other way was in-transit. Cornwell: Okay. If I understand then, you don't have a distinct recollection about exactly what you said to Oswald, but you asumed it was what you said to everyone who came in, which was that you explained both processes, that they either must have friends in Cuba or the in-transit visa could be granted if they got a visa from another country. Tirado: No, if only they asked me. Because they usually go there and say, "I want to go to Cuba." But if they say I'm just in transit, then I explain 27 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 22. Cornwell: Okay, then. Let me see if I can rephrase it and get what's in your mind as best we can. Is it your best recollection that you did explain both alternatives to Oswald? Tirado: I don't remember exactly, because I think he immediately says that he wants to go to Russia, and he was in transit to go to Cuba. I think he immediately says so. Cornwell: Okay. So then your best recollection that you may have only explained the in-transit visa process. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornell: But, I gather from the way you have answered the question, there is still the possibility that you also discussed with him going to cuba if he had friends, but you're not sure about that second one. Is that accurate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now, after this first basic explanation, what if anything did he say or do? Tirado: Well, I don't remember exactly. He show all the paper that he had, when he gave me the application when he came back,... Cornwell: Okay. Wait a minute. Just the first visit. Is there anything else about the first visit? Or, 28 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. did he leave at that time and if he left, why did he leave? Tirado: To have photographs of himself. Cornwell: Okay. So your memory is that on the first occasion you also explained to him that he needed photographs and he left shortly thereafter to obtain them. Tirado: Yes, and perhaps, but I'm not very sure, that, uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution, and when he showed me all the scrap paper that he has. Cornwell: All right. You don't remember if that was on the first or the second occasion. Correct? Tirado: Yeah, I don't remember. Cornwell: Nevertheless, he did leave to go get photographs, and he did return? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did he return with the photographs? Tirado: With four photographs. Cornwell: Four of them. tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Were they all the same? To the best of your memory, was he wearing the same kind of clothes that he was wearing that day in the photographs? Tirado: Yes. 29 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 24. Cornwell: So, from all the circumstances, did it appear to your that he just went somewhere locally and had the pictures made? Tirado: Yeah. I think that I already explained (to) him where he could take the photographs. Cornwell: You told him some locations in town where ge could go? Were there some right in the neighborhood of the Consulate there? Tirado: That I don't remember. Cornwell: All right. But at any rate you knew of some place at the time, mentioned one or two places to him? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Correct?... Did you look at the photos when he brought them back, careful about to be sure that it was the same man who was standing in front of you? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And what did you do at that time? Tirado: I filled out application. Cornwell: You personally typed it, and did you type it in duplicate or triplicate or just one copy? Tirado: Duplicate. Cornwell: And was the second copy a carbon? 30 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Tirado: Carbon? Cornwell: Did you have it twice or did you type one and make two copies? Tirado: Only one. Cornwell: And made two? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And what did you do with the photographs? Tirado: Stapled them. Cornwell: Stapled them? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: On top of the application. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: The application has a place on it for a date, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you type in the date that was in fact that day? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Let's just talk hypothetically for a moment. Is there any chance that he was at the Consulate on more than one day? Tirado: No. I read yesterday, an article in the Reader's digest, and they say he was at the Consulate on three occasions. He was in Friday, Saturday, and Monday...That's not true, that's false. 31 Silvia's Tirado Interview Page 26. Cornwell: All right. Let's try a different hypothetical. If the one in the Reader's Digest is definitely wrong, is it possible that he first came on like a Thursday, and then came back on a Friday? Tirado: No, because I am positively sure about it. That he came in the same day. Cornwell: Let me ask you then something about just the procedures or the Consulate at the time. Would it have been consistent with your normal procedures for you to have typed the application on his first visit, even though he didn't have a photograph to put on it? Tirado: No. Cornwell: In other words, before you started the process of typing it, you were sure you had everything you needed to make it complete. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did he tel you where he was staying at the time? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you recall any problem with him not knowing any address, where he was staying in Mexico City? Tirado: No, because he say that he has no time to wait, he was in a hotel and uh, I didn't ask the address, in Mexico City because I mean didn't care. Cornwell: You didn't have a need to know that? 32 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 27. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you recall any problem coming up where he needed to know it? For any other reason? Tirado: Me to know his address? Cornwell: No, for him to know. Did he have any problem, did he have any need to know it himself? Do you remember anything along those lines? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Going back to the second visit, is it your memory that you typed the application in duplicate, you stapled the pictures at the top of each copy, if that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Then what did you do with the application? Tirado: Well, I used to put it in a file, and uh, I used to keep one copy, another to send, the original, we used to send to Cuba. And I think I have another file. Cornwell: Was he required to sign the application? Tirado: He sighned it, yes. Cornwell: Did he sign one or both of them? Tirado: I think both, it has to be. Cornwell: Was there any requirement in the Consulate that he do it in any particular person's presence? Anyone have to watch him while he signed it? Tirado: I don't know, I mean I just don't remember. 33 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Cornwell: As a hypothetical, did Azcue have to watch people sign the applications? Tirado: No. He was in his office. Cornwell: So you could handle that all by yourself. Tirado: yes. Cornwell: Did he sign it in your presence? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did anything else occur on the second visit, any other conversation, or any other event? Tirado: No, but I told you, it's uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution. He show me letters to the Communist Party, the American Communist Party, his labor card, and uh, he's working in Russia, I don't remember exactly, but he said on his application, his licence number... Cornwell: Marriage license? Tirado: (Spoke in spanish.) Se dice serup los recortes del Cornwell: Okay, we had to pause for a second to turn the periodico tapes over. As I recall, you were explaining the kinds of things he brought with him. Tirado: Yes, it was his labor card, form Russia, his us, marriage pact, yes, that he was married with a Russian, and uh, a clipping that he was with two policemen taking him by his arms, that he was in a meeting to support Cuba. And a card saying that he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba in New 34 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 29. Orleans. And Cornwell: Do you recall what was said or what occurred that caused him to produce all of these documents about his having a Russian wife and his Fair Play For Cuba activity? Tirado: Just a minute. (Spanish--what means recall?) Lopez: Recordar. He showed me all of these papers to demonstrate that he was a friend of the revolution. Cornwell: But did you say anything to him or did anyone else say anything to him that made him feel he needed to produce this kind of documentation. Tirado: No, I don't think so. What I said is that when he said he was a member of the Party, of the Communist Party, the American, I said why don't they arrange, the Party, your Party with the Cuban Party, and he said that he didn't have time to do it. Cornwell: Did you ask him why hw didn't just have the Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: the Cuban Communist Party? He just said he didn't have time? Tirado: Yes. Because there was a manner to do it. I mean, we get, for instance, the visa directly 35 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 30. from Cuba and saying give the visa to this people that's coming and somebody say oh, yes, you have you visa here. Cornwell: Do you recall anything else happening on the second occasion? Or have you related all that's in your mind on that? Tirado: No. It was strange. I mean because I you are a Communist and you're coming from a country where the Communist Party is not very well seen, and in Mexico City that the Communist Party was not legal at that moment -- crossing the border with all of his paper, it was not logical. I mean if you're really communist, you go with anything, I mean just nothing, just your passport, that's all. And that was something that I didn't like it but... Cornwell: So, you were a little suspicious of the amount of documentation he brought? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Did you say anything to him about that? tirado: Perhaps I told him, what are you doing with all of this? And he said to prove I'm a friend of yours. Cornwell: Did you discuss your suspicions with anyone else? Tirado: With the consul. Cornwell: With Azcue? 36 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 31. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember when that discussion occurred? Tirado: It was afterwards. Cornwell: Was that after his second visit as you recall? Tirado: It was during his third visit. Cornwell: During his third visit. All right. Let's back up again for just a moment. what time of day as best as you recall did he come to the Consulate the first time? Tirado: Perhaps it was eleven o'clock or something like that, ten thirty. Cornwell: And the second time? Tirado: About twelve, or eleven, no, about one o'clock. Cornwell: Okay. The first one was roughly late morning, and the second one was early afternoon. Tirado: yes. Cornwell: And then, when did he leave the second time? Tirado: To get his Russian visa. Cornwell: Would it have been the standard procedure in the Cuban Consulate, to take the application, have him sign it, and have it ready to go in the file if the request was in-transit, for an in-transit visa, even though he did not have the visa from the third country. Or from another country? Tirado: Uh, huh. 37 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 32. Cornwell: All right. Tirado: Yes, I did send it to Cuba. Cornwell: All right. Okay. So, then you sent him in effect, to the Russian Embassy. And it was at that point after he left that you spoke to... Tirado: No. Cornwell: No, you didn't speak to the Consulate at all yet. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Had there been any problem at all yet? Tirado: No. Cornwell: So far, it's like any normal visa appplication. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would it have been consistent with the procedures in the consulate or you to have allowed him to take one or both of the applications typed up outside the Consulate? Tirado: I don't remember very well if uh, there were only two copies. I mean, one original and one copy, but uh, it could have happened, but I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. To the best of your memory then, the person who made the application was not permitted to have a copy. Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. You're not sure. But your tentative memory is that would not have occurred. 38 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 33. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would you have ever allowed a person to take all of the applications outside and attach the photos or sign them themselves? Tirado: Yes, because you may come, ask for the application and you may keep it. Cornwell: You, on occasion, would allow someone just to have a blank copy. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. But he was different because he did not speak in Spanish so I have to fill it. Cornwell: I see. If he would have spoken Spanish or professed to having someone with him who did speak Spanish, you might have allowed him to take the applications and fill them out. Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: At least on other occasions you have done that, with other people. Tirado: That's something that I really don't remember. Cornwell: There at least, there was no requirement that you type it there in the office, as long as it got filled out. Tirado: I think I have to type it. I have to type it because I have to make some observations, always. Cornwell: Down at the botton? Tirado: Yes. 39 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 34. And I think that if you fill it in handwriting, I have to type it, for, to send it to Cuba. Cornwell: So, at most, you would allow someone to fill it out and bring it in so you could type it? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: If that procedure was employed, allowing someone else ot fill it out, would you still be required ot check the photograph to be sure it was accurate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would you still require the person to sign it in your presence? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Just so we can keep out documents straight, let's just mark now on the back a photograph and we'll ask you some questions about it. We'll mark it as Exhibit Number 2. This is a photograph of what would appear to be a visa application. Does it appear to be basically the type of visa application that we have been speaking about? Tirado: Yes. The numbers, I think they're mine. Cornwell: The numbers in the upper right-hand corner which are hand-written? Tirado: I think so. 40 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 35. Cornwell: Those appear to you to be in your handwriting. Tirado: Yeah, because when I file I write in the number, the following number? Cornwell: Okay. And on the very bottom of the application, where it says "para uso de la mision" that means it's filled in by someone associated with the Cuban Government. Is that correct. Or the Consulate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Who, according to the usual procedure, filled out that portion. Tirado: Me. Cornwell: The other day when we talked to you informally, you read through the words in that section. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. I remember. Cornwell: And your memory is that you in fact typed that section on this application. Tirado: Yes. I used to do this with all the applications. Cornwell: And under that, there is a signature. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Are you able to tell whose signature that is? Tirado: No, I was thinking it was Mirabal, but no--I couldn't sign any papers. Cornwell: Okay. So it was definitely not your signature? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you know whether, according to normal procedure, 41 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 36. any particular person routinely placed his name at that location? Tirado: No, only the Consulate. People in the Consulate. Cornwell: What would be the purpose of a signature in the lower right-hand corner? Tirado: I don't know, perhaps to check that it was right as it was written. Cornwell: Did you ever see the Consulate or any other employee routinely sign the applications at the location? Tirado: I don't remember, but what I used to do was put the originals in one packet and that was with a letter to the Minister, de Relaciones exterister (spanish). How do you say that? (Lopez - Minister of Foreign Relations), and I used to give to the Consul so he sign the papers and send it to Cuba. Cornwell: Okay. One copy stayed in the Consulate and one was mailed to Cuba, to the Minister of Foreign Relations. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Is it possible then that the signature in the lower right-hand corner is someone in Cuba? Tirado: Perhaps that one that get it. Cornwell: That receives it in cuba. All right, the stamp, 42 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 37. which appears slightly over the name, the handwritten name, Lee H. Oswald, when did that get laced on the application if you know? Tirado: Perhaps in the moment that he sign? Cornwell: Was that part of the normal procedure? Did you have a stamp as you recall to do that? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And was that a means of authenticating the signature, that you would stamp on top of it like that? Tirado: I think so. Because let me see. This was signed by Cuba, I think because this was October 10. This was the answer, perhaps. Cornwell: So there's a date you just pointed to, around the middle of the application reading 10-Oct. 1963 and you are assuming, I take it, that that was the date placed on the document in Cuba? Tirado: Perhaps but I don't know. I don't know the date of when we send the application. Cornwell: Or it was placed on there when you mailed it? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know which? Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: You don't remember which? Could it have been the date upon which the application was received 43 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 38. in the Consulate here in mexico City? Tirado: In return. cornwell: In return? Back from cuba? Is that what you mean? Tirado: Perhaps. I don't know that. Cornwell: Could it have been the date you received it from Oswald? Tirado: No, because it was the same date. Cornwell: Okay. The only date on here of receipt from Oswald was the one near the top, the second line, which reads: 27 Sep. 1963. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: So I guess the best we can do is say that you don't have a distinct recollection of how the 10th of October date would have gotten placed on here. Correct? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: How long normally would it have taken between the receipt of an application and the date that it would have been mailed to Cuba? Tirado: Well, it depends on the flight. We had, I don't remember in that time, if we were three flights from Cuba to Mexico and from Mexico to Cuba and it depends on the work that we have to do, if we have a lot of work we wouldn't have sent it immediately or,--valise diplomatica, How do you say it? Cornwell: Diplomatic pouch. 44 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 39. Cornwell: Would there have been some usual amount of time? How much could it vary? Tirado: The flights were Monday, Wednesday and Friday, I think. And uh, well, we send a bunch if, I think, I don't know, when what day in the week was the 27th? Perhaps if it was Wednesday, we would send next Friday, or next Monday. Or... Cornwell: I have another photograph of just the upper left-hand corner of the same document, which we'll mark as Exhibit 3 on the back, and ask you if, to the best of your recollection, that is a photograph of the man whom you saw on or about the 27th of September? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: I don't understand. A moment ago, did you say that there was a normal time of the week that mailings to Cuba occurred? Tirado: Would you please repeat the question? Cornwell: Was there a usual day, did the mailings to Cuba usually occur on one given day of the week? Tirado: Yes, I don't remember exactly, but I think it was on Friday, perhaps, that we make, we send applications. Yeah, it was one day to send all the applications. Cornwell: All right. So, if we were to tel you the 27th of 45 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 41. Cornwell: What happened? Tirado: Somebody took them to the Consulate. cornwell: Okay. you said the main gate. Was that the area that, on Exhibit one, you marked as beign the door to your office, or some other area? Tirado: He was closed. In the afternoon he was closed. But perhaps he came... Cornwell: The door on Area One was locked up. Okay? Tirado: Yes. And then he was open. Cornwell: Over near Number Seven, is that correct? Where they let the cars in? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: There was a door there too? Tirado: Yes. It was the garage and another door. Cornwell: And the doorman from that area brought him to your office? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What occurred on that occasion? Tirado: What? Cornwell: What happened on that occasion. Tirado: Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian Visa and uh, he want to get his Cuban visa. And I said that that was not possible because he has to be first sent to Cuba and then 46 Sylvia Tirado Interview Page 41. Cornwell: What happened? Tirado: Somebody took them to the Consulate. Cornwell: Okay. You said the main gate. Was that the area that, on Exhibit one, you marked as being the door to your office, or some other area? Tirado: He was closed. In the afternoon he was closed. But perhaps he came... Cornwell: The door on Area One was locked up. Okay? Tirado: Yes. And then he was open. Cornwell: Over near Number Seven, is that correct? Where they let the cars in? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: There was a door there too? Tirado: Yes. It was the garage and another door. Cornwell: And the doorman from that area brought him ot your office? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What occurred on that occasion? Tirado: What? Cornwell: What happened on that occasion? Tirado: Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian visa and uh, he want to get his Cuban visa. And I said that that was not possible because he has to be first sent to Cuba and then 47 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 42. wait for the answer, no, it was necessary that he has to have first a Socialist visa, the Russian visa. And, uh,... Cornwell: Did he show you his passport with a visa in it? From the Russian Embassy. Tirado: No, No. I don't remember exactly but what I remember is he says that he already has his Russian visa and I said I don't see it and well, I don't remember exactly what we discussed in that moment. But, he was very stubborn. So, I say, well, I'm going to call to the Russian Consul, so I called the russian Consul and I said hey, listen, here's a man that, he say that he already got his Russian visa. And he said, yes, I remember it. He came to us for visa but uh, the answer will be in three or four months, that was the usual time. Cornwell: So as you recall, then, the person t the Russian Embassy said in effect, no, he doesn't have it yet, he's only applied for it. Is that right? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay. Go ahead. Tirado: And uh, and I told him what the Russian Consulate says and then, he was angry. He age angry. And he insisted that he was a friend of the Cuban Re- 48 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 43. volution, that he has already been in jail for the Cuban Revolution, that uh, oh, that he wanted that visa and that he couldn't wait for so long time because uh, his Mexican visa was finished in three days. So he was insistent and uh, I didn't have time and well, I couldn't make him understand that. So, I went to the Consul's office and I explained to him, and would you please come and talk with him? Axcue came, Misrabel I think he didn't speak English, so Azcue came and told him those things, all the requirements that he needs to fly to Cuba, and he was really angry. He was red and he was almost crying and uh, he was insisting and insisting so Azcue told him to go away because if he didn't go away at that moment he was going to kick him, or something like that. So, Azcue went to the door, he opened the door and told Oswald to go away. Cornwell: Okay. So he went to the door which was in the area we marked 'one,' which was at the Consulate Office? Tirado: Yes...Remember, I was feeling pity for him because he looked desperate. Cornwell: He looked desperate? Tirado: Yes. 49 Silvia Tirado Interview page 44. Cornwell: So, you felt kind of sorry for him? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At any time during these three contacts, did he indicate to you that he could speak or understand Spanish? Tirado: No. Cornwell: During this period was your normal work week, did it include Saturdays? Tirado Yes. Cornwell Is it possible that, in addition to his visits on Friday, he also came back the following day on Saturday mourning? Tirado: No. Cornwell: How can you be sure of that? Tirado: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easy to remember, because not all the Americans that came there were married with a Russian woman, they have live(d) in Russian and uh, we didn't used to fight with those people because if you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were friends, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, I mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him. Cornwell: Okay. I understand that but I don't understand how that really answers the question. In other 50 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 45. words, the question is, what is it about the events that makes you sure that he did not come back on Saturday, and have another conversation with you? Tirado: Because I remember the fight. So if he (come) back, I would have remembered. Cornwell: Did Azcue work on Saturdays? Tirado: Yes, we used to work in the office but not for the public. Cornwell: Was there a guard, was there a guard out here at the corner near number seven on your diagram on Saturdays? Tirado: Excuse me? Cornwell: Was there a doorman out near the area that you marked as number seven, on the diagram? Tirado: Yes, but on Saturday he never let people ... Cornwell: Never let people in. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak Spanish? And were very insistent? Tirado: No, because they could answer or something. They could ask me for instance, no ? by the inter-phone. Cornwell: They could do that on a Friday, though. 51 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 46 Tirado: But what I remember is that Oswald has my tele- phone number and my name and perhaps he show to the doorman (Spanish). Cornwell: When did you give him the telephone number and name? Tirado: In the second visit, perhaps. Cornwell: Okay. Tirado: I used to do that to all the people, so they don't have to come and to bother me. So I used to give the telephone number and my name and say "give me a call next week to see if your visa arrived." Cornwell: Well. Are you saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturdays? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call? Tirado: Only one. Cornwell: Just one. The ... I believe I asked you this, but just to be sure, although the application was typed with 52 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 47. a carbon to make two copies with one typing, did he have to sign both independently? Or did you allow them to use a carbon to sign the paper? Tirado: No, no. It was the original. Cornwell: Two original signatures. All right. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Was anything said that you recall at this time which looking back on it indicated the possibility, even on that date, Oswald had on his mind some intension of killing the President of the United States? Tirado: No, I don't think so. Cornwell: Let me read something to you, and ask you if it at all refreshes your memory or if hour have a memory of a conversation similar to this? I don't believe I read this to you before, when we talked the other day, or did I? Did I rea and excerpt from Daniel Schorr's book to you? Tirado: No, you told me. Cornwell: Okay. I'll read it to you then at this time. It's an excerpt from a book called Clearing the Air, written by Daniel Schorr, published in the United States in 1977. And page 177 reads as follows: "In and interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark, Castro 53 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 48 (meaning Fidel Castro) said that Oswald had come to the Cuban Consulate twice, each time for about fifteen minutes. The first time, I was told, he wanted to work for us. He was asked to explain but he wouldn't, he wouldn't go into details. The second time he said he wanted to free Cuba from American imperialism. Then he said something like 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' Then Oswald said, and this is exactly how is was reported to me, maybe I'll try to do it." Do you recall any conversation like that in either what was said to you by Oswald or that was said by Oswald to Azcue or anyone else that you might have overheard? Tirado: No, I don't remember. Cornwell: Did any part of that conversation occur? Tirado: No, because I don't remember that he says he was to go to work in Cuba because he only that he wanted to go in-transit. That's what I remember. Cornwell: What do you think, well, first let me ask you, do you think that conversation could have occurred and you just forgot it? In other words, is that the kind of conversation which, if it occurred, you would definitely remember it? Tirado: Yes. Because in the fight with Azcue there was shouting and crying and things like that. I could miss something, but not, because even if would say so, I mean, I could have heard, no, I mean 54 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 49 if you kill President you're not going to change the whole system. You see, that's why I give you answer, even Azcue. I mean that's no the, I don't think so, that he had that conversation with anyone. He was arguing. . . Cornwell: Do you remember any part of the conversation indicating that Oswald blaming the United States or President Kennedy for his inability to get to Cuba? Tirado: I don't remember but that could be possible. Cornwell: In other words, if he's frustrated and he comes to the Cuban Consulate, he might feel animosity or anger towards various people. He might be angry at you, or Azcue, or at the Cuban Govern- ment or at the Russian Government or perhaps the United States Government, depending on how the conversation went. What do you recall about that? Who was he angry at when told he couldn't go to Cuba Tirado: He was angry at us. That's why I called Azcue Because he was not a strong man but anyway, I didn't like to fight with him. He was very angry and he was blaming me and Azcue because he thought it was in our hands to give the visa immediately, and he couldn't understand that the visa has to 55 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 50 come from Cuba. Cornwell: You mentioned earlier that you had discussed with Azcue on this, as I understood this, during the third visit with Oswald, the suspicion that you had about the documents. Is that accurate or did I misunderstand? Tirado: No, it was the third time when I told Azcue that there was a man that bother me, that when I told him about. this man, I mean because it was normal, I used to that was my job, to attend people who come in so I didn't have to bother the Consul for every man who came, because there was a lot crazy men from the United States that they wanted to go to Cuba. Cornwell: Okay. So, from what I understand then, when you went in to Azcue to bother him, since you normally didn't do that sort of thing, yo gave him a sort of background resume of your dealings with Oswald. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And was it at that point that you told him of your suspicion about the documents? Tirado: I think so. Cornwell: What was his reaction? Azcue's? Tirado: He was worrying. When he went to my office. 56 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 51 he was very tranquil, hw was very polite, hw was explaining things, very polite. And uh, he was starting to get angry when he saw that he was a stubborn man, that he didn't want to under- stand, and he said uh, I remember now, he said you're not a friend of the Cuban Revolution, be- cause if you are a friend, you have to understand that we have to take care, to be very careful with the people that are going to Cuba, and if you don't understand this, you are not friend of the Cuban Revolution. And he was shouting and, I don't remember how long was this conversation, but uh, they got really angry, both. Leap: May I call you Silvia? Tirado: Yes. Leap: At any time during you conversation with the Consul, did you discuss the possibility that Oswald was a penetration agent? Intelligence agent for a foreign power? Did you discuss that possibility? Tirado: No. I don't think so because we didn't have time. Because this man was in my office and I was in Azcue's office so I couldn't leave him many times alone. Leap: Did you ever have conversations with Ascue out- side of Oswald's presence relative to the issue? 57 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 52 Tirado: Repeat the question please. Lopez: Did you ever have a conversation with Azcue when Oswald was not in the office about the possibility that he was an intelligence agent for some country? Tirado: No, no. I don't think so. We only thought that he was a crazy man, an adventurer, or something like that. Leap: Did it ever enter your mind that that he was a penetration agent? Tirado: Perhaps. Perhaps, because it happened, it happened sometimes that somebody came and say this is a policeman or something like that. Leap: That's all the questions that I have. Tirado: The only thing that I can say, it was that it was strange, traveling with all of his documents just to prove one thing. Lopez: Do you think now, looking back on what happened then, that he may have been an intellegence agent? Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: Did anything else ever come to your attention? That caused that suspicion? Other than just his presentation of the documentation? Anything else ever happen? Tirado: With him? No, no. The only thing that was strange is that if you belong to the Communist Party, 58 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 53 any party. Your French, but French could get Cuban visa but Mexico, for instance, if you're Mexican and you're a member of the party, of the Communist Party, you don't have to go and ask for application visa because the party writes to the Cuban Communist Party, and they arrange everything. That was the strange thing. There's no need. At first, he said that he was a Communist. That was strange. Because it would be really easy for him to get the visa through the Communist Party. Cornwell: At any point in the conversations that you have told us about, did Oswald say anything indicating that he really wanted to stay in Cuba? Tirado: No. He just wanted to go and visit and saw what was the Revolution. Cornwell: Okay. That's sort of what I meant. In other words, he did indicate that he didn't just want to pass through, that he wanted to spend some time there. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What do you recall about that part of the conversations? Tirado: I told him that he get to Cuba, for instance, at two o'clock, and there was a plane going to 59 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 54. Russia at five o'clock, he has to stay in the airport, in the Cuban airport. That he couldn't go out. Cornwell: Why didn't you tell him that? Tirado: Because he was saying that he wanted to go to Cuba to visit and to see what the revolution had made. Cornwell: Did you ever see him again, after the argument with Azcue? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you ever talk to him again? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Not in person nor by telephone. Tirado: No, he never call He could have called when I wasn't there, but I used to get the message, if somebody answer, I used to get a message. Cornwell: Did anyone else overhear any of the conversations you have described? Other than the one time in which Azcue was involved? Tirado: Yes. Could be that people from the Commercial Office, could be Mirabal. Cornwell: Was there anyone else physically persent in the Consulate's office during those conversations as you can recall? 60 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 55. Tirado: I can't remember. The only thing that I remember is that it was only Mirabal. Cornwell: And did Mirabal come out in the reception area during the conversations as you recall? Tirado: No, I think he stay in his office. Cornwell: But he could have overheard it at the time. Tirado: Yes, everybody who was passing through, even in the streets, they were shouting, really? Cornwell: Were the windows up as I guess they might have been at that time of year? Tirado: (Didn't understand) Cornwell: The windows would have been up? The windows to the Consulate Office would have been open? Tirado: What? I.. Cornwell: In other words, you're saying people on the street might have overheard it? Tirado: Yes, yes. If you were here and there was always a police here, they could have heard the shouting, the crying. (Lots of background, unintelligible.) 61 KENNEDY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TAPE 2 Name: Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date: June 5, 1978 Time: Address: Place: Interview: Cornwell: You told us previously when we discussed informally with you that you were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution during the early 1960's-- Tirado: Yes. Cornwell Did you ever overhear any conversation either in the Consulate or among any of the people you may have associated with concerning the possibility of killing the President? Tirado: No, because I think the people I used to know during that time, they think like me, and I think the death of a man doesn't make anything good, I mean, you have to change the structures, I mean, it's just like a building, to? The President is like, I mean, for instance, a roof--not the top, but if you take the top, the building still stands. You have to destroy the whole building, not one man. If you kill the man, you make a hero. So, is no good. Cornwell: What were your own feelings towards President Kennedy? Interviewer Signature Typed Signature Gary Cornwell Date transcribed 6-26-78 By: br Form #4A 62 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 2. Tirado: Well, I like him. I mean, he was very nice, he was very intelligent. And I think of the relations with Mexico, as I remember now, they were very good in the commercial area, the cultural area. He came ot Mexico and he was very acclamation. They loved him. They liked him very much. Cornwell: And, what you're saying is, you're describing what you understood to be the basic reaction of the Mexican people? Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Was that feeling the same even among the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution? Tirado: Uh, translate, please, Ed. I want to be sure of the question. Lopez: Would you repeat the question, please? Cornwell: Was the feeling that you just described as being that of the Mexican people? Lopez: (Translated question.) Tirado: In general. Cornwell: The same with respect to that part of the Mexican people like yourself who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution? Lopez: (Translated.) Tirado: Well, yes, more or less. because I mean, if you're uh, how can I explain this, uh, if you're a President 63 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. of a country that is against uh, against Latin America, undeveloped countries, you don't love them, of course, but you may see that is different, that he has been a good President, that he was, I think he was ingenious with his Alliance for Progress, that he tried to have more friends, not like Dulles who said we don't have friends, we have interests, things like that. Do you know that phrase? Cornwell: One more time. Lopez: (Speaks to Tirado in Spanish.) Dulles. Tirado: He said once the United States has no friends, they have interests. (Speaks in Spanish.) And Kennedy tried to destroy that phrase, saying we want to have friends. And he was changing the politics of Latin America, Kennedy. Cornwell: So, you're saying that because of President Kennedy's policies towards Latin America, that even the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution, they also very much liked President Kennedy? Tirado: I think so. Now, I'm not sure, I mean I-- Cornwell: At least-- Tirado: Yeah, but you make the difference with one President and another. Cornwell: I understood your answer to my question a moment ago but let me ask it one more time, nevertheless. 64 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 4. I asked you if at any time during the early 1960's you had overheard any conversations among among people who were in favor of the Cuban Revolution to the effect that they would consider killing the President, and you answered with a statement on the logic of the situation, that you don't change the system by changing the President. Nevertheless, let me ask you again, more pointedly. Did you, nevertheless, ever overhear any such conversations? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you ever overhear them within the Cuban Consulate or outside it? Tirado: No. Cornwell: I'm sorry, go ahead. Tirado: No, but I'm Mexican ad I was in Mexico and I was working there and you have to see that uh, even though the Cuban people know I was a friend, they would not say things like that in front of me, of course, no? Cornwell: When the news came over the television and in the newspapers that President Kennedy had been killed, and then you heard the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and saw the picture, I guess you immediately reflected back on your contact, correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At that time, did anything come into your mind 65 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. in connection with those contacts that you could have read as foreknowledge, in other words, did it totally surprise you that that was the alleged assassin, or was there anything about your contact with him which him it understandable? Tirado: No. No, even now I don't think that he would have done it. Cornwell: You still don't think that he killed him? Tirado: No, because I think that he was a weak man. I saw that he could get angry, but uh, for me, he was not a man that could kill the President, because even when I saw him on television and he said all the time, "I'm innocent" and if I kill someone very important, I would be proud. I mean, because even if I'm with police I know that I'm going to be killed or die or something like that, I'd say, "Yes, I killed the President" and I don't think so. Cornwell: So based on all of your contacts with him, you do not think that he killed the President? Tirado: I don't think so. Cornwell: Let me ask you just some miscellaneous questions about the nature of your contact with him. Was there ever any conversations or indications about money problems that he had? Was that ever the sub- 66 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 6 ject of a conversation? Tirado: No. The thing that I remember only that he was very in a hurry because his visa was finished and I think he said, he mentioned that he only had three days to stay here in Mexico City. Cornwell: Did he ever indicate that he hoped the Cuban Government would finance his trip? Tirado: I don't think so. Cornwell: Had you ever done that before? Had the Consulate ever done that sort of thing? Tirado: No, no. We used to do that but they were visitors and we had instructions from Cuba, from the Cuban Government. Cornwell: Only visitors from cuba, is that what you mean? Tirado: No, no. For instance, your--the Cuban Revolutionary Anniversary, they invite people, they do have everything paid. Cornwell: In other words, it was persons that had been invited to go to Cuba by the Cuban Government? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: Well, even though, then would not have financed this trip, did he ask for such assistance? Tirado: At the time that I was working there, it never happens. Cornwell: Specifically Oswald. 67 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 7. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did he ask for monetary assistance? Tirado: I don't remember. I don't think so. But I don't remember. Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or did you ever observe anything to indicate that he had traveling companions in Mexico City? Tirado: No, he didn't mention it. Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or do anything that indicated that he knew other people in Mexico City? Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember. Cornwell: To the best of your knowledge he knew no one, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know when he left Mexico City? Tirado: No. Cornwell: By what form of transportation? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did anyone ever call or come by the Consulate of his behalf? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did they ever deliver anything to the Consulate for him? Tirado: No. Cornwell: There have, let me ask you this--Has any allegation ever been brought to your attention that you met 68 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 8. with Oswald outside of the Consulate? Tirado: No. Cornwell: On--let me show you two books, one of which is labeled photo ident book and has roughly three inch by five inch pictures in it and the other one which is labeled JFK Document 7549 and has smaller pictures in it, and I'll turn the recorder off for a second and give you a few minutes to look through them and ask us, and I will ask you if you recognize any of the people in these photos. Recorder turned off. Cornwell: Okay. We've turned the tape recorder back on and you've had five minutes, maybe ten, I don't know, to look through the two books. In the first book, you only picked out photograph-- Tirado: This looks like Fidel. But no exactly. cornwell: Which one: Number 12? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Who does that look like? Tirado: Fidel but not exactly. Cornwell: All right. Just a little. Tirado: Yeah. 69 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 9 Cornwell: Okay. And you also I believe pointed to number 57 when you went through the book. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And who do you think that is? Tirado: Oswald. cornwell: Lee Harvey Oswald. Now, many of the pictures in the book are not that clear, of course. When you saw him the first time in the book, you indicated that that looked like him except that as you recalled him, he had either blue or green eyes and blond hair. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: When you say blond hair, what color is that? Is it very light? Tirado: Light. Cornwell: Let's see if we can find an example. Looking in the second book--that's all you found in the first book, correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All right. Looking in the second book, uh, take as an example, Number 266 04 268, would that be basically what you recall to be the color of his hair, blond? Tirado: Yes. Here it looks very, very light, not that light. Cornwell: Okay. That would be what you describe as blond but your memory is that it was close but not quite as 70 light as that? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay, but the tape recorder was back away from us so just to make sure we got that answer, you picked out in the first book photograph #57. You stated that it looked like the way you recalled the man who came ot the Consulate except that he had blue or green eyes and blond hair. And then we were trying to determine what shade you recall the blond hair being, and I asked you--all these are black and white--if it would be similar to photos #266 and #268 in the book 7549? And you said in those pictures that it looks very light and that it would not have been that light, quite that light to your memory. Is that right? Tirado: Yes. (Long break.) Cornwell: I don't know how, working with black and white photos, we can do much better than that? But-- Tirado: A little lighter than my eyebrows? There's another photo...In the second book, number 26 or 27. You also pointed to those photos when you went through the book. Would the color of that hair approximate the way you remember it? 71 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 11. Tirado: No, because he had very light, almost white... Cornwell: Okay, again, it would be not as light as that? Tirado: No. Cornwell: All right. Then going to the second book, you pointed to photograph #4, when you looked at the book the first time. What is your memory about that? Tirado: He reminds me of Mirabal, he reminds me but not exactly. Cornwell: All right. He looks a little like Mirabal? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: If I skip a photograph you remember looking at, let me know, but I jotted down some notes as you came to 'em when you looked at the book. You next pointed to number 26 and 27. Does that appear to you to be the same man? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And who was that? Tirado: Ernesto Lefel. He used to work with my husband. Cornwell: Ernesto Lefel. And what's the nature of the association between he and your husband? Tirado: He was working with him. Cornwell: In the architectural business? Tirado: Yes, yes. He's a designer. Cornwell: He's a designer? 72 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 12. Tirado: He started working with us. He learned some-- Cornwell: Is he a social acquaintance of yours in addition? Tirado: Is what? Cornwell: Do you know him on a social basis in addition to his being a business associate your husband? Tirado: No business associate. He was working for him, for Horacio. Cornwell: Okay. That's what I meant. He was an assistant. Tirado: Assistant. Cornwell: All right. Tirado: No social. Sometimes he came to our house to dinner, or something like that. Cornwell: Next, you I believe pointed to Number 57. Is that correct? Fifty-seven? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Who does that look like? Tirado: He looks like Gavino Fernandez. Cornwell: What's the first name? Tirado: Gavino. Cornwell: Gavino? And who is he? Tirado: Well, he's uh, dignitary, and he used to go to the Cuban Institute. Cornwell: He was a dignitary of what? Tirado: He was working for the Social Security and he was working, not in this government period, in the last 73 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 13. one, and he was working even with the President. Cornwell: I see, so he was a dignitary of the Mexican Government. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay. Tirado: But when he was going to the Cuban Institute, no, he didn't? Cornwell: You also knew him from the Cuban Institute? Tirado: He's an economist. Cornwell: He's a what? Tirado: Economist. Cornwell: Economist. You then pointed to number 65. Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: And that's a face that you're not sure you recognize? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: but looks a little bit like who? Tirado: Solchi Vargas. Cornwell: But looks a little but like who? Tirado: Solchi Vargas. Cornwell: Solchi Vargas? ]Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay. And who was she? Tirado: She's Mexican lady who was married with a journalist, he used to work for the Cuban press, and she used to live in Cuba. And now she's at the Cuban Institute. Cornwell: I believe you next pointed to Number 111--- 74 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 14. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And that's a, sort of a three-quarter shot from behind. tirado: yes. Cornwell: Of a man you think you might recognize, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. cornwell: I'm sort of trying to recall the way you stated it when you first looked at the photographs, so if I misstated it, just correct me. Who do you think that man may be? Tirado: The attache, the Cuban Cultural Attache at that time, Luis Alberu. Cornwell: Alberu? Tirado: Alberu. Cornwell: And then I believe you next indicated that you may recognize Photograph 115? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And who is that? Tirado: Luis Alberu. Cornwell: That of course is a front and you can clearly recognize him from that photograph, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Then, you next pointed to Photograph 133. Do you recognize that man? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Who is he? 75 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 15. Tirado: The doorman. Now I don't remember the name. Cornwell: But he's the doorman who left Lee Harvey Oswald into the Consulate on his third visit? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: That's accurat? Tirado: Uh?...I said yes. Cornwell: Okay. And then I believe you pointed to photograph 158? Tirado: Numbers 157 and 158. Cornwell: 157 and 158. Who was that? Tirado: I think that he was working at the Consulate in Vera Cruz? Cornwell: And do you know what his position was at the Consulate? Tirado: I think he was vice Consul but I'm not really sure. Cornwell: And which Consulate is that? Tirado: In Vera Cruz, Cuban, the Cuban Consulate. Cornwell: The Cuban Consulate in vera Cruz. And I believe finally you recognized possibly the center man in the group photograph labeled 275. Tirado. Yes. Cornwell: And who do you think he is? Tirado: An American. cornwell: Do you remember anything more about him? 76 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 16. Tirado: No. cornwell: Do you remember where you saw him? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you think you recognized the photo from a personal contact or from a picture? Tirado: From a picture I think. I think he was an American Ambassador. Cornwell: American Ambassador? Tirado: Or something like that. Cornwell: All right. And you don't have any memory what his name might be? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Okay. Uh... Tirado: But tell me, who is it? (Laughter.) For a change. Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in photo 266? Yes, that's the one I want. 266? Tirado: No. He looks like Russian. Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 265? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 213? Tirado: No. You're not going to tell me who's that man? Cornwell: Not right now. (Laughter.) But maybe later. When the assassination occurred, do you remember where you were, when you first heard the news reports? 77 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 17. Tirado: At the consulate. Cornwell: And do you know what you did at that time? Tirado: No, it was almost noon, I mean the lunch hour, about two o'clock, or near two o'clock, and somebody came and said Kennedy was killed, and all was confusion and, uh, well, we were really sorry. Everybody came in and went out and there was confusion. All over. And then I went home to have lunch. Cornwell: Did you speak to Horatio or anyone else prior to going home? Tirado: I don't remember, really. Cornwell: When you went home was he at home? Tirado: We used to have lunch. Cornwell: And? As you recall he was there on that day? Tirado: It was my birthday so he has to be there. (Laughter.) Cornwell: What if any conversation do you recall having with him at that time about the assassination? Tirado: No, I don't remember. I only remember at night. Cornwell: All right. You had a birthday party planned that night. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: During the day, prior to the birthday party, had you received or heard as part of the news broadcast the name Lee Harvey Oswald? Tirado: No, only in the afternoon. 78 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 18. Cornwell: In the afternoon, after lunch? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: After you returned to the consulate, is that correct? Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: And at that time, did you think you remembered the name? Tirado: It was, I think, at night, because, it was in the afternoon, perhaps when they start saying about Oswald. Right? and, it was at night and uh, I don't know if I call my husband or we were un the kitchen mixing some drinks or food, I don't know, but we were in the Kitchen and I told him, I think this man went to the Embassy to ask for a visa. Cornwell: And at that time, had you heard his name? Tirado: His name? Cornwell: His name, seen his picture, or both? Tirado: No, no. The picture was in the newspapers the next day. cornwell: Okay. So you only thought that you might have recalled the name. Is that correct? Tirado: No, not the name, but when they say Lee Harvey Oswald, married to the Russian woman and he live in Russia, and things like that. Cornwell: Okay. Did you have any other discussion that you can recall with him about it? based on that news 79 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 19. report? About your contact? Tirado: With my husband? Cornwell: Yes. Tirado: I only told him, I think this man came to the Embassy. Cornwell: then, the next morning you saw a newspaper. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Were you sure at that time that that was the man? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember who was at the birthday party that night? Do you remember whether or not you discussed these events with any one else at the party? Tirado: Yes, we were talking about it. Cornwell: Whoever was at the party. Tirado: The whole night, yes. Cornwell: What was the time of the party? Tirado: Sorrow. And speculation, what's going on? Because with Kennedy we knew that was going on, but now, what will happen? Cornwell: The next morning what did you do? Tirado: I show the paper to Horatio and told him this is the man that went to the Embassy and I went to the Consulate and I look in the Archivos and I sqaw the application, I saw that it was the man and I went to the Embassy and I talked to the Ambassador and I told him that this... 80 Solvia Tirado Interview Page 20 Cornwell: What was the nature of your conversation with the Ambassador? Just to tell him that that was the man? Tirado: Yes. I think so. Cornwell: What was his name? Tirado: Fernandez Armes (or Hernandez). Cernwell: And, did you do anything else? Did you pull the file on him or make any other attempts to put the facts together? Tirado: I think I leave the file with him. Cornwell: Pulled the file and left it with the Ambassador? Tirado: Yeah, the whole bunch. Cornwell: What would have been in the file besides the application, if anything? Tirado: Another applications. Cornwell: I see, you pulled the whole file which included his application? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did anything else happen that morning at work? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Then, did you go home for lunch again? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And what occurred at that time? Tirado: Uh, my brothers-in-law, servant, maid came and when she saw me, she cried, she started crying, and she said "You're alive?" And I say "why?", because some man 81 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 21. came to the house and says that uh, you had an accident and you were dead and they take away Senor Ruben to identify you." Then we went to Ruben's house and it was full of men and they catch me. Cornwell: They caught you. Okay. And the men were representatives of the Mexican police, is that corect? Tirado: Yeah, but they never told me. Cornwell: What happened when you walked into the house, to Ruben's house? Tirado: I saw my brothers-in-law, wife, and the same thing. She cries, and says "Silvia, you're okay?" "Yes, I'm okay." She was between two men and she couldn't get near to me, but I was walking and I saw in the bedroom, it was Ruben, and full of photographs on the bed and he said the same thing--"Silvia, you're okay, you're all right?" and I say "Yes" and "What happened?" Then I saw the telephone and I try to get the telephone and a man hold my hand and he says you can't call because you are under arrest, and they say, I don't remember, but they say, ah, this is the accomplice of Kennedy. I thought that's what they told but I say I don't remember. They told me, "You're under arrest." I sat down on the bed and I said "You have to show me an order signed by a judge that I am under arrest." Then they hold 82 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 22. me, my hands, and I try to defend myself, and they kicked somebody and they took me-- Cornwell: You were trying to kick them and keep them from taking you with them, right? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: Who were you going to call on the telephone? Tirado: The police. (Laughter.) Tirado: The police, the lawyer, I don't know. And when they took me out of the house and I was crying, "Call the police, call the police!" and they, he covered my mouth, and they took me to stationwagon that was parked at the corner. There was a man there but I didn't know him and I was quiet, and they say, "Don't cry. Scandalous woman." "Scandalous old woman, shut up. Because where we are going we will see what's going to happen to you." So, in that moment, I said quit. Cornwell: So you were taken to the police station. Tirado: No. It's not the police station. The office where the security, that was where the intelligence agencies were in. But I didn't know that because that building belongs to the State Social Security. Not the one I work for. Cornwell: Then? Tirado: For government employees. 83 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Cornwell: And who else was taken down there besides you? Tirado: The whole--my brother-in-law, his wife, my sister-in-law, a friend of hers, another woman that was there, and me, but they were taken in another car. Cornwell: And, at the police station what inquiries were made of you? What did they ask? Tirado: Everything. Everything. They asked me my name, where was I born, my jobs, when I married, my status, everything. They have my finger-prints, photographs of myself, everything. And uh, well, they ask me where I was working, if I had been in Cuba, some people that I saw in Cuba, and what I was doing at the Consulate, that there was a tunnel, that makes me laugh, it was a tunnel from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy, and uh, well, a lot of foolish questions. Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege that you had done? Tirado: What? Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege you had done? What did they accuse you of doing? Tirado: Nothing. They never said-- Cornwell: During the questioning on all the subject matters that you had mentioned, did they make a verbatim transcript? Tirado: They used a little machine. They say it is a stenograph or something like that. Cornwell: They made a stenograph record. Tirado: Yeah, and a man was writing. 84 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 24. Cornwell: All the questions and all the answers? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did any of the procedures that we have asked you about cousel you to say anything to the police that was not the truth? Tirado: No, I don't think so. I don't have nothing to hide. So... Cornwell: Everything that you told them was the truth? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At any time during the questioning did they ever allege that you had met with Oswald outside the consulate? Tirado: Yes. A lot of times. Cornwell: Did they ever ask you any questions about a Negro? Tirado: I don't remember. Cornwell: You don't remember anything about that? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you ever know, during this same period of time, any Negroes? Tirado: Yes. At the Commercial Attache was a Negro. Cornwell: Anyone else? Tirado: The doorman. Cornwell: Anyone else? Tirado: The wife of the Commercial Attache. And the children. Cornwell: Is that all? Did they ask any specific questions about them? 85 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 25. Tirado: No. Cornwell: What was his name? Tirado: I don't remember. I even don't remember if he was there when Kennedy was shot. Cornwell: Were they from Cuba? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you know any other Negroes from Cuba outside the Consulate? Tirado: I don't think so. Well, this man, the boy at Consulado at Vera Cruz. He was a Negro, not completely, but-- Cornwell: The one you showed us in the photograph? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you know any Negroes who had red hair? None of the ones you described did? Tirado: No, we used to call "Red to a boy who was working there but he was like Spanish; I mean he was white and-- Cornwell: Not even very dark skinned? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Remember his name? Tirado: Rogelio, Rogelio Rodriguez, I think, something like that. Cornwell: After the questioning, first, how did that terminate? When did they finally release you? Tirado: About One o'clock. Cornwell: Did you meet again with your family, your husband? 86 Silvia Tirado Page 26. Tirado: Yes. Well, they were waiting for me and... we went to have lunch, something to eat because we haven't had. And well, we talk about it. Cornwell: Remember where you went? Tirado: No. Horacio told me we went to Sanborn's. I don't remember. I even don't remember when I got home and what happened. Next day everyone know. Cornwell: Did the officers from the Securidad Department ever suggest to you during the questioning that they had information that you and Oswald had been lovers? Tirado: Yes, and also that we were communists and that we were planning the Revolution and uh, a lot of false things. Cornwell: What happened the next day? Tirado: Well, we stayed home and at night a friend of ours came and we didn't say anything. Cornwell: Why was that? Tirado: Why? Cornwell: Why did you not say anything? Tirado: Because these people told me to keep quiet. Cornwell: The police? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Or the officers? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you then go back over to the Consulate either Sunday or Monday? 87 Silvia Tirado Page 27. Tirado: On Monday. Cornwell: Okay. What happened then? Tirado: When I got there everybody ask me what happened? And I say "Why?" And in the newspaper was the this part of the question that I told you about, Azcue telling Oswald to go away. Cornwell: It was in the newspapers? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: How did the newspapers get that story? Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: You never had any idea? Tirado: Well, of course. The police gave it to Excelsior. It was the first government newspaper. Cornwell: So you just always thought they got it from the police? Cornwell: But the people at the Consulate said they had read the newspaper and asked you what had happened, right? Tirado: Yes. cornwell: Did you discuss that with anybody that you can remember specifically? Tirado: With the Ambassador. Cornwell: And what was the nature of that conversation? Tirado: I tried to repeat all the questions. Cornwell: Okay. Uh..would that have been a violation of what the police asked you to do? To talk to the 88 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Ambassador about that? Tirado: Huh? Cornwell: Was that a violation of what the police asked you to do? Was that... Tirado: Well, of course, They told me to keep quiet. I never says anything about what happened on Saturday. Never. but when I saw in the papers I couldn't say "Well, nothing happened." It was all in the paper and it was exactly what I said to the police. Cornwell: What did the Ambassador say to you? Tirado: That he was going to write a report and he sent it in the plane. Cornwell: What if anything did you consider doing at the time? Tirado: What? Cornwell: Did you consider taking any course of action at the time? Tirado: Oh. I was going to make a protest to the Mexican Government. We went to, a friend of mine was a daughter of the Chief of Tinetraph and we could reach the President and we were going to ask to explain what happened and you know, there was an illegal (tape stops)... Cornwell: Did in additional to your considering filing formal protest with the Mexican government, did you also consider taking a trip out of the country? Tirado: No. 89 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 29. Cornwell: Did you consider going to Cuba? Tirado: No. Cornwell: What happened after that? Tirado: Well, I told to the Ambassador all that happened during the questioning and I told him also about the protest that we wanted to make and I asked him, "Don't do anything because we are trying to do something here, against these police." And after that, uh, Tuesday, I went to work and Wednesday morning when I was going to have breakfast the police came again, two agents, and they asked me, very polite, if I want to go with them, just to answer some questions. They wanted to know something. And, uh, it was unnecessary to take my car because they were going to take me and bring me back. So I called uh, the Consulate. That's why I remember I already had the telephone and I said I'm coming in late because I'm going to the police station. okay don't worry, we wait for you. And they keep me two days and a half. Cornwell: And why did they tell you that they kept you this time? Tirado: Oh, to protect me. Cornwell: Did they tell you anything in any more detail? Was there a specific threat? 90 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 30. Tirado: No. They were very rough this time. They were very angry with me, the man that I told you, that I kicked him in his balls. He was very angry, and they repeat the same questions but they were more, how you say, how do you say anticipito? Lopez: They anticipated her. Tirado: And they were, wanted to know exactly what I have done in Cuba, the people that I met there, everything. They were asking me questions about all the people that were working in the Embassy and uh, this time I wanted to go to the bathroom and they wouldn't take me and it was longer, because it was about 10:00 from 10:00, I think almost 6:00, they questioned me. Cornwell: Were you afraid during the two periods they held you? Tirado: Yes. I don't know exactly what happened but I was uh, I was innocent. So I said, what am I doing here, no? And uh, the only thing that I have, I had the feeling that I was going to die and I said okay, if I'm going to die, I'm going to die, how you say it, with pride, my child will not be shamed. I remember I do anything that--I was very dramatic in those moments. So, sometimes I lost my temper. I never say no bad words or nothing. I cry sometimes, I shout and things like that but then I sat down again. Cornwell: As I understand it, they tried to scare you, is that correct? 91 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 31. Tirado: Yes. The first time. Cornwell: The first time. Because of that was there anything that you knew that you simply refused to tell them? Tirado: That's what they thought. Because all the time they tell me that I was a Communist and I said I'm not a Communist, but do you believe in Socialism? Yes, I believe in Socialism but I'm not a Communist; and they insisted that I was a very important people for the government, the Cuban Government, and that I was the link for the International Communists--the Cuban Communists, the Mexican Communists and the American Communists, and that we were going to kill Kennedy, and I was the link. For them I was very important. Of course, it was not true. Cornwell: Okay. Even though you were innocent of those charges, you had not conspired to kill the President and were not in the Communist Party. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Because that was what they were interested in, because that was the nature of the allegation, did you withhold any part of your story? Were you afraid that something you had done, although innocent, they might have misconstrued, misunderstood, so did you withhold any information from them because of the very severe accusations they were making? Tirado: No. I tried to answer it, what they asked me I tried to answer. All the time. 92 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 32. Cornwell: You understand though, the kind of question I'm asking you? (Tirado spoke to Lopez in Spanish, who asked Cornwell to repeat the question.) Cornwell: Okay, let me just ask you a hypothetical. Sometimes, a person has done something completely innocent but then they are confronted with avery severe accusation. They may think that their innocent act will be misunderstood by their accusers so they might withhold the innocent act simply to be sure that they don't get into more trouble-- Tirado: No. Cornwell: Simply to be sure they don't get into more trouble than they apparently are already in. Tirado: No. cornwell: There was no thing that you had done or seen or knew about that you withheld because of that? Tirado: No. No, I explain everything that they wanted to know and uh, I think sometimes they were fools. Cornwell: They were what? Lopez: Fools. Cornwell: Fools. Tirado: Tonto. Fools. Cornwell: After they finally released you, they held you for another two, two and a half days. Did you make any 93 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 33. trips out of the country then? Tirado: No. Cornwell: How long did you continue to be married to Horatio after that? Tirado: Five years. Cornwell: Why were you finally divorced? Tirado: We separate and we divorce eprhaps four years after. Cornwell: Why was that? Tirado: Why? Why we divorce four years after? Because we don't like. Cornwell: Go ahead. Tirado: Because he did not want to get legal problems and he said that it was a lot of problems to get divorced. He was married once so he said that it was nonsense. Cornwell: Why were you separated? Tirado: Because I used to believe in the romantic love, and even we have a very, how you say that, uh, we loved each other very much but it was not the passionate love that I used to believe in, so I thought it better to divorce, get divorced. It is very difficult to explain. (Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.) Lopez: They were incompatible, had incompatible characters. Cornwell: You have not spoken to anybody in the news media or any official investigating body since 1963 about these events, is that correct, except for the 94 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 34. Washington Post and that was approximately a year or so ago, a year and a half ago? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: You indicate that you read some part of the Warren Commission Report recently. Do you recall anything about that that was inaccurate other than what you have already related? The part that you read. Tirado: What? Cornwell: Was there any part of that which was inaccurate that you can recall? Tirado; What I said. That I was exceeding my duties. Cornwell. Had you either done anything or offered to do anything for Oswald other than what you have already described to us? Tirado: No. Cornwell: And was that all within the scope of your responsibility? Tirado: It was...? Cornwell: Was it all within the scope of your authority? Tirado: Scope? (Lopez translates.) Tirado: Yes. (Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.) Cornwell: Did you ever have any of the people at the Cuban Consulate attend parties in your home? Was there 95 Silvia Tirado interview Page 35. a social relationship with any of them? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Which ones? Tirado: Azcue, Maria Carmen, I think Luisa, she went once. Cornwell: Who is that? Luisa? Tirado: Luisa Caldaron, the one you ask me. Cornwell: Okay. Azcue, Luisa, and the secretary who was killed, is that correct? Tirado: Before, before this, before I used to work at the Embassy, uh, and before we move to Constitutyentes we make some parties, for instance, when Armando Hart (Ph.) was here, he was the Minister of Education, and with the Ambassador he was in that time and Organa, who was Director of the Movies Institute. Some people who came from Cuba. We used to invite. Cornwell: Okay. How about Theresa Proenza? Tirado: Perhaps she came. Cornwell: Did you ever receive any indication from them that any of them had ever had a contact with Oswald? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did Elena or Elinita Garro do Paz ever come to those parties? In your home? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Or in the home of Ruben? 96 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 36. Tirado: Once, but it was, I think it was before that I was in the Cuban Embassy. Cornwell: Would it have been aproximately around '63? Tirado: I don't know because when they came from France... Cornwell: Approximately 1963? Tirado: I only, perhaps, I don't know. Hardy: Did you say that it was when they came from France? Tirado: Yes. Hardway: It was after they returned from France that they came to one of the parties? Tirado: Yeah, to Ruben's house. Hardway: At Ruben's house. Tirado: Yeah. That was the whole family there. I only saw Elensa a few times. One was the day that I got married and another time was somewhere else, I think three times I only saw her. Cornwell: Did you know General Clark Flores? Tirado: Yeah, but not very well. Cornwell: Was he ever at those parties? Tirado: I don't remember. Perhaps once, at Ruben's house but not at my house. Cornwell: Did you know Emilio Carbillido? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did he ever attend those parties? Tirado: I don't remember. 97 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 37. Cornwell: Did Devaci? Tirado: Devaci. Elena's sister. Cornwell: Did she attend those parties? Tirado: No, she went, I think I saw her sometimes at the Embassy. Cornwell: How about Eunice Odio? Tirado: No. I know her, I mean I met her sometime. But, no. She was not a close friend. Cornwell: Over the years, have any of those people ever indicated to you that they had any knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico city? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Have they ever professed to have either seen him or heard any stories about any one who did see or meet with him? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Has anyone else ever come to you since 1963 and professed to have knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico City? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Would you have any reason to believe that if we spoke to any of those people they could have information of help to us? Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: Have you ever had any association with any intelligence agency of any country, including our own? 98 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 38. Tirado: Once I met a Russian when I was working at the Press Agency but he was from the Russian Press, and they say that he was from the police, the Russian Police but I don't know. Cornwell: But you just met him one time? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: I don't have any additional questions. Lopez: I have a few questions of Ms. Duran. As normal procedure, when a person came to the Cuhban Consulate, do you explain to them that there are different types of visas? Tirado: No. Lopez: So they would normally come to you and ask you for a special type of visa, and then you would get that kind of application? Tirado: Uh, huh. Lopez: Okay. Tirado: the application was the same. Lopez: Same application. But they were different visas. Tirado: There were only two visas. Transit visa and normal visa. Lopez: You didn't normally explain to people whether there were two different types of visas when they came to you until after-- Tirado: Perhaps. 99 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 39. Lopez: Okay. I just wanted to read to you a couple of sections of what was recorded in the Warren Commission Report. What happened was, there was a report given by the mexican authorities to the Warren Commission and it was published in the report given by the Mexican authorities to the Warren Commission and it was published in the report and let me read you one sentence, okay? The declarant complied with her duties, took down all the information and completed the appropriate application form, and the declarant admittedly, exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate with the intention of doing what she could to faciliate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. Is that statement accurate? Tirado: It's that one and I don't like it. The otherone? Lopez: That part about admittedly exceeding her responsibilities? Tirado: Uh, huh. Cornwell: That's the part you had reference to earlier when you told us that you had read something-- Tirado: Yes. Lopez: It says here that you telephoned the Russian Consulate. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Did he ever telephone you back? Tirado: No. Lopez: Okay. And it says here with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa. Did you ever do anything else to facilitate the issuance of the visa? 100 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 40. Tirado: No, nothing. I couldn't do anything. Lopez: Did you ever explain to him that in order to get a visa he could have a recommendation letter from a fellow Communist or a fellow Cuban citizen, and then if he had that letter, he could get a visa? Tirado: Yeah, that was one of the requirements. Lopez: And then, did you ever send him to anyone, give him the name of anybody? Tirado: No, never. I mean I never did that. Lopez: I see. Okay. Then there's another section here that says: However, they told her (this is the Russian Consulate) that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case. Was that the first time that you explained to Lee Harvey Oswald that it would take him about four months to get a visa? Tirado: Yes, I didn't know it. Lopez: Was that when he became angry? Tirado: More or less. Lopez: More or less. And that would have been on his third visit? tirado: Yes. Lopez: Okay. Then there's one other section here. It says: The Consulate who came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Azcue telling him that if it were up to him he would not give him the visa and a person of this type was harming 101 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 41. the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it. It being understood that in the conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Is that correct? Tirado: No. Lopez: What is your understanding of that? Tirado: The conversation that he had with Azcue, was exclusively with the Cuban Revolution. Lopez: Exclusively with the Cuban Revolution. I wanted to ask you, in this report here, they don't say how many times Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. Did you ever tell the Mexican officials how many times he had visited? Tirado: I think so. Lopez: And it was probably taken down by a stenographer. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Do you consider this report which is about a page long to be completely fair and accurate and complete? Tirado: No, because about exceeding my duties and about Azcue speaking about the Russian Revolution, that's not true. Lopez: But, my question is, they interrogated you from about four in the afternoon until about twelve at night, and in that process you spoke to them for eight whole hours and yet the whole conversation, interrogation, has been reduced to one page. Do you consi- 102 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 42. der this accurate? Is it complete? Tirado: No, of course not. Because they ask me a lot of questions that has not been in the Warren--about my trip to Cuba, about my job atthe Institute, the Cuban Institute, about why I have been Communist, as they say, and i say I'm not a Communist, and it takes hours to explain them. And as you explain you are not a Communist, if you are a member of the Communist Party, things like that, and where did you take your beliefs, no? I say at the University, oh, at the University, and then there's a discussion and uh, the classes I take at the University, and things like that. Lopez: Okay. You do remember telling the Mexican officials when they questioned you how many times Oswald visited the Consulate? Tirado: I think so. And I, they asked me I don't know how many times, the way that I used to give my name and telephone number and they made me write and they take the paper out and then again, they ask me, how do you do this, and I write it down, and I give the paper. I think I did it five or six times. Lopez: And did they ever ask you to describe Oswald? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Would you do me a favor and describe him for me now? 103 Solvia Tirado Interview Page 43. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: For example, let's start at the beginning. Was he tall, short? Tirado: Short. Lopez: Short. Could you stand up for a minute, Gary? (Laughter.) Would you say he was as tall as Gary? Tirado: Yeah, more or less. Lopez: Would you say he was taller than Gary? Tirado: No, I think just the same. He was about my size. Lopez: About your height? Tirado: Yeah. Lopez: Okay. And what's your height? Tirado: 160. I think 160 or 162. Lopez: Was he skinny? Tirado: Yes. Skinny. Lopez: Could you estimate how much he weighed? Tirado: About your weight, more or less. Lopez: About my weight. We already went over... Tirado: He has stronger shoulders, perhaps, than yours. Lopez: Just for the record, my weight is 199 pounds. You told us before he had a suit on. Tirado: That I don't remember very well. I think he was wearing a jacket but what I can remember is that he was not wearing nice clothers, expensive clothing. 104 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 44. He was cheap, perhaps. Lopez: Do you remember what his nose looked like? Was it skinny? Fat? Tirado: No. He was normal. There was nothing that you may remember. The eyes were small. Lopez: Small eyes. Tirado: Smaller than yours. Lopez: Smaller than mine, for the record. I can't do that. Tirado: If you describe, you say small eyes. Cornwell: Okay. In sum, you identified a picture in the book as being as best as you can remember his face and hair. Was there anything about that which in your memory was different from the picture other than the fact that you do remember his eyes being blue or green and his hair being very light colored or blond but not as light as some of the other pictures look. Tirado: And he has not very much. He was, has few, poco pelo. Lopez: He didn't have very much hair. Cornwell: Is there anything else about that picture in the book which does not look like your memory of him? Tirado: No, but because even when I saw the television when he was shot, I used to remember him. I mean it was the same that I remember.. Lopez: I understand. If you bear with me just a few more minutes--his hair line, was it receding? 105 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 45. Tirado: Yeah, yeah. Quite a bit. Lopez: Okay. And his cheeks, were they high cheek bones or low cheek bones? Do you remember that? Tirado: Well, I remember that he was a little, I don't know what you call it (spoke with Lopez in Spanish.) Lopez An elongated face. Tirado: Uh huh. Lopez: Did he have a long chin? Tirado: No. Lopez: (To Cornwell) : Do you have any more questions about his description? Lopez: (To Duran): Just wanted to ask you a few other questions. Did Luis Aparicio ever attend any of those twist parties that you had, or that Ruben had? Tirado: No, Ruben never, Ruben never have parties for the people at the Embassy. Lopez: Did he ever attend? Tirado: Aparico, he was, I don't remember, where he was, I think he works in the Commercial Office. I don't remember. Lopez: You don't remember if he went to any parties? tirado: No. But he was at the Cuban Embassy. Lopez; Okay. Do you know a person named Eunice Odio? Tirado: Yes. 106 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 46. Lopez: What was your relationship to Eunice Odio? Tirado: It was not close. I know her because she's a poetess and uh, well, I know a lot of painters, things like that, but just hello and..perhaps if I meet her now I don't know if I could recognize or even she recognize me. Lopez: I see. And did she ever attend any of those parties? Tirado: No. Lopez: Do you know a person named Ricardo Guerra? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: And what was your relationship to him? Tirado: Very close. Lopez: Very close. Could you elaborate? Tirado: Well, when I was unmarried I had a lot of friends and his sisters were friends of mine, that's when I met him, before I got married. And when I married, we continued our friendship and uh, he got married with a writer, but I admire her very much, and he was a very close friend of mine, and we continue the relation all the time that we were married. Both. And uh, how was professor atthe philosophy faculty, he was my teacher also. I mean he was a close friend. Lopez: I see. He was a professor, you said. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Did you ever attend any seminars at the University of Mexico where he was lecturing? 107 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 47. Tirado: No, we used to have in our house. Lopez: What were those seminars about? Tirado: Marxism seminar. Lopez: You never, though, attended any seminars at the University of Mexico? Tirado: No, he was a teacher and I used to take lessons with him. Existentialism, you know? (Spoke in Spanish.) Only two courses. Lopez: Do you know if he ever held seminars at the University of Mexico? Tirado: He had to. Lopez: By any chance do you remember if he would ever hold seminars on Saturdays? Tirado: No. Lopez: No, he did not or no, you do not remember? Tirado: I don't know, I don't know. Hardway: I've just got a few questions that if you'll bear with me... During the three times that you met Oswald, did you ever hear him speak any language other than English? Tirado: No. Hardway: In general, in the Consulate's Office, was it common for any other language other than Spanish to be spoken? 108 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 48. Tirado: No. Hardway: Was Russian ever commonly spoken at the Consulate's Office? Tirado: No. Hardway: Do you remember anyone having spoken Russian in that office? Tirado: No. Hardway: At any time? Tirado: No, I don't think. The only language they speak, it was English and not everybody, just a few of them. Hardway: When Oswald came back the third time, did he tell you that he had a Russian visa or that the Russians had told him that there wouldn't be any problem? Tirado: That he was going to get the Russian visa, that there was no problem. Hardway: Did he tell you that he was going to get it, or that he already had it? Tirado: He said I already got it. hardway: And he told you that he already had it as oposed to telling that they had assured him that there was no problem? Tirado: Yes. Hardway: Could you tell me what Eusebio Azcue thought about John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President Kennedy? Tirado: What he thought? About the assassination? 109 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 49. Hardway: No, about President Kennedy. Tirado: I don't know, I don't remember. Hardway: Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with consul Azcue? Tirado: No, he was not about the assassination but about Kennedy and his policies and things like that. Tirado: No. Hardway. Did you ever hear Azcue discuss it with anyone else? Tirado: No. Hardway: Did-- Lopez: I don't remember if he came. His son came, and I don't remember if he came once to Mexico and he told me about the conversation that he had with Fidel Castro but I told you the other day what Fidel Castro but I told you the other day what Fidel says and all of that and t he way they write a protest to Mexico, to the Mexican Government, but I'm not really sure if he was his son, or if he was Azcue. Lopez: Would you have seen Azcue at any time during the last two years? Tirado: So, I think that I never saw him again. His son, he came, I saw him, but, Azcue, I don't remember. Lopez: Do you know if Eusebio Azcue is still in Cuba? 110 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 50. Tirado: I think so. I don't know. Hardway: Did you ever discuss with Consul Azcue the policies of United States towards Cuba? Or other Latin American countries? Tirado: Perhaps we did, but I don't remember. Hardway: Do you remember by chance what Azcue's views would have been on that? Did you ever discuss Azcue's views on changing that policy? Tirado: What I remember is that during the Blockade (spoke to Lopez in Spanish.) Lopez: The Student Economic Bloc of 1968. The strike, I'm sorry. The economic blockade. Tirado: What I remember but I don't remember exactly if it was Azcue, the Commercial Attache, the Ambassador, but what I remember, it was all the people, they have expectations and they were how you say, trusting, that with Kennedy, the policy of the American Government was changing. They were hoping... Hardway: Did you or anyone else at the Consulate ever offer Lee Harvey Oswald any aid of any kind? Tirado: No. Harday: Did you ever know a person by the name of Guillermo Ruiz? Tirado: No. Hardway: Just for the record, when you were arrested on that Saturday afternoon, what time that arrest was, approximately? 111 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 51 Tirado: About three o'clock. Hardway: Was the interrogation that was conducted at that time transcribed or taped? tirado: It was written and when I sign I read it. Hardway: Was it written out in a summary form or was it written out as you said it? Tirado: They change, because once it was a man with a little machine, and another moment it was a man writing, typing. Hardway: But most of it was taken down literally, as you said it? Or did you sign a summary of that? (Lopez translated.) Tirado: No, no, no. They were typing, all the time. They were typing all the time, even once, I don't know how many times, they told me, slow, because he was writing. But they didn't write exactly what I said sometimes because when I read all of that bunch of papers they say, come on, it's one o'clock, here, sign this. I said, no, I'm not going to sign this if I not read it. And sometimes I said this, I didn't say that. For instance, no? For instance, I'd remember, they say she was very, very glad when Kennedy came. And I say no. I said I like it but I didn't say that I was 112 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 52. very, very glad. Things like that, no? But almost, it was what I said. But they didn't want to change anything. Hardway: Okay. Did you ever discuss the allegation that they made that you had been lee Harvey Oswald's lover with your husband? Tirado: Well, I told him almost all what happened. He told me what they did to him and I told him what they did to me. Hardway: Do you remember specifically talking about that specific allegation with your husband? Tirado: No, it was not important. Hardway: Going back to when you recognized Oswald, the man whose picture you had seen in the paper as the man who had been at the Embassy three times. Were you certain that the man in the papers was the same man, before you checked your records at the archives? Tirado: Yes. Immediately I saw the paper, I told him. This was the man that I want to check. Hardway: To your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of the communist Party? Tirado: I think that he was, I don't know if he was exactly member, but he was sympathizer and we had a lot of friends that they were members of the Communist Party. Hardway: Uh, to your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of any intelligence organization? 113 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 53. Tirado: I don't remember exactly. I think he was working for the, how you say that? I think he was in a campaign. Against the drugs. Hardway: Do you know when that would have been? Tirado: No. Hardway: Do you know when he would have been a sympathizer for, with the Communist Party? Tirado: Well, I'm completely sure. Being Communist, being policeman. All of that, it was after I meet him. Hardway: Do you know why-- Tirado: Do you know why they asked you to keep quiet after the first interrogation? Tirado: No, I don't. Hardway: Did you ever attned a party where Lee Harvey Oswald was present? Tirado: The party where Lee, no, I don't know that he attneds some parties. Hardway: The question was, did you ever attend a party where he was present? Tirado: No. Hardway: That's all I've got. 114 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 54. Cornwell: Just two brief matters and I promise we will and this very long questioning session. The questions which were just asked you about which languages he spoke, by Mr. Hardway, when the call was made to the Russian Embassy, what language was spoken there? Tirado: Spanish. Cornwell: Did the Russians speak Spanish too? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did at any point in that conversation Russian-speaking people get involved? Did anyone at the Russian Embassy speak Russian to you? Tirado: I don't speak Russian. Cornwell: Well. I understand that. Did you at any point put Oswald on the phone and let him talk? Tirado: No, no. Cornwell: The reason I'm asking of course is to try to jog your memory. Did he at any point in that transaction speak Russian? Did Oswald speak Russian that you recall? Tirado: No. Cornwell: The second question, just to be sure that we've got your memory as accurate as we can on it, have you not spoken to Azcue at all since 1963? 115 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 55. Tirado: That's something that I don't exactly remember. If he came once or if he was with his son, but I knew all about Fidel's and Azcue's conversations. Cornwell: So you do remember either talking to Azcue or his son about the Oswald trip? Tirado: Not the Oswald trip, the Fidel, what he says. Because Azcue was called by Fidel Castro in that day when the Cuban Ambassador sent my report. That's what I told you the other day. In the same day they speak to azcue, Fidel, they spoke, they have a conversation, and then on the second day, that Sunday present, they protest to Mexican Ambassador. Cornwell: You described to us earlier hwo the Ambassador filed a report. Did you ever see the report? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you know what was in to by any other means? To the best of your knowledge, it would at least have (Tape ends.) 116 Silvia Tirado (Duran) Page 1. Cornwell: Okay. The first part of your memory is that, as I understand it, the Ambassador filed a report within three days or so after the assassination and your arrest, right? Then you mentioned something about Fidel talking to Azcue is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: How did you learn that? Tirado: That's what I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. At any rate, what can you remember about the nature of the contact. between Azcue and Fidel? Tirado: Fidel asked him what happened exactly that day in the Consulate and Azcue tried to remember everything and he said what he knew, that Fidel was afraid of uh, if I was going to say something false to, because I was threatened by the police, and uh, Ascue says that no, that I was honest and I was not going to do anything false. that that was not the right thing, the truth... Cornwell: Okay. In other words, Fidel was worried about the possibility that you would say something against the Cuban Government? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And that's because you were a Mexican citizen, is that correct? 117 Silvia Tirado Page 2. Tirado: And I was,...(asked lopez how to translate) threatened. Cornwell: Okay. So he was afraid that the Mexican authorities might threaten you and that you might say something against the Cuban Government? Tirado: Yeah. Because the police many times told me, you have to say the truth. Remember that you have a little child. And...remember, you have a daughter. And remember you have a daughter. All the time they were telling me this. Cornwell: Okay. Did you possess any information that might have incriminated the Cuban Government? Tirado: No. Cornwell: And you can't remember how it is that you learned about this questioning of Azcue by Fidel, is that right? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Then, several years later, you had another conversation with either Azcue or his son, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you think it might have been Azcue? Tirado: Could be. Cornwell: Is that when you learned about his conversations with Fidel? Tirado: Yes. 118 Sylvia Tirado Page 3. Cornwell: During that period of time, when you spoke to Azcue two or three years later, what if anything did he have to say about the assassination? Tirado: What did he say? Cornwell: Yes. Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: When you believed you may have talked to him. Did he have any theories or speculation? Tirado: I don't remember. I only remember the part that they were talking about me. Cornwell: Did he believe as strongly as you apparently do that the person who was on television and in the newspapers was the same man who went into the Consulate? Tirado: Yes. I don't know about television because he was not here. Cornwell: He was not on television here? Tirado: No, no. Azcue was not here. Cornwell: I know, but I mean when you talked to him two or three years later. Did he say anything about that? Tirado: No. I don't remember. Cornwell: Do you think for sure that the man who was on television was the man who came to the Consulate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: The man who was killed by Jack Ruby? Tirado: Yes. 119 Sylvia Tirado Page 4. Cornwell: Did you see him being killed by Ruby on television? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: Was there anything about him that looked different to you? Tirado: No. It was black and white. So I couldn't see the color. But he looks like the one that I met. Cornwell: Guess that's all the questions and thank you again for being so patient with us and answering all of our endless questions. Lopez: It is 9:15 p.m. 120 Mr. CORNWELL. Also there is a diagram which is made reference to in the transcript. We might mark that separately as F-440B, and with your permission, also enter that in the record, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record. [The information follows:] 121 JFK EXHIBIT F-440B 122 Mr. CORNWELL. The early portion of the transcript simply established her present name, that her name in 1963 was Sylvia Tirado Duran, the fact that the tape recording of the interview began at 5:45 in the afternoon, and that her birthday is November 22, 1937. We might ask that those who have transcripts--there were copies provided both for the press and the public and to the committee, if you would turn to page 5, we will begin the tape record- ing at the top of page 5 of the transcript. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. At that point, Mrs. Tirado did make a sketch of the consulate which is now part of the record. We would ask, however, that we now move to page 19 of the transcript and continue her testimony at that point, near the bottom of page 19. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, we would ask that we turn to page 25 of the transcript, beginning near the bottom. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. We next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 45, or 40, excuse me, near the top of the page. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we turn to page 47, near the top portion of the page. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. I next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 54, toward the middle or slight upper portion of the page. [The playing of the recording was resumed.] Mr. CORNWELL. And the final portion of the tape recording, Mr. Chairman, begins on the following page, which is labeled page 1 of tape 2. [The playing of the recording was resumed.] Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, we also, while we were in Mexico, spoke to Mr. Horacio Duran. That is the man who is displayed in the blue coat, in JFK exhibit F-432, and who was Sylvia Duran's husband in 1953. We also spoke to Ruben Duran, who is Horacio's brother, and who is displayed in the white shirt in JFK exhibit F-431. And to Betty Serratos, the lady on the left in the array of JFK exhibits, numbered F-430, and who was the wife of Ruben. Each of those individuals was, of course, around Sylvia, spoke to her during the traumatic events after the assassination of the President. And each of them provided information to us of substantially the same nature in all significant respects as that which you have just heard in the tape recording of Sylvia Duran. We would ask at this time that those three exhibits be placed into evidence. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 123 JFK EXHIBIT F-432 124 JFK EXHIBIT F-431 125 JFK EXHIBIT F-430 126 Mr. FAUNTROY. Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from the District of Columbia. Mr. FAUNTROY. I take it that their statements are also a part of the record, a part of our files. Mr. CORNWELL. They are part of the files of the committee, that is correct. Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Is counsel finished? Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the next witness to be called is Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963 who informed the individual who visited the consulate and gave his name as Lee Harvey Oswald that he would not be issued a visa to Cuba. Senor Azcue is presently living in retirement in Cuba. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Azcue. Chairman STOKES. Prior to calling the witness, the Chair will once again advise that this particular witness, due to security reasons, we are requesting that all persons remain in their seats any time the witness comes into the hearing room or at any time that the witness is leaving the hearing room. We ask that all persons please cooperate with those arrangements with the committee. At this time the committee calls Mr. Azcue. The Chair requests first that the interpreter please stand and be sworn. Sir, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you interpret before the committee will be a truthful and accurate interpretation of the testimony of the witness to the best of your ability? Mr. ANTHONY J. HERVAS. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. I would ask that the witness be sworn. Mr. Azcue, please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? SENIOR AZCUE. [through the interpreter]. Yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. Does counsel desire to be heard prior to the witness testifying? Mr. STANDARD. Yes; with the Chairman's permission. My name is Michael Standard of the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard of New York. Mr. CORNWELL. Excuse me, Mr. Standard. Would you mind moving the microphone so we can make a record of your statement. Mr. STANDARD. For the past 17 years the office has represented the legal interests of the Government of Cuba in the United States. To my immediate left sits Sr. Eusebio Azcue, the witness. To his left sits Sr. Ricardo Escartin, first secretary and consul of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington; and to his left, Capt. Felipe Villa, of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cuba. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear here today in two capacities. One, to reflect the view of the Cuban Government that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 127 was an act of the vilest kind, an act unacceptable by any standards of human and political behavior. Both at the time of the convening of the Warren Commission and today, the Cuban Government has cooperated to the fullest extent in providing what information it has at its disposal to the U.S. authorities investigating the event. Second, to accompany two former consuls of the Republic of Cuba who were present in Mexico City in the period September 1963 through August 1964, both of whom appear today of their own volition, and as a result of the Cuban Government's decision to provide the Congress of the United States with the testimony of such witnesses as may aid in the process of gathering evidence regarding the assassination. On the day following the assassination, President Castro, in a speech televised to the people of Cuba, and devoted exclusively to the implications for his country, said, and I quote: It is in the interest of the American people and all the people of the world that it be known, that it be demanded what is really behind the Kennedy assassination, that all the facts be revealed. On April 3, 1978 members and staff of this committee had an extensive interview with President Fidel Castro in Havana. President Castro made it abundantly clear, and I quote from the transcript of the interview: We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. There is nothing as important as having your conscience clean--absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified. It is in that context, and with that hope, that Senors Azcue and Mirabal appear here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. The Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Gary Cornwell. TESTIMONY OF SENOR EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY [The examination of Senor Azcue was conducted through the interpreter.] Mr. CORNWELL. Would you state your name for the record. Senor AZCUE. Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, you are presently a resident and a citizen of Cuba, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. Mr. CORNWELL. What is your age? Senor AZCUE. 67. Mr. CORNWELL. And where were you born? Senor AZCUE. Havana, Cuba. Mr. CORNWELL. You are presently retired? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, I am retired. Mr. CORNWELL. In 1963, what was your occupation? Senor AZCUE. Consul of Cuba in Mexico, Mexico City. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, when did you first go to live in Mexico prior to 1963? Senor AZCUE. In 1944. 128 Mr. CORNWELL. What was the basic nature of your occupation between that date and 1963? Senor AZCUE. I was an architect in Mexico before the triumph of the revolution. At the time the revolution triumphed, I was requested to take charge of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Mr. CORNWELL. For how long a period of time or until what date did you hold that position? Senor AZCUE. Until November 18, 1963, though since the month of September of 1963 I had started to turn over affairs to the new consul who was to replace me, Mr. Alfredo Mirabal. Mr. CORNWELL. And on November 18, 1963, when you did ulti- mately turn over that position to Senor Mirabal, where did you go? Senor AZCUE. I went directly and definitively to Havana. Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to direct your attention to an exhibit which has been marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-408. That exhibit is provided in an enlargement form, and a photograph of it in a smaller form has been handed to the witness. Can you tell us what type of document that is? Senor AZCUE. This form is a request that was given to foreigners who approached the consulate requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman? Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered in the record at this point. [The information follows:] 129 JFK EXHIBIT F-408 130 Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, can you tell us, do you recognize that document? Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a document that we used at the consulate to be completed at the request of the applicant. Mr. CORNWELL. The document bears the date 1963. Would you tell us what function that document served during that period of time. Senor AZCUE. This document? Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. Senor AZCUE. We had large amounts of printed forms of this nature, of these applications, and they had to be completed in sextuplicate, that is to say six copies of this document, to which were attached their photographs. They had to affix their signatures, as well as provide all the detailed information that was required to accompany the request. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, this particular document bears the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and the date September 27, 1963. Do you recall the occasion upon which this application was filed with your consulate? Senor AZCUE. Fine. This gentleman wants me to narrate the antecedents of the visits of this individual to the consulate. Is that the nature of the question? Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. If you recall the occasion on which this specific application was filed, would you describe that occasion for us. Senor AZCUE. Certainly, with pleasure. Yes, this gentleman appeared on the date indicated at the consulate, requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. This gentleman was referred to, as was the usual practice in the consulate, to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen, who was responsible for handling these contacts with persons applying for such visas. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, in a previous interview with the staff you stated that the very first occasion to your memory on which you saw this individual was 1 to 2 days before the date on this application. Is that still accurate to the best of your memory? Senor AZCUE. It is something that I cannot state categorically. I cannot state whether it was on the very same day, a day before, or several days before, and I am in a position to explain why. Mr. CORNWELL. Please do. Senor AZCUE. He approaches us. The secretary normally takes care of the case. There is no need for me personally to go out to see him unless he specifically requests that I do so, as a special case, that he requests either my presence or the presence of another Cuban consul responsible. He did so. He requested my presence because when he initially formulated the application with the secretary, the secretary explained to him all of the requirements that he would have to fulfill in order to obtain the visa. And as he was carrying along certain documents which he believed would be sufficient for the visa, and the secretary could not resolve the case, he then calls upon me to see whether I, upon examination of those documents, can proceed to issue the visa immediately. I answered negatively. The documents that he submits are not enough. He is exhibiting or producing documents such as, one, attesting to his membership 131 in the U.S. Communist Party. Also another indicating that he is a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Also another document indicating his residence in the Soviet Union, as well as a marriage certificate to a Soviet citizen. Upon presentation of these documents, he thinks that I will be able to solve his problem and grant him a visa. I at that time tell him that this is not sufficient; that I must request authorization from the Cuban Government. And at that point he agrees to proceed to fill the application out in order to process the visa. At that point, he leaves the consulate, conceivably to look for some photographs. One could think whether he returned on that very same date with the photographs; it is possible that he might have returned on that very same date with the photographs, or that he might have returned the following day. As far as the date that appears herein, and bearing in mind that I received him on three occasions, maybe it would be possible to determine that on this very same date, it is possible, I cannot fully guarantee this, it is possible that on that same day he might have made the first two visits to the consulate; one during the morning very early, and the second one a little later, bringing the photographs in order to complete the application. There is a sufficient time for such a thing. Mr. CORNWELL. Was the first visit of this man that you have just described to us during the normal working hours at the consulate? Senor AZCUE. Yes, without a doubt. The consulate opened at 10 in the morning and closed at 2. Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention, then, to the second occasion on which, as you have just described, the individual returned with photographs which could be attached to the visa application, what occurred on that second occasion? Senor AZCUE. I did not assist. I was not present at the very time when the secretary receives the photograph and fills the documents. That is a function that pertains properly to her. He very probably insisted once again on the need to proceed urgently to Cuba or to transit Cuba. As the amount of time required to process this document by our own Government was one that I could not predetermine, it could be a matter of 15 days, 20 days, or the response could be negative, during this second visit that he makes to me I bring up or note that if he already had a visa to go to the Soviet Union, I would be in a position to grant him a visa to Cuba without the need to consult my Government, in terms of a transit to the Soviet Union. This should have been clearly stated or established during the course of the second visit that he made. Whether it might have been on the same day or 2 days thereafter, I tend to believe that it will have been on the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th. Mr. CORNWELL. So the second occasion that you have just described would have been the date on the visa application, September 27, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That is very correct. Mr. CORNWELL. At the termination of the conversation on this occasion, what if anything did the individual do? 132 Senor AZCUE. I believe, and this is something I think, that he left or withdrew from the consulate, and we can imagine or conclude that he attempted to obtain a visa from the Soviet Union, because he was a resident of the Soviet Union and he was married to a Soviet citizen, according to what he stated. Mr. CORNWELL. After he left on this second occasion, did you have any conversations with the Soviet Embassy about this routine, in other words, about the possibility of him obtaining a visa from the Soviet Embassy? Senor AZCUE. I don't know whether it was that very same day or on the following day. A few years have gone by since, and it is very difficult to determine or recall exactly the manner in which the events occurred exactly. It is possible to reconstruct a sequence. It could have been that very same day or the following day. But obviously if the first two visits took place on the 27th, the third visit would have had to take place on the following day, because in and during the same day it is not possible to complete three visits that are separated by time, and at the same time to undertake the necessary actions to obtain the photographs we needed. In fact, after he left the consulate, I received a telephone call from the consulate of the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee whether it was on that very same day or on the following day. But whatever day it might have been, the consulate of the Soviet Union gets in touch with me over the phone. And the consul tells me that apparently the documents that he is exhibiting or producing attesting to his residence in the Soviet Union and his marriage certificate with the Soviet citizen are apparently legal, are correct, and he believes that they are correct. But without a doubt he cannot issue the visa without consulting Moscow. Consequently, I cannot, in turn, grant him a visa to transit Cuba without consulting the Government. That was the content of my telephone conversation with the Soviet consulate. Mr. CORNWELL. After that conversation, did you again see the individual, did he return to the consulate? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. That was the third and last time I saw him. He possibly thinking that his documents had been legalized orally, verbally, that I would consequently change my attitude and in view of the legality of the document would grant him the visa; these were his hopes. And in addition one noticed that he was very anxious that we grant him the visa, because we never had any individual that was so insistent or persistent, in spite of our refusals which were logical and legal. Mr. CORNWELL. Did all three of these visits occur during normal working hours at the consulate? Senor AZCUE. We never received anybody, any individual, outside these regular office hours. Mr. CORNWELL. As I understood your testimony, the first visit may or may not have been on September 27. The second visit was most probably on September 27. And the third visit would have been most probably on a day afterward, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That is correct. I believe that on the 27th, that was the day that the application was completed. I have no doubt about it. 133 The first visit, however, could have been that very same day, earlier in the day. And the third visit could have taken place the following day or could have been on the same 27th if the first visit had taken place on the 26th. But my private opinion, the first two visits took place on the 27th and the last one, after my conversation with the Soviet consul, was on the following day, that is to say September 28. I believe this would be the most reasonable thing if one were to analyze it. Mr. CORNWELL. September 27, 1963, was a Friday. Does that mean that the third visit could have occurred on the following Saturday? Senor AZCUE. On Saturday, exactly. Mr. CORNWELL. The consulate was open on Saturday. Senor AZCUE. Saturday morning--not open to the public. Mr. CORNWELL. Would you tell us how the conversation on the third visit ended. Senor AZCUE. He had great hopes that I would grant him the visa in transit. When I told him no, that if the Soviet Union does not grant him the visa as destination of his trip, I cannot grant him an in-transit visa to Cuba without consulting my government. He always had a face which reflected unhappiness. He was never friendly. He was persistent. And he was not pleasant. So on the last visit, when he loses the opportunity to obtain the visa, he gets very worked up. And then in English, which is a language that I have not full command, and all our conversations took place in English, and with great effort on my part because it is a language that I do not have full command of, but I do hear him make statements that are directed against us, and he accuses us of being bureaucrats, and in a very discourteous manner. At that point I also become upset and I tell him to leave the consulate, maybe somewhat violently or emotionally. Then he leaves the consulate, and he seems to be mumbling to himself, and he slams the door, also in a very discourteous manner. That was the last time we saw him around. Mr. CORNWELL. Was he with anyone on any of these occasions? Senor AZCUE. With my colleague, Mirabal, who probably was always with me, because I was together with him. I was the exiting consul and he was the new consul. I am handling this case because I had a better knowledge of the English language than he did. But we were both handling the case, he in order to become more familiar with the situation and I also in order to train him. So this was a colleague of mine who saw him, how many times I don't know, whether on one or two or all three occasions; he was a colleague who was present there, and I know that he also saw him. And in addition to Consul Mirabal, he was also seen by the secretary, because she was the one who took care of his application. The three of us were the only ones who were able to see Oswald, nobody else. He could not have seen anybody else, because the business that brought him to us was one that was of the exclusive responsibility of the consulate. And therein the only ones present were the three of us. 134 Mr. CORNWELL. Was the individual who came to your consulate on these three occasions accompanied by any other persons? Did anyone come with him? Senor AZCUE. I never saw. The private area of the consulate, from this private area it is difficult to observe who comes in from the street. My secretary from the chancery, maybe she was able to see. But whenever I emerged from that area, and to the chancery, I always saw him alone. Mr. CORNWELL. Did he say anything in any of the conversations with you which would have indicated that he either had a companion with him in Mexico City or that he knew any persons who lived in Mexico City? Senor AZCUE. No, never. We did not hold any conversations other than those directly related to the visa. Mr. CORNWELL. If I could direct your attention again to the JFK exhibit F-408, I would like to ask you first, was the document signed in your presence? Senor AZCUE. No. It is not necessary. It is never necessary. This is a document that is provided to him by the secretary. It is filled in by the secretary. She affixes the photograph, turns it over to him, and right there he signs, until it is sent, forwarded to Cuba, through the pouch. Mr. CORNWELL. Would it have been necessary, under the usual custom and practice of your office at that time, for the document to have been signed on the premises of the consulate? Senor AZCUE. This document or this application does not leave the desk of the secretary. She types it out and places the photograph, places the seal, and hands it over for the individual's signature. Mr. CORNWELL. You told us earlier that the normal procedure for the preparation of such applications was that more than one copy of the document was made, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. Yes, six. Six photographs, six signatures, and six copies of the application is complete. Mr. CORNWELL. Do you feel certain about your memory today as to the number of copies that are made or were made in 1963? Senor AZCUE. Yes, absolutely. There was never an exception made. They come already together in a bunch. Mr. CORNWELL. The copies as opposed to the original, the carbon copies, were they signed separately or was the carbon paper used to transfer a signature from one to the other? Senor AZCUE. No, one by one, because the paper is very thick. This is mimeograph-type paper. Chairman STOKES. Will counsel suspend for a moment? I think this would be an appropriate place for us to take a 5-minute recess at this time. The Chair requests that as the witness departs from the room, that all persons remain in their seats please until the witness has left the room after which we will have a 5-minute recess. [A brief recess was taken.] Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. All persons in the hearing room are requested to remain in their seats while the witness is being brought in to the witness table. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Cornwell. 135 Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we begin again, I believe that we neglected to have the interpreter identify himself for the record. Would you do so? Mr. HERVAS. My name is Anthony J. H-e-r-v-a-s. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. Senor Azcue, I would like at this time to show you JFK exhibit F-407. For the record, that would appear to be a carbon copy of the previous JFK exhibit F-408. The previous JFK exhibit, F-408, is a photograph of a visa application which the staff of this committee took while they were in Cuba this year. It was taken of a document which was provided to us by the Cuban Government in an original form. We were allowed to inspect the original and to photograph it. The exhibit which we just placed on the easel, JFK F-407, is a photograph of a visa application which was provided to the Warren Commission in 1964 by the Cuban Government. As you can tell, the writing on JFK F-407 appears to be somewhat displaced on the lines; part of it sitting directly on top of lines instead of resting over them as you would expect, and otherwise its content appears to be virtually identical to 408. Would the two documents in that form have been expected, based upon the usual procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963? Mr. HERVAS. May I ask a question? Did you say would the two documents have been expected or inspected? Mr. CORNWELL. Expected to be in that form with those type of variations based upon the procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963? Senor AZCUE. Do you have some other copy of the actual size that I could be able to look at or analyze because from this distance it is for me very difficult to see the exhibit on the easel. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, would you like to go to the easel to get a better picture of the blowups? Do the representatives from the National Archives have a small photograph of that document with them here today? OK, we do have a smaller photograph we will show the witness. It is also marked for identification as JFK F-407. Senor AZCUE. As I stated before, the paper on which the application is printed is a very thick or heavy paper. So it is not possible to prepare six copies at one time, not even three in an ordinary typewriter such as the one Sylvia Duran had in the consulate. Conceivably, she prepared them two at a time, an original and one copy, an original and one copy, an original and one copy. So conceivably it is possible that there be some differences between some of them, between three, for instance. Mr. CORNWELL. But at any rate your examination of the two documents would indicate that JFK F-407 is a carbon copy of the original JFK-408; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. I am not an expert on these matters, but any one of you could--and I cannot see very well either and the quality of the copy is not very clear. However, in looking at these two documents I note that the words appear exactly one on top of the other in both documents in the same places. 136 So, consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the copy, that the second exhibit constitutes a copy of the first one. It would be very difficult to place them in separate. In spite of my limitations, I believe I can affirm that this one is the original and this other one is the copy. One does notice, if one analyzes the margin on the right side, that the text on both copies coincides perfectly one with the other. That is very difficult to do otherwise. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, the pictures on the upper lefthand portion of each document would appear to be of the same individual; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. Mr. CORNWELL. Do those pictures of that individual appear to you to be the same individual who visited the consulate in Mexico City on the occasions you have previously described to us? Senor AZCUE. Truly, this photograph is one that I saw for the first time when the honorable U.S. committee members came to Cuba in April of this year, and I was surprised that I believe that it was not the same person. Fifteen years had gone by so it is very difficult for me to be in a position to guarantee it in a categorical form. But my belief is that this gentleman was not, is not, the person or the individual who went to the consulate. Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to the period of time immediately after the assassination, the day of the assassination or the day after the assassination, did you during that period of time have an occasion to see pictures of the alleged assassin in the newspapers or to observe on television the man identified at that time as Lee Harvey Oswald? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, not so close to the date, not in the first few days, not immediately thereafter. Some time I calculate approximately-and I say this because I am not a great movie fan, but it was in mid-December approximately--I saw at that time the film in which Ruby appears assassinating the Oswald who was there, and I was not able to identify him and only 2 months had gone by since I had seen the Oswald who appeared at the consulate. And I had a clear mental picture because we had had an unpleasant discussion and he had not been very pleasant to me and I did not recognize when I first saw him. I did not recognize Oswald. The man who went to the consulate was a man over 30 years of age and very thin, very thin faced. And the individual I saw in the movie was a young man, considerably younger, and a fuller face. Mr. CORNWELL. What color hair did the individual have to the best of your memory who visited the consulate? Senor AZCUE. He was blond, dark blond. Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual you saw in the movie, the person who was killed by Jack Ruby, resemble more closely the individual in these photographs to your memory than the individual who visited the consulate? Senor AZCUE. I believe so. Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to show you JFK exhibit F-434. Do the representatives from the National Archives have the original or a small photograph of that exhibit? 137 While they are looking, Mr. Chairman, I believe we neglected to ask that JFK exhibit F-407 be admitted into evidence. Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evidence. [The information follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-407 Mr. CORNWELL. That is a passport. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman, JFK F-434? Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evidence. [The information follows:] 138 JFK EXHIBIT F-434 Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual who visited the consulate look like that individual? Senor AZCUE. No. Mr. CORNWELL. What differences were there? Senor AZCUE. Many differences. The individual who visited the consulate is one whose physiognomy or whose face I recall very clearly. He had a hard face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight eyes. His cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed. This gentleman looks like he is somewhat heavier, more filled, his eyes are at an angle with the outside of his 139 eye, at an angle with his face. I would have never identified him or recognized him. I believe I can recall with fairly good accuracy the individual in such a way that I could recognize him now in a group of 100, that is better than a photograph of him because obviously during a period of 15 years he might change. I think I could recognize him, and this is not him. Mr. CORNWELL. We would like to show you what has been previously admitted into evidence in this case as Exhibit 194. As you can see, Senor Azcue, the pictures on the right are simply blowups of the same visa application, but I would like to direct your attention to the two pictures on the left which come from photographs taken by the Dallas Police Department. I ask you if that individual looks like the man who visited the consulate? Senor AZCUE. I would have never recognized him as I did not recognize him in the movie where he dies, and I can, however, identify him as or think of him as the person who was killed or assassinated by Ruby. It is a question of personal evaluation on my part. But it is very clearly imprinted. Mr. CORNWELL. The staff of the committee has had an opportunity to speak to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, and during the interview with her she expressed no doubt about the fact that the person who was killed in Dallas by Jack Ruby was the individual who visited the consulate. Do you have any reason to question her memory or the reason that her memory might differ from yours? Senor AZCUE. Categorically, I could not affirm it without any doubt. However, it is possible that she might be more susceptible to impression or more impressionable than I. I remember what I saw on the film and also what I saw on TV later or maybe before. I remember that moment when he was killed and I remember I did not recognize him. I did not have any prejudices or preconceptions. I wanted to recognize, however, only 2 months had gone by. It was between September and November. At that time I was much younger. That was 15 years ago, and I think that because of my own profession I probably had better eyes. And because of the impression that was made by this person who visited the consulate, for these reasons, maybe my version is correct or more correct. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. At this point the procedure will be as follows: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, chairman of the Kennedy subcommittee, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. The Chair recognizes Mr. Preyer. Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Azcue, it is good to see you again. As I understand it, at the time Lee Harvey Oswald visited the consul in Mexico there were three people who could have seen him: yourself, Sylvia Duran and Mr. Mirabal. Is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That is correct. Mr. PREYER. And you were the consul at that time and Mr. Mirabal was in training to replace you as consul? 140 Senor AZCUE. I would say it was the opposite. The consul who was already functioning as such was Mirabal. From the very time he arrived as a designated consul. When the consul arrives--of course, there could be two or three consuls--but when the consul arrives, he takes over the functions, the responsibilities, and I was turning over the official business of the consulate to him. Mr. PREYER. What I was getting at was, you had been the consul before Mr. Mirabal arrived? Senor AZCUE. Yes. Mr. PREYER. Mr. Mirabal came to replace you as consul? Senor AZCUE. Yes. Mr. PREYER. At the time of the assassination on November 22, you were no longer in Mexico and Mr. Mirabal remained as the consul at that time; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. I had already returned to Cuba and Mirabal had assumed the position of consul there alone. Mr. PREYER. You returned to Cuba, as I understand it, on November 18, which was, of course, after your encounters with Oswald and before the assassination; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That was the case. I returned on November 18. Mr. PREYER. Did your return to Cuba have anything to do with your encounters with Oswald or did it have anything to do with the assassination of President Kennedy? Senor AZCUE. It was not related to any of those things. I returned to Cuba because all of my family was already there. As of June of that year I had been awaiting a consul to replace me because I already had a son studying in Havana and a son working there and already in June they had given me permission to return permanently to Cuba. I was not able to return before because they were not sending me a consul to replace me, and the reason I did not leave immediately upon Mr. Mirabal's arrival was, first, because I had to train him. He did not have any experience in the handling of consular affairs there, and, second, because there was a meeting or congress of consuls being held at that time and I was asked to stay. This was because of my connections developed over the 5 years that I had spent there. Mr. PREYER. So that it is fair to sum up your answer by saying you were not recalled by the Cuban Government, but, you, at your request, returned to Cuba? Mr. HERVAS. Excuse me, sir, did you say at your wish? Mr. PREYER. Yes, at his wish. Senor AZCUE. I cannot say it was at my wish exclusively. I need the permission of the Government of Cuba, but I had requested my return in June because, as I noted previously, my sons were back in Havana. One was already working. One was studying there. I was then alone in Mexico with my smaller daughter, and I also wanted her to study in Cuba. I wanted to return there. Mr. PREYER. I would like to turn to the visa application, the JFK exhibit F-408, for a moment. In the middle of that document, over on the right-hand side, there is a printed date that says October 10, 1963. I don't believe there has been any discussion about that as yet. Could you tell us what that date is? 141 Senor AZCUE. I will relate the manner in which I believe that appeared. We sent, of the six copies of the application with photographs, five to Havana. Those are distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to different organizations in government, different entities, and these receive different copies of the document. Immigration possibly receives two copies. The Interior Ministry receives a copy. Each organization receiving a copy might possibly stamp the date of receipt of the document on such a document. One organization in this case must have stamped that date on the document. On the other document, the organization probably did not have its routine practice to date such document because it was not a rigid requirement. Mr. PREYER. So that this was a date stamped on the document in Cuba. Senor AZCUE. I believe that that is so, because if we received the reapplication on 27th, we never hold on to or retain, in order to protect the interest of the applicant, the document for such a long period of time before forwarding it to Cuba. We will be mailing it in the next mail departure, 2 or 3 days at most, and this date, October 10, corresponds more closely to what I had just indicated, that is, to the distribution of the correspondence to the different entities, where they are supposed to receive copies of this document, that is, 13 days thereafter. Mr. PREYER. So it does not indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico on October 10. Senor AZCUE. No; in no manner. He never returned to the consulate. We never saw him again. This date is completely independent of Mr. Oswald. This is an internal matter. Mr. PREYER. Looking again at this document, the visa application form, doesn't it indicate on this form how long Oswald wanted to stay in Cuba? Senor AZCUE. Here it should be stated. Sometimes we included it, 2 weeks, and, if possible, a longer period of time. Mr. PREYER. Does it also indicate when Oswald wanted to leave for Cuba? Senor AZCUE. Proposed date of arrival in Cuba, September 30, 1963. Mr. PREYER. That was just 3 days after he applied for the visa, and I believe you have testified earlier today that you had never seen anyone so persistent in seeking a visa. Did Oswald tell you why he was in such a hurry to get to Cuba? Senor AZCUE. None whatsoever. He arrived there convinced that with the documents that he exhibited at the time, I would issue the visa immediately, and one can analyze the fact that if he had a great need to go to the Soviet Union, he would have chosen the shortest route, and that was not through Cuba. Mr. PREYER. But he gave you no explanation of why he was in such a hurry, why he was so anxious to go to Cuba? Senor AZCUE. I do not recall it, and it is hard to find a reasonable explanation, because if he is in a hurry, he can go through any other country. Mr. PREYER. Down in the right-hand corner of the visa application there is a signature. Is that your signature? 142 Senor AZCUE. No. Mr. PREYER. Is it Sylvia Duran's signature? Senor AZCUE. It is a signature, and we have been able to check it thereafter, of Alfredo Mirabal, who, as I have already mentioned earlier, he already was empowered as a consul. He had already been named or appointed consul. Mr. PREYER. So it is Mr. Mirabal's signature. Just above that signature there is a section, a printed section, that has the title "Observations." Now you have testified, in general, as to what those observations were, but I wonder if you could read out loud for us, for the sake of the record, what that section says. Senor AZCUE. The applicant states that he is a member of the U.S. Communist Party and also the secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and that he lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959, that he is married to a Soviet citizen. He showed documents certifying that he was a member of the organizations mentioned, as well as a marriage certificate. He went to the Soviet Embassy in this city requesting that his visa be forwarded to their embassy in Cuba. We called the Soviet consulate, and they responded that they had to obtain, they have to await authorization from Moscow to issue the visa, and that it would take approximately 4 months. This is the very same thing I told the members of your committee in Havana in April without having seen this document before. Mr. PREYER. This section of the application was not filled in by you? Senor AZCUE. No, no, I had never seen it. This was made or prepared by Sylvia Duran, and it was signed by Mirabal, as it appears here. I repeat once again that the first time I saw this document was when the committee showed it to me in April. Mr. PREYER. Is there anything in those observations that would make you think that the person who wrote them believed that Oswald would be given a visa? Senor AZCUE. Probably no, this is something that is written or addressed to Cuba, all of the information that we can provide Cuba, but we do not prejudge what Cuba is going to determine, even if we may have an interest in seeing something resolved. Mr. PREYER. Incidentally, to clear up one point on that, I believe you testified this morning that you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy. No, I'm afraid I have that just reversed. I believe this morning you testified that it was the Soviet Embassy that called you, but in the observations it states you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy. Would you like to clarify that point? Senor AZCUE. It is relatively easy, I believe, if one analyzes it. Conceivably, I was under the impression that the Soviet Embassy had called me because I was told to pick up the telephone. I did not call. It is possible, however, that at Oswald's request, Sylvia might have called the Embassy and then would have transferred the call to me, and thereafter I was under the impression that it was the Soviet Embassy that had called me, and I was always under that 143 impression. But it is possible that she might have initiated the call and thereafter transferred the call to me. Mr. PREYER. One final question. Going back to the observations written on the bottom of the application, written by Sylvia Duran, in your opinion, did Sylvia Duran ever pressure you to grant the visa or encourage you to grant the visa to Oswald? Senor AZCUE. She, the poor woman, was in no position to pressure me. She might have been in a position to make a personal recommendation, and the recommendation was not a personal matter. Yet she might have believed that because of the fact that he was a resident in the Soviet Union and he was a member of the North American Communist Party, she might have believed that we might have been in a position to make an exception, but this is simply as a comment, a possible comment. She did not exert pressure or any such thing. Mr. PREYER. Did she make any personal recommendation or did she evidence any unusual interest in Oswald's case? Senor AZCUE. No; she might have thought that we might be in a position to grant him a visa because of his personal conditions or circumstances, not for any reason of friendship. It wasn't any such thing. She never spoke again about him, nor did we ever speak about him. As in the case of many of the hundreds of applicants who come through a consulate, we see them at that time, and thereafter we never remember them again or discuss them again. And if it hadn't been for the unfortunate incident, I would have by now completely forgotten about this gentleman. Mr. PREYER. After Oswald visited you the first time, that visit ended when you sent him out to have a photograph taken, as I understand it. Was there a place nearby where he could have had the photograph taken? Senor AZCUE. Yes, yes, about four or five blocks away in a street known as Calzada de Tacubaya. There are photographic studios. Possibly Sylvia might have pointed out to him where he could obtain the photographs, or maybe he already had the photos. Mr. PREYER. Well, in the photographs on the application, and also in the passport, Oswald appears to have on a tie and a sweater. How was he dressed when he came to the Embassy, to the consulate? Senor AZCUE. I always imagine him or visualize him as wearing a suit, coat and pants, trousers, with a pattern of crossed lines, not very clear design. Blue, some reddish. I never conceived of him or visualized him wearing a light sweater. When I saw this photograph in April of this year, I also noticed that the clothing he was wearing was not the same. Mr. PREYER. So that the clothing he was wearing in the photographs was not similar to that which he was wearing when he actually visited you in the Embassy. Senor AZCUE. I am almost in a position to assure that. Mr. PREYER. When he returned with the photographs and with his application, visa application form, and his passport pictures, 144 would you have looked at the pictures on the visa application and on the passport? Senor AZCUE. No, I did not see the photograph, nor did I witness the preparation of the form. I did not see the photograph at that time. I only saw this photograph last April, when they came to Cuba. Mr. PREYER. So that at the time of processing his visa and the passport, you never looked at the photographs, you never compared them with the man standing before you. Senor AZCUE. No, I was never present during the preparation of this form nor of the affixing of the photograph. And it is also signed by Mirabal. And in the normal course of business this is a matter that goes to Cuba. It is generally kept until it is prepared for shipment in the next plane, outgoing plane, and there was no reason for me to go back searching for this form. Mr. PREYER. You have indicated to us that you don't believe the man whose photograph appears on the visa application and the passport was the same man who appeared before you in the consulate. Have you ever seen a photograph of the man you believed to have appeared before you in the consulate? Senor AZCUE. Never. I shall explain. The committee brought to me an album with many photographs. I shall try to explain. It is very possible that amongst all of those photographs which were made available to us by those persons who took pictures of every person that went near the consulate or the Embassy and that were contained in those that I was shown, it is very difficult when I consider all of the photos that I saw, that anyone could escape being photographed if he approached the consulate during working hours, that is, escape without having his photograph taken. It would be easy for them, having at hand the photographs and the dates, to facilitate or make available the photograph of the person who went to the consulate, be it the decedent or the dead man or the other person that I think I saw went to the consulate. It is indeed curious that they did not provide that photograph, because if it were the same man, you would have recognized him in that photograph. And if I remembered the face, I would have recognized it amongst those photos. And there was no photo of either. This is very curious, that something like that should happen, especially among individuals or men who are so efficient and who spied on our consulate and our Embassy. Mr. PREYER. I would like to ask if we could have exhibit 437 displayed. Mr. Azcue, I will ask if that is a picture of you in Cuba looking through the album of photographs which the committee made available to you. Senor AZCUE. Right. That is a photograph of myself with the photo album that you provided me. Mr. PREYER. And I believe you recognized none of the photographs in that album as being the man whom you feel you saw in the Embassy. Have you ever seen that man again, the man who you believe you saw in the consulate? Senor AZCUE. No, never. This is what I stated before. Mr. PREYER. I believe you said that the man who signed the visa application did not sign it in your presence, as far as you recall. 145 Senor AZCUE. No; the secretary is the one who takes care of all of this. And we are normally in our private office while she is having the applicant provide the information and fill the forms and attaching the photograph. During all of that time we are in our offices working. Mr. PREYER. If analysis of that handwriting, of that signature on the visa application showed it to be Lee Harvey Oswald's signature, would you still believe that the man who visited you in the consulate was not Oswald? Senor AZCUE. Under such circumstances I would have to accept that I was being influenced or that I was seeing visions. Mr. PREYER. Mr. Chairman, I am at a point now at which there are two other areas that I wanted to ask Mr. Azcue some questions. It will probably take about 15 minutes. Would you prefer to go forward or to recess until after lunch at this time? First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-437 be admitted into evidence at this point. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 146 JFK EXHIBIT F-437 Chairman STOKES. The Chair thinks this is a good time for us to take a recess. Accordingly, the committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon. I request at this time that all persons remain in their seats until the witness has been escorted from the hearing room, after which we will declare a recess. [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m.] 147 AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. All persons in the hearing room are requested to take their seats and to remain seated while the witness is being brought into the room and to the witness table. Thereafter you may move about if you please, but then once again, whenever the witness departs the room, you are also further requested to remain in your seats for security purposes. You may bring the witness in. The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may further consume. TESTIMONY OF EUSEBIO AZCUE--(Resumed) Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-428 be placed on the easel, please. Do we have JFK exhibit F-428? In the earlier testimony that was read to the committee today from Sylvia Duran, mention was made of a newspaper article by a reporter named Comer Clark which appeared in an american paper. This is a copy of that article. I would like to read you about the first five or six paragraphs of that article, Mr. Azcue, and get your comments upon it. I would suggest to the translator that I might read by sections of it and give you a copy of the article and you can translate it directly, in the interest of time. The article reads in the first paragraph, it begins in quotation marks: "Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him. "I might have been able to--but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect." These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15. "Lee Oswald came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. The first time--I was told--he wanted to work for us. "He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't. "He wouldn't go into details. "The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.' "Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' "Then Oswald said--and this was exactly how it was reported to me--'Maybe I'll try to do it.' "This was less than 2 months before the U.S President was assassinated." Mr. Azcue, would you comment on that statement? Senor AZCUE. I have already commented to you, in the course of previous conversations, that Mr. Oswald did not see nor could he have seen, either at the consulate or the Embassy, any persons or individuals other than we. He did not have any contact other than contact with us, consul Mirabal, I as consul, and Sylvia Duran as a secretary. He did not mention any such thing to any of us, and much less would we have passed this information on to Fidel. So I see no way in which our Commander in Chief could have been aware of a conversation that Oswald says he held with one of our agents. The only agents present were those three I have mentioned-the two consuls and the secretary. 148 First of all, I would have never tolerated a conversation of that nature because, without any doubt, that would have constituted a provocation, and we do not allow ourselves to be provoked, and our revolution never dealt with anything related to terrorism, much less so the death of President Kennedy. What would become of us should we have intervened? This is ridiculous that we should attempt to walk into the mouth of the lion, and this has been repeatedly asserted by our Commander in Chief. We have never used terrorism. We have never supported terrorism, and we have never even supported terrorism even in those cases in which we sympathize with the views of those who did practice it. Mr. PREYER. So that the man who appeared before you in the consulate did not say these words as set out in the article, nor anything that sounded like those words. Senor AZCUE. I repeat once again that I would not have tolerated it because I would have taken this as a provocation, and our behavior in this context is extraordinarily clear and clean. Mr. PREYER. Moving to another area, Mr. Azcue, Sylvia Duran and her husband often entertained, I believe, in Mexico City. Did you socialize with the Durans from time to time? Did you attend their parties? Senor AZCUE. Yes; in Mexico naturally it is a custom to have social gatherings in the home of one or another friend. They did host them, not as frequently as the question you have formulated would imply, but they did, and I in turn have attended some of those gatherings, and I believe that whenever they did have a party, they always invited me because I was very friendly to both. Mr. PREYER. Do you know if they had any parties in September of 1963; that is, the time when Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico? Senor AZCUE. It is possible, but it is difficult that they would have held such a party without inviting me, a person that was so close to them. And I recall that the last gathering that I attended at the Duran home was one that was carried out in order to bid me farewell in preparation for my return to Cuba, and it was during the month of November, a few days before my departure from Mexico. Mr. PREYER. Do you know Elena Garro de Paz? Senor AZCUE. Yes. I have seen her on some occasions in the home of one of her sisters, whose husband is a Mexican painter, Horacio, whose name is Guerrero Galvan, and who was a friend of mine. Mr. PREYER. I believe her husband is Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet? Senor AZCUE. Yes, Octavio Paz, who was also Mexican Ambassador to Paris and a distinguished poet, was her husband at the time I met her. Mr. PREYER. Elena Garro de Paz was a friend of the Durans and also a friend of yours, I believe; is that correct? Senor Azcue. That is correct; yes. She was related to Horacio Duran. Mr. PREYER. And did I understand you to say that the painter, Guerrero Galvan--is that the way you pronounce that?--was a 149 friend of yours and was married to the sister of Elena Garro de Paz? Senor AZCUE. Exactly. Mr. PREYER. Perhaps I should get the blackboard out and draw some lines to spell out the family tree there. But let me just sum up by asking: You knew Elena Garro de Paz fairly well? Senor AZCUE. Not very well. I have met her on two, maybe three opportunities because she was living at that time in her sister's home, the home of Mrs. Guerrero Galvan, the home that I used to visit with a certain frequency, but we were not intimate friends. It was simply a social acquaintance. Mr. PREYER. Would you describe her as an emotionally stable person? Senor AZCUE. She appeared to me to be a delicate person, a refined person, a cultured writer. Mr. PREYER. Did she have what we might call a vivid imagination about things other than her writing? Senor AZCUE. I believe it is very difficult in the course of two or three visits to be able to fully understand the character of a lady without being a close or intimate friend, and her writings I have only read from the standpoint of literary criticism or review. I would not attempt to make a critical evaluation of her personality or character because I am not a psychologist. Mr. PREYER. Let me put it this way. If she told you a story about something that had happened, would you be apt to believe her? Senor AZCUE. It would depend on the kind of story she would be telling me. Mr. PREYER. If she told you something of a serious nature, would you be apt, likely to believe that she would be telling the truth about it? Senor AZCUE. I repeat once again that it will depend on the subject matter. It depends on the issue itself, not who is telling the story. If it has some viability or credibility, I would accept it. If not, I would not. Mr. PREYER. Did you ever hear that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended one of the Durans' parties when he was in Mexico? Senor AZCUE. No, never, and that is one of the things I would not believe, no matter who would tell me, because I knew the Durans well, and I knew that this gentleman, I know that this gentleman who turned up at the consulate to request a visa had no other activities or purpose while there. He came to the consulate and thereafter we never talked about him or saw him any other time. And I repeat once again that I wouldn't believe that either Sylvia or Horacio would host a gathering during those days without inviting me. Mr. PREYER. Did you know a man named Emilio Carbellido, a Mexican writer, I believe? Senor AZCUE. Yes, of course, very well known in Mexico. He is a well-known writer, and well known in Cuba also, because he has visited there repeatedly. Mr. PREYER. Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with Mr. Carbellido? 150 Senor AZCUE. It is my prior practice not to discuss with anyone outside of my own group, members of my own Embassy, or of our own group, any of these issues of foreign policy or policy of other nations. We are very careful regarding our own views, especially in the presence of a gentleman who was not such a great friend of mine. Mr. PREYER. Would Mr. Carbellido have been at the parties or some of the parties that the Durans gave from time to time? Senor AZCUE. It is possible. I do not recall his presence at any specific one, but it is possible that he might have attended. Mr. PREYER. I have asked you some questions earlier, Mr. Azcue, about Miss Elena Garro de Paz, and as to whether you would be likely to believe a story if she told it to you. Miss Garro has told us that on one occasion she was at a party at one of the Durans' houses, and that you and Oswald were both at the party. She has told us that at another party at one of the Durans' homes she overheard a conversation in which you and Emilio Carbellido were discussing President Kennedy. She says that at the conclusion of that conversation, you stated that there was no alternative than to kill President Kennedy. Would you care to comment on her allegations? Senor AZCUE. Yes; first, because it is not possible or conceivable in my own mind to kill anyone, much less so the President of the United States, and much more so because of the possible implications or effects upon our own revolution, which I would defend with every effort that I could muster. It would be necessary to ask this lady why she makes such statements; it is incredible. Because, I repeat, I have seen her only two or three times in my whole life, and much earlier than the time when this gentleman showed up at our consulate. With some analysis, I could probably even determine the date of these meetings with her. And I know that the last time I saw her was much before Mirabal arrived at the consulate, and Mirabal arrived on September 2. I can almost fix the date. The previous secretary, the one who preceded Sylvia Duran, was a relative of mine who died on July 19. And I clearly recall that the son of Guerrero Galvan, the painter, who was a student of medicine, was discussing with me the unfortunate death of my secretary, who was, in turn, my relative, as a result of a car accident in a Volkswagen, and he was explaining to me how dangerous it was to be in an accident in a Volkswagen because of the shortness of the car and the proximity of the riders to the windshield, and it was a date so close to July 19 that he was telling me that, during that same period, those same days, there had been three fatal accidents similar to the one in which my secretary had died, and that was the last opportunity on which I saw Elena Garro. What did they offer Elena Garro to make such absurd statements or declarations? Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions at this time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 151 How are you again? Senor AZCUE. Glad to meet you, sir. Mr. DODD. I am not going to speak in Spanish. My Spanish isn't that good. Could you please tell me, Mr. Azcue, how long you had been the consul in Mexico prior to your departure in November of 1963? Senor Azcue. When the revolution achieved its victory, I was appointed consulate the beginning of January 1959. Thereafter they called upon me, thereafter the Government of Cuba recalled me to put me in charge of the reconstruction of housing for peasants in our country, and who were members of the rebel army, and housing that had been destroyed during the course of the war. So at that point I returned to Cuba in June of 1959 and was working in the Sierras, in the mountains, in charge of construction, work, probably until 1960. I do not recall the exact date. Then I returned to Mexico as an attache, a diplomatic attache, to the Embassy, and shortly thereafter I had to take over or take charge of the consulate, and on this occasion until November of 1963. Mr. DODD. Am I to understand, then, that you assumed the duties of consul in 1960, some time early in 1960, the end of 1960? What period of time did you assume those responsibilities? Senor AZCUE. Yes, it was in April of 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. Mr. DODD. Now, did I understand your testimony correctly, that you were not aware of how the photograph on the exhibit, the visa application, you are not aware of how that photo got on that application? In fact, you had not seen the photograph on the application? Senor AZCUE. That is the case. Sylvia Duran was handling that area. She typed in the form, affixed the photo, had the applicant sign the forms. In the meantime there was no reason for us consuls to be present there observing the procedure. We were simply in our private offices. We had a lot of work. Mr. DODD. The reason I asked you that question, is that when several of us had the opportunity to interview you in Cuba a few short months ago, on page 14 of our interview, which I hope you have a copy of, I was questioning you and I asked you: Going back to the physical appearance of Lee Harvey Oswald, apart from having a receding hairline, was there any gray in Lee Harvey Oswald's hair? You responded: You know he had blond hair. It is all very interesting. You see this picture, I really did not study carefully. The picture was taken by the secretary and she applied it to the application. It would seem from your response to my question then that, one, you did see the picture on the application or that you did not see the picture on the application then, but were merely looking at it when it was in front of you, and that you had very specific knowledge as to how the picture got on the application, that in fact Sylvia Duran stapled it to the application. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair will permit the witness to respond to the question. Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a matter of routine. She is the one who handles all of these detailed operations. I could assure that she was the one who did it without having seen her do it. There was no one, 152 no other person there, that would do that work for her, and neither Mirabal nor I did that work. Mr. DODD. All right, then. May I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, just to proceed and finish this line of questioning, which should take just a couple of minutes? I will try to make my questions brief for the translations. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman may proceed. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Based on the testimony you have given, if we are to believe your testimony with regard to the description of the individual that you said you saw that day, it would vary quite significantly, or significantly from the actual photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald, the one on the visa application and the photograph that you see to your left over here. They would be different than the person that you saw in the Cuban Consulate, isn't that correct? Senor AZCUE. For me, yes. When I saw in April the photograph placed on the application, I was surprised by his looks or similarity with the Lee Harvey Oswald who had been killed. This was my reaction in front of you. You were the ones who showed me that picture. That was the first time that I saw that application completed with the photos and all of the other information. Mr. DODD. But what you saw was someone that was very different looking from the person that you met in the Cuban Consulate in September of 1963? Senor AZCUE. Yes, as different as I found him when I saw him in film. The image I had of the individual who showed up at the consulate was the man in his thirties, maybe 35 years old, and with the very thin face. You will recall that he had very natural lines, very thin straight nose, except for all of the items I mentioned, and this gentleman appeared to me to be much younger and with a much fuller face. That is the evaluation I have with absolute certainty. It is my truth. Mr. DODD. My question is this, after having gone through that, I am left with two choices that I perceive that caused this to occur, since according to your testimony and the testimony of others, there were three people who were working in the consul's section. There was Mr. Mirabal, there was yourself and there was Sylvia Duran. It was either a terrible mistake on the part of Sylvia Duran, who also saw this individual come into the office and who stapled this on here, or there was complicity in placing the photograph on the application at the time. If the two people were that different, then the only people who could have been involved would have been people at the consulate. Would you please help me out with that possible contradiction? Senor AZCUE. Well, I am sure that it was not a case of complicity. It is possibly a matter of what I see as the truth and what she sees as the truth, my image of the individual present there, her image of the individual there, and whether she carefully studied the photo. These types of photographs are not necessarily that precise. They are not as regular passport pictures which have to be very clear. And there is, of course, one other possibility, and I cannot guarantee that this is the case, but it is conceivable that 153 while writing down all the information on the application, that she might not have checked exactly the picture against the individual who was applying, that, occupied as she was, she most probably proceeded to place the photograph on the application without this check. Mr. DODD. In effect suggesting that there was an enormous error. Senor AZCUE. It is a mistake that results very often in the case of the course of one's work, in the normal or ordinary case. Mr. DODD. And that also, if I understood you, the third option being is that you could be mistaken as to separating the identity of the two people. Senor AZCUE. It is possible. We are all exposed to error or mis- take. It is not, however, my view. My view is that I am right. Now I have to say I am not infallible. Mr. DODD. I wasn't suggesting that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the additional amount of time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just curious. You had been in Mexico from 1943; am I correct in that? Senor AZCUE. 1944. Mr. SAWYER. You were a Cuban by birth and had lived in Cuba before that time, I understand. Senor AZCUE. Yes, many years. Mr. SAWYER. Why had you spent so long a time in Mexico as opposed to being in Cuba? Senor AZCUE. I first left Cuba during the time of the government of Machado in 1931. I lived for about 10 years almost in Europe. At that time I wanted to return to Mexico, to conclude my studies. Because I did not agree or follow the politics in Cuba during the time, I never felt at home with Batista, I never felt well. I preferred to live in a country that offered me opportunities to study and to work, and I built my life there. It was my second homeland, as is the case with so many other Cubans who at that time had to be bouncing around from one place to another. Mr. SAWYER. So then since about 1931, up until about 1959, you were what you might say a political refugee, or political exile, in effect, from Cuba. Senor AZCUE. A voluntary exile. Nobody forced me not to live in my country. I did not find it pleasant because of the political climate in my country to live there. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THONE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one question in line with the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, on which I am a little confused. Chairman STOKES. Certainly. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. THONE. Consul Azcue, did I understand, and I may not have gotten it right this morning, that when you went back to Cuba you saw a film which depicted the shooting by a Mr. Ruby of Lee Harvey Oswald, and at the time you were concerned that this wasn't the same person at all that was at the consul applying for a visa? 154 Senor AZCUE. Exactly. Only 2 months back I had seen the individual who appeared at the consulate. So I had his image clearly engraved in my mind, and I did not recognize him in the movie. Mr. THONE. Exactly. Now my question. Did you report this to the Cuban Government, and if so to whom and what happened on your report in this regard? Senor AZCUE. I reported this to some of my friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But in fact, in truth I was aware of the fact that it was testimony of my own, it was of my own imagination. And that the conditions under which I had seen him in the film at the time he was killed, with distorted features as a result of pain, it is conceivable that I might be mistaken. I reaffirmed my view when Attorney Garrison of New Orleans stated that the Oswald who visited or was at the consulate was not the one who allegedly killed Kennedy, because of the date he departed New Orleans and the date he had visited the consulate in Cuba. So that confirmed my own view, and at that point I believed that as being the truth. And then I communicated this. And that was probably filed, recorded. I did not write a report. I made an oral report. But it would be necessary to investigate whether such a report in writing exists or does not. But that was the time when I saw my own views confirmed in my opinion that there were two Oswalds. Garrison shares the same opinion. Mr. THONE. Senor Azcue, I don't want to be too repetitious. But just a quick followup question. Again, to whom in the Foreign Division, or Service, down in Havana, did you report this after you had seen the Ruby film, and at what time? Senor AZCUE. These were colleagues of mine in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at that time all three of us were working in the National Council for Culture. And it was Mr. Lechuga and Mr. Otero. Mr. THONE. And when did you make that report? Senor AZCUE. Immediately after reading Garrison's statements in the newspaper. Possibly at the end of 1964. That would be something very easy to check out. Or maybe beginning of 1965. Mr. THONE. Last this, and it is probably a question you cannot answer. Do you know what action at all was taken within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on your report in this regard? Senor Azcue. Honestly, I do not know that. Mr. THONE. Because this is quite a startling development here. You would have thought that your government would have done something with the report from the consul who supposedly had three confrontations with the man reported to be Lee Harvey Oswald. And when you came up with this information that this was not the same person that was down there, you would have thought something would have happened. Just a comment. I don't know that it needs a response, Mr. Consul, unless you would have a thought on it. Senor AZCUE. Yes. It is very possible, it is a possibility that they did not believe me at all, that they might have thought that this was simply my own impression or evaluation. And moreover, that 155 it might be with reference to a matter that was not one of immediate concern in terms of current events at that time for us. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time to the Chair. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Azcue, you testified that Oswald produced a document showing his membership in the U.S. Communist Party. To your knowledge was that document valid? Senor AZCUE. I did not concentrate much of my attention on the documents themselves. And I could not see whether they were authentic or not. The person who saw them, or the person who made the notations might have been Sylvia. But she had no way of telling whether they were authentic or not, any of the documents. That is the reason that he addresses himself to the Soviet Embassy, so that they in turn could tell us whether the Soviet documents are or are not valid. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. At your consulate, whose responsibility was it to compare the applicant in person with the picture on the application, or the picture offered to be put on the application, to assure that the photo was indeed the photo of the person applying for a visa? Senor AZCUE. The first one that should have checked that out was Sylvia. And I feel that we also should have checked. But fatally I did not make the comparison or that check. I had not seen that photograph until April of the present year. Mr. FITHIAN. May I direct a question to counsel, Mr. Cornwell. Would the passport, the application that we have on the display board, would we have gotten that from Havana, or the consulate in Mexico City? Mr. CORNWELL. The passport and the passport application came from New Orleans. Are you talking about the visa application? Mr. FITHIAN. I am talking about the visa application that was submitted to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, the large display on the board. Mr. CORNWELL. Two visa applications; No. 408 is the one on the right, that is a photograph of an original visa application which was provided to us for inspection during our trip to Cuba by the Cuban Government. The one on the left, No. 407, is a photograph of a visa application provided by the Cuban Government to the Warren Commission, and would appear to be a carbon copy. Mr. FITHIAN. My question, Mr. Cornwell, goes to the stamping of October 10 on it. Obviously if it were from the Cuban consulate at Mexico City, and it had a date of October 10 on it, that is one thing. It is quite another, obviously, if it is a photo of a copy that has been sent on down to Havana to one of the other bureaus. Mr. CORNWELL. I don't believe there is testimony solving that issue yet. The only testimony I believe we have had is with respect to the exhibit 408, and as I recall, Senor Azcue provided information about his understanding of the date October 10 on that document. He was not asked why there was no similar date on document 407, to my memory. 156 Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. Mr. Azcue, Lee Harvey Oswald was a radar operator in the Marines and was familiar with the U.S. spy plane, the U-2. Did Oswald ever mention to you his service in the Marines or in the military in the United States during your conversation with him as he was trying to get a passport to Cuba? Senor AZCUE. He did not provide any information on his own background other than the presentation of the documentation that he had brought forth in connection with his application. It was clear, and I was able to check out from the first time, that his only intent was to obtain a visa immediately. Therefore his background, especially his nonrevolutionary background, was of a nature that he had no interest at all in communicating to us. He was interested in telling me that he was a member of the Communist Party, that he was a resident of the Soviet Union. In other words, that which he believed would be sufficient to obtain the visa. And our conversations were always extremely brief, because I used to put an end to these conversations, referring to the instructions I had from my government of a need to obtain their prior authorization before issuing any visa, either the final destination visa to the Soviet Union, so that I may be in a position to provide him, without prior consultation to Cuba, with a transit visa, but with the visa of the Soviet Union already affixed to his passport. Everything went around that very issue. He did not speak a single word outside of that issue. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does counsel have anything further? Excuse me. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to pursue one other line of questioning, if I may, and I will try and be brief on it. Could you tell me, Mr. Azcue, what the Cuban surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico might have shown during those days in September 1963? Did you conduct or have photographic surveillance of people who came into your Embassy, or did you keep any sort of surveillance mechanism by which you could keep a record of those people who came to your Embassy or stopped in for whatever business? Senor AZCUE. We were very young, maybe trusting. We did not have great experience. And we had great trust in our neighbors. At first we did not mistrust anyone. Intuitively we might have had certain reasons to be concerned or to fear certain individuals, but we did not take any photographs, nor did we have any mechanisms or systems. We simply took measures to protect ourselves from some possible aggression or aggressive act. But it was a result of our own action. And with some small security protection or guard that the Mexican Government provided outside the premises, and our own colleagues within the Embassy, who might be able to react to outside aggression, but with nothing much other than their own physical ability to do so, with their bodies. Mr. DODD. As I understood your testimony, you were in Cuba on November 22, 1963. You had returned from Mexico. Senor AZCUE. I left on the 18th. Mr. DODD. I presume Once it became--once the knowledge was acquired in Cuba that the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had applied for a visa in your consulate in Mexico, that there was 157 then an investigation in Cuba, that it was then a concern, I presume, of Premier Castro and his government to inquire as to those people who had knowledge of that particular circumstance as to actually what in fact happened in Mexico in September of that year. Is that a fact? Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The Chair will permit the witness to answer the question. Senor AZCUE. Immediately, as soon as I saw the name, I communicated it, or got in touch myself with the Foreign Ministry, and after a quick interview with the Minister and with the Chief of the Bureau, I was immediately sent to the person responsible for such matters in the Interior Ministry, and that was Commandante Pineiro. Naturally this event constituted a great commotion for us because we feared that we might be involved in that dirty business. At that time the Commander in Chief, in his speech of November 27, he is already informed in advance of all those points on which I had personally reported, reported to Commander Pineiro of the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore it is in that speech that Fidel comments or reflects and states what 1 have always stated. Mr. DODD. Did you make any effort or are you aware of any effort that was made to also talk to either Sylvia Duran, Mr. Mirabal, anyone else that could possibly shed any light as to what actually happened in the consulate in Mexico, other than talking to yourself? Senor AZCUE. Our colleague, Sylvia Duran, was arrested by the Mexican Government in order to obtain from her clarification or other types of statements from her. Regarding other possible investigations on the part of the Cuban Government, I am not aware of them, because I am not an intelligence agent of the Cuban Government. I provide the information I hold so that it might be processed or acted on. Mr. DODD. So am I to understand that you gave oral testimony, there was no written statement, there was no tape recording or any stenographer that took your statement at the time? Senor AZCUE. No. Commander Pineiro and I were alone in his office. But a few days thereafter I heard the speech of Fidel and I realized that the Commander in Chief was fully informed of all points. So the precise report summarized in brief form is incorporated in the speech of Prime Minister Castro. All of the information is contained therein, and consequently printed in the press and televised and transmitted through radio. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask whether or not we as a committee have asked the Cuban Government for any and all documentation which they may have prepared or have at their disposal as a result of their investigation of this particular aspect of the case at the time that they became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application in Mexico. Have we made that request, and, if so, have we had a response? Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Dodd, we have indeed asked the Cuban Government to provide us with any written reports filed at that time by either Mr. Azcue or any of the people with whom he dealt. And they have informed us that this was handled orally; that no written reports were made at that time. 158 Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Azcue, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled, under the rules of this committee, and of the House, to have extended to him 5 minutes in which he may comment upon the testimony he has given before our committee, and I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose at this time, if you so desire. Senor AZCUE. Thank you very much. I will use the 5 minutes or possibly less. First, I want to thank you for the good reception that we have had in this visit here during our trip, for all attentions extended. It has been more than we could have expected. And at the same time I want to state or express that it is in our greatest interest that this entire issue be clarified to the utmost, and that we have always cooperated, and that you must have been able to note it as a result of statements made by our own Prime Minister reflecting our sincere cooperation, without holding back any information, an attitude which we have consistently maintained. We have the greatest interest in seeing that the issue is clarified, possibly an interest equaling your own interest in having it clarified. At any and all times we are available to you and at your disposition within the context of our possibilities. We have always played with clean decks, with clean cards, as has always been our custom. Once again, thank you very much. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Azcue, I want to also say to you it is nice to see you again. We enjoyed the visit we had with you in Cuba, the testimony we took from you at that time. And on behalf of the committee, we want to also thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee and for you voluntarily appearing here today as a witness. So on behalf of the committee and the House of Representatives, we thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee. You are now excused. Senor AZCUE. [in English]. You are welcome, Mr. Stokes. Can I go? Chairman STOKES. Yes, you may go. All persons are requested to remain in their seats until the witness has departed from the hearing room. Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, if I may, for a moment. Chairman STOKES. Yes, counsel. Mr. STANDARD. The witness has made reference today to two speeches of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of November 23 and November 27, 1963, and I ask they be incorporated as part of this record. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, your request is granted. JFK exhibit F-684 may be entered into the record at this point. [The exhibit follows:] 159 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 160 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 161 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 162 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 163 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 164 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 165 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 166 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 167 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 168 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 169 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 170 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 171 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 172 Mr. STANDARD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have one other request, if I may. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. Mr. STANDARD. Congressman Thone addressed himself to what in fact happened to the discussion which Senior Azcue had, and I would refer him to what I believe is part of the interviews of your committee and your staff with Mr. Otero, which is not yet part of this record as far as I know; and second to the transcription of the 4-hour interview with President Castro, which I understand will be made part of this record by reference when the witnesses have completed their testimony. Chairman STOKES. That is correct. The full transcript of the statement with President Castro will be made and incorporated into the entire record. Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. At this time, Mr. Azcue, you are excused. All persons are requested to remain in their seats while the witness leaves the room. Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, the witness would like to remain in the room; if I could provide a chair for him, I would. Chairman STOKES. Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, in light of the questions raised as to the identity of the man who visited the Cuban consulate, that is whether or not he was Lee Harvey Oswald, the committee decided to test by handwriting analysis the authenticity of the signature on the visa application. The committee was advised by the Cuban Government that the visa applications had to be typed in duplicate and that the applicant had to sign both copies. In 1964, one of the forms allegedly signed by Mr. Oswald was turned over to the Warren Commission. In 1978 the committee obtained the second copy, which has been incorporated in the record, in Havana. Consequently, there are two checks to be made in a handwriting analysis of this question, one, to determine that both visa application forms were signed by the same person, and two, to determine if possible whether the signatures were in fact or are in fact identical with the other writings attributable to Lee Harvey Oswald. For the purposes of verification, the committee asked its handwriting experts to compare the signatures on the two forms which are part of the record with two other writings. Those other writings were the signature on Oswald's fingerprint card at the time of his arrest in New Orleans in August 1963, and his passport application dated June 24, 1963. Mr. Chairman, the committee's panel of handwriting experts have in fact made that analysis, and a representative of it will be with the committee on Monday to report in full on those findings. In essence, however, it is that Lee Harvey Oswald signed both of the visa applications. That representative of the handwriting panel will be Mr. Joseph P. McNally. The committee will recall that Mr. McNally has already testified before the committee and will be available again on Monday to be fully cross-examined on this and several other issues that have arisen in the handwriting area. 173 At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to note that another member of the Cuban consulate staff who was present when Oswald allegedly applied for a visa was Senor Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. Senor Mirabal succeeded Senor Azcue as Cuban consul in Mexico City. Senor Mirabal was born August 11, 1923. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Mirabal. Chairman STOKES. Will the witness please stand. Raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God. [The testimony of Senor Mirabal was given through the interpreter.] Senor MIRABAL. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. TESTIMONY OF SENOR ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HERVAS, INTERPRETER FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes counsel, Michael Goldsmith. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mirabal, when did you assume your position as Cuban consul in Mexico City? Senor MIRABAL. September 2, 1963. Mr. GOLDSMITH. How long had you worked in that capacity? Senor MIRABAL. Eleven months. Mr. GOLDSMITH. What hours of the day was the Cuban consulate open to the public? Senor MIRABAL. Ten in the morning to two in the afternoon. Mr. GOLDSMITH. And what days of the week were these hours observed? Senor MIRABAL. Monday through Friday. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the consulate open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays? Senor MIRABAL. No. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, while you were Cuban consul in Mexico City, did you ever see Lee Harvey Oswald? Senor MIRABAL. Twice, on two occasions, when he was at the consulate processing his visa application. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did anything unusual happen when Oswald was applying for his visa? Senor MIRABAL. Yes; since he first came for the visa, I must note that I do not know English, and therefore it was my colleague Azcue who took care of him, though he had in fact concluded his responsibilities in the position. When I arrived, he stayed on to help me out and he, together with the secretary, took care of this visitor. From inside my private office I could hear loud voices, and I came out of my office several times to see what was happening in the area where the secretary worked. I asked my colleague, Azcue, who was taking care of the visitor, I did not know who the visitor was. But my colleague Azcue told me that the visitor was in need 174 of an urgent visa, that he was in a great hurry to travel to Cuba. However, as our own procedures dictated, and as our instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Relations provided, we were not authorized to issue a visa, and therefore the visa was not issued. He continued in this discussion. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did Mr. Oswald get involved in arguments with Mr. Azcue on both occasions that he, Oswald, visited the consulate? Senor MIRABAL Yes; on both occasions there were discussions or arguments to such an extent that from the very first moment it appeared to me as if this instance could be a case of a provocation. I sensed that there was an intent to create some kind of a scandal, of a disturbance. That was my feeling. The second time the same thing happened. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Approximately how long did these arguments last? Senor MIRABAL. Today I could not be exact or precise; 15 years have gone by since then. Some time, 15, 20 minutes. Mr. GOLDSMITH. And you had occasion to see Mr. Oswald on both of these occasions? Senor MIRABAL. Yes. I had an opportunity to see him. But it was from my private office where I stuck my head over and had a look at him from that vantage point. Mr. GOLDSMITH. How far away from you was Mr. Oswald during these two visits? Senor MIRABAL. About 4 meters away. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall when Mr. Oswald made his visits to the Cuban consulate? Senor MIRABAL. It was at the beginning or shortly after my arrival. Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time, Mr. Mirabal, I would like to refer your attention to what has been marked as JFK exhibit F-408. That is the second exhibit from the right. And I believe you have just been handed a copy of that exhibit. Mr. Mirabal, does the date on that application refresh your memory as to when Oswald visited the Embassy? Senor MIRABAL. Yes; it is close to the date of my arrival. Yes, in addition the visa applications are filled in at the very time that they are being requested, and this would be on the second occasion. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, please look at the picture that appears in that application. Is the person whose picture appears in this visa application the same Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate requesting a visa? Senor MIRABAL. I really did not observe him with any great deal of interest. He for me was one of many who visited the consulate. The image that I have of him, I believe that the answer is yes, that he is the same person. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, after the assassination of President Kennedy, was there ever any discussion at the Cuban consulate or Embassy concerning whether the Oswald arrested in Dallas was actually the same person identified as Oswald who visited your consulate requesting a visa in September 1963? Senor MIRABAL. Yes; on the day following the assassination it is my own secretary that communicates this information to me in the morning when I arrive at the consulate. At that point, she advises 175 me of the fact that the assassination has occurred. Later, and I cannot recall exactly how late or how soon thereafter, she communicates to me the fact that the alleged assassin is the same person that came to the consulate. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, at this time I would like to read to you a quotation from Comer Clark's article. He attributes the quotation to President Castro. I believe that Mr. Hervas has been given a copy of that. "Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time--I was told--he wanted to work for us. "He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't. "He wouldn't go into details. "The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.' "Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' "Then Oswald said--and this was exactly how it was reported to me-- 'Maybe I'll try to do it.' Mr. Mirabal, do you recall Mr. Oswald making the remarks that are allegedly attributed to him? Senor MIRABAL. I feel that what has just been read is totally absurd, it is incredible. In addition, it is completely false, it is a lie, and it is impossible to imagine that that has been stated. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal. I have no further questions at this time. Chairman STOKES. Does any member seek recognition? Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Mr. Mirabal, let me just follow up the one line of questioning I had for Mr. Azcue, and that is with regard to how the photo on the visa application got there. Can you enlighten us at all as to how that photograph got on the application, what either the normal operating procedures were or if there were any unique operating procedures in this case which would explain how that photograph ended up on that visa application? Senor MIRABAL. The entire matter of the processing of the paper work relating to the application was entrusted to the secretary. I did not participate in any manner. She was most efficient, and we trusted her in this task. Mr. DODD. In other words, you never saw the visa application when it was in the consulate in Mexico. Senor MIRABAL. Yes, I did. In fact, there is a footnote with a series of remarks or a remark or observation that I included or I made. Mr. DODD. Do you recall that photograph as the photograph of the man that you saw, granted not all that clearly, during the 30 minutes or so, the total period of time that he was in your office back in September of 1963? Senor MIRABAL. I know that this was the photograph that was affixed to the request of the application, but at no point did I verify whether this photograph was in fact that of the person who submitted the application, because this was not a matter that I took care of. It was the secretary who was responsible for this, and when she brought these documents to me, I assumed that everything was in order. Mr. DODD. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 176 Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Yes, I just have one question. You stated that the statement attributed to President Castro as to the statements made in the consulate by Lee Harvey Oswald were not correct and were a lie or something to that effect. At that time, I understood you could not speak English and did not understand English; is that correct? Senor MIRABAL. Yes, it is true. I did not speak English at that time. However, my colleague, Senor Azcue, and the secretary would, without any doubt, have informed me if he had stated anything of such a nature. I have complete trust in my colleague, Azcue, and in the secretary, and obviously because of the unusual and extremely alarming nature of any observations or statements of that kind, I feel sure that they would have advised me had they heard them. Mr. SAWYER. I just wanted the record to be clear that you are repeating what the other two told you rather than stating an observation as to what he said yourself. You are nodding your head yes. Senor MIRABAL. Yes; I don't understand English. Even if I heard it in English, I wouldn't have understood it--yes, it was my colleague, Azcue, and the secretary who took care of the application submitted by Lee Harvey Oswald. It was also them who provided me with all of the information that enabled me to add the observation contained in that footnote to the effect that he was requesting at the same time a visa to go to the Soviet Union. In fact, I noticed that he presented a card or credentials as belonging to the Communist Party of the United States. I understand, or it is also my understanding, that the Communist Party of the United States stated that he never belonged to the party. I was surprised by the fact that the card seemed to be a new card. I must say that I also have been a Communist for a number of years and that generally we do not use credentials or a card to identify ourselves as members of the party. Rather, we are identified to ourselves as Communists by our own behavior and by our own ideas. I was surprised by his unusual interest in using identification as a Communist. I would think it would be interesting to know how he obtained the card. It did have his name, and it did coincide with the same name that appeared in the other document. And, as I indicated, it was my colleague, Azcue, who brought all these documents and all this information to my desk for my report. It is then that I talked with the Soviet consul, and when I mentioned this to him, he told me that Oswald had in fact requested a visa for the Soviet Union but that he had been told that it would take about 4 months to obtain a response, and that is the reason that I included that information in the footnote that was to be sent to Havana. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Mirabal, was it standard operating procedure for an applicant to affix his signature to the application in the presence of a consulate official? Senor MIRABAL. That was normal. And it was always applied in that manner. 177 Chairman STOKES. Were there ever any occasions when an application form would be signed in blank? Senor MIRABAL. During the 11 months that I was there, that was never done. Chairman STOKES. And under the procedure as you knew it, were applicants ever permitted to take the application forms out of the consular office? Senor MIRABAL. To my knowledge, no. The ministry did not allow that to be done. I could not authorize it, and as far as I know, it was never done. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Mirabal. Is there anything further? The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could I get Mr. Mirabal to describe Mr. Oswald's demeanor, please? Senor MIRABAL. What I recall, and this, of course, is not only an image that time has eroded, but also I looked at him without concentrating great attention on him. At that time his appearance was not a cause of concern, but rather the events that were taking place at that time, the loud conversation, et cetera. As I recall him, he was a rather small man, medium height or somewhat less, narrow shoulders. I believe he was wearing a coat, short hair. I do not recall him having a moustache. He did have a serious expression on his face. He appeared hard or tough, someone who is upset or unhappy. That is the image that I retain of him. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Is there anyone else seeking recognition? Mr. Mirabal, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before our committee, he is entitled under the rules of this committee and of the House to address the committee for a period of 5 minutes in the event he desires to in any way clarify his testimony or expand upon it or explain it. I would at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire. Senor MIRABAL. Thank you. I would like to state to the members of the committee that in connection with this entire process of the two visits that he made to the consulate, my impression from the very first moment was that it was in fact a provocation. He insisted on the urgency of his need for a visa. He indicated that he was being persecuted. He indicated that he could not stay long in Mexico, that he had an urgent need to travel to Cuba and therefrom to go to the Soviet Union. On the first day he was not given the visa because he did not fulfill the necessary requirements, requirements that are asked of all individuals who are visa applicants. On the second time he came to file the application, and yet he insisted that he needed to have it processed rapidly with great urgency. It was because of these demands of his that the argument with Mr. Azcue and with the secretary followed, and in fact during the argument he accused us all of not being true revolutionaries, of not being sensitive to the fact that he was being persecuted. I must say that from the very beginning I considered this a provocation, and I assured that in the manner in which we handled the case we followed the directives of the Foreign Ministry in the 178 sense that all individuals have to follow certain procedures in order to obtain a visa. I would also like to say personally that as far as I am concerned, it is a source of great satisfaction to be present here before the committee because in the first place I consider this a very important investigation in itself and also because we are very interested in its successful outcome. I am individually--and my government wants to insure--that things will be perfectly cleared up as a result. We feel that there have been efforts at making propaganda, at conducting campaigns, and Cuba has been, attempts have been made to link Cuba to this horrendous assassination. From the reports that have been read here, apparently even I had been linked to this event, and I can assure that neither Cuba nor I in any manner whatsoever participated in something that we very strongly repudiate, as was clearly stated by Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal. We also want to thank you for having volunteered to be here today and to testify before this committee, and we are deeply appreciative for your appearance. Does counsel have any statement to make? Mr. STANDARD. Just this, Mr. Chairman. In anticipation of your incorporating in this record the 4 hour approximate transcript of the interview with President Castro, I ask that you incorporate into the record and make it a part of it a series of articles which are referred to but not with specificity by date or name. First, a series of three articles by the French journalist, Jean Daniel, one which appeared in L'Express in French and two articles which appeared in the magazine, The New Republic. Second, in the course of the interview several references are made to Ambassador William Atwood. Those statements describe his role in contacting the Cuban Government at the behest of President Kennedy. And I ask that those be included as well. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, counsel's request is hereby granted. JFK exhibit F-685 may be entered into therecord at this point. [The information follows:] 179 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 180 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 181 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 182 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 183 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 184 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 185 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 186 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 187 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 188 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 189 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 190 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 191 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 192 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 193 Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Because of the lateness of the hour, it will be the plan of the committee to make the presentation tomorrow morning of the interview with President Fidel Castro in Cuba. For that reason I would like to make some other remarks at this time. This committee made two trips to Cuba, one on March 30, which extended from the 30th of March to the 4th of April. The second trip was from August 24 to August 29. Prior to going to Cuba on both occasions, it required a great deal of preparation and a great deal of contact between this committee and the Cuban Interest Section in the Cuban Government. I want to acknowledge the presence here today at the witness table of one of the gentlemen who was extremely helpful and cooperative to this committee in terms of both of those trips, Senor Ricardo Escartin, who is the Consul and the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section. It was necessary for Mr. Escartin and other members of the Cuban Interest Section to meet with me on many occasions and also with Professor Blakey and members of this staff. We spent a great deal of time and received a great deal of cooperation from him on every occasion. Also, in Cuba, Senor Senen Buergo, the American Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was extremely helpful and cooperative with this committee. I also want to acknowledge the presence here at the witness table today of another gentleman who was extremely cooperative with us, and that was Senor Felipe Villa, Captain of the Ministry of the Interior, and during the course of both of our trips he extended a great deal of cooperation and help and assistance to this committee. I would like also to mention two very talented and able Cuban translators who were extremely helpful to us, Ms. Juanita Vera Nellie and Ruiz de Sarade. Others who gave cooperation and hospitality to this committee were Dr. Mondo Torres Santrail, the Minister of Justice; Oscar Fernandez Mel, the mayor of Havana; Jose Raimond Fernandez, Minister of Education, all of whom were extremely helpful and hospitable to us on our stay in Cuba. In addition, we want to express our deep appreciation to President Fidel Castro. On the first trip we made to Cuba, President Castro spent in excess of 4 hours being interviewed by the chairman of this committee and other members of the committee and staff. The entire transcript will be put into the record at some point tomorrow. During that period of time, the President made it very clear that it was the purpose of the Cuban Government to make it very clear that their government had nothing to do whatsoever with this very tragic occurrence in this country. It was the intent of their government to do everything possible to cooperate and see that the Cuban Government did everything in its power to clear up whatever it could around a tragedy of this type. So we are indeed grateful for the kind of cooperation that this congressional committee has received, and we want to thank each of you gentlemen for the assistance you have given us in this very important matter. 194 If there is nothing further at this time, I might also say that we are once again indebted to the U.S. Marshall Service for the security arrangements here around the distinguished witnesses who have appeared here today. We also would like to thank the interpreter from the State Department, Mr. Hervas, for a very efficient job he has done here today. At this time the chair will request that everyone remain seated until our witnesses have departed from the hearing room. Thereafter, we will adjourn these hearings until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused. [Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, September 19, 1978.] INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Leodis Matthews, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In late March and early April of this year, three members of the select committee--yourself, Congressman Preyer, and Congressman DODD--as well as three staff members, traveled to Cuba. It was the first of two trips in which the committee sought firsthand information about Lee Harvey Oswald's alleged visit to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, as well as other evidence about the Kennedy assassination. During the trip to Havana the committee representatives were given an opportunity to interview President Castro himself. In a 4-hour session, which was tape recorded, President Castro denied that he or any official of his government had anything to do with the death of President Kennedy or with Lee Harvey Oswald other than the visit to the Cuban consulate in September of 1963. The committee asked President Castro a series of questions. First, the committee asked him to recount whatever details he had learned and could recall regarding Oswald's two visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in September 1963. Mr. Chairman, I ask that JFK F-429A, a photo taken during the interview of President Castro, be displayed and entered into the record at this point. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this place and displayed. [The information follows:] (195) 196 JFK EXHIBIT F-429A Mr. BLAKEY. In addition, may a tape of that interview, JFK F-429B, and a transcript, JFK F-429C, also be included in the record at this point? Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [Tape referred to above is retained in committee files.] [The information follows:] 197 JFK EXHIBIT F-429C INTERVIEW OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ PRESIDENT OF CUBA ------------ STAFF REPORT of the SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION September 18, 1978 198 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Ninety-Fifth Congress LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, District of Columbia STEWART B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California CHARLES THONE, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICHIGAN HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania STAFF G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Director GARY CORNWELL, Deputy Chief counsel Kennedy Task Force EDWIN JUAN LOPEZ SOTO, Researcher 199 Table of Contents Page I. Introduction...............................................1 II. Excerpts: A. Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.....................2 B. Comer Clark's Allegation............................8 C. Use of Assassinations as a Political Weapon.............................................11 D. Statements made by Fidel Castro at the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963..................................17 III. Transcript of an interview of Fidel Castro Ruz of April 3, 1978 by Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, and Christopher Dodd, Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell, and Researcher Edwin Juan Lopez Soto...............................................19 200 INTRODUCTION This Staff Report contains an interview held with Fidel Castro on April 3, 1978. It is President Castro's story as told by President Castro, about major areas of the Committee's concern. President Castro's words have been transcribed from the contemporaneous translations of Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Their translations have been used so as to provide as accurate a transcription as possible. It is based solely on statements made by President Castro; it does not rely upon or cite other source material, or evidence the Committee has uncovered. It is based on an interview conducted by the Committee and staff with President Castro in Havana, Cuba. This interview, released today in its entirety, will also be published as an appendix to the Final Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations. This staff Report should not be reas as "implying" that the Committee believes or disbelieves the statements made. The Committee is currently analyzing and investigating all aspects of the subjects raised in this interview that are related to this investigation. The Final Report will contain a complete analysis of the subjects discussed during the interview related to the investigation. The Final Report will also incorporate all the material that the Select Committee has acquired as a result of its investigation. 201 Page Two EXCERPT A Lee Harvey Oswald's Visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after the assassination that Lee Harvey oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City? Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an application there. But tens - or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applicaitons realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the consulate and filled out an application for a visa - that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And, 202 Page Three then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and had protested in an irate manner because he could not receive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. the rest you know. Stokes: We were wondering your... Castro: There is something I would like to add in that connection. You see, it was always very mcuh suspicious to me--that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa rom cuba. Because, I said to myself - what would have happened had by any chance that man come to cuby - visited Cuba - gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation - a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm -- we rejected visa applications...like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: Why does (this applicant) want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in cuba? Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you know, so it was very difficult for a north American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba - because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into 203 Page Four Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to (travel to cuba) were denied. Now, if it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our Consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person..like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that person had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United states would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange... 204 Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts: One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information available to you, would this be your opinion also--that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter? Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't remember now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an 205 Page Six idea on that. I've heard those comments before -- comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking -- if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for? From my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apply for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many conjectures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the passports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there? Where was Oswald's passport? What became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere. I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that posibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent? I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory. Villa: About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963. 206 Page Seven Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I amy say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. 207 Page Eight EXCERPT B Comer Clark's Allegation Cornwell: One passage reads as follows: An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark...do you have the translation of it there? Villa: Yes. Castro: Let me see it. I have it here. Pause: (Approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.) Castro: This is absurd. I didn't say that. Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur? Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? It's a lie from head to toe. If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying create provocation or a trap, and uh--we would have denounced 208 Page Nine him. Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that--and that never happened--in no part, as far as I know. Escartin: That refersto the interview you spoke about in the beginning. Castro: But how could they interview me in pizzeria? I never to to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented rom the upper to the bottom. I do not remember that. And, it is a surprise for me to se because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related--and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about about that journalist in that newspaper? Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you. Castro: Let me tell you. of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because 209 Page Ten if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview--just almost three years. And even that of Moyers. I didn't want to have that Moyers interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent form the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. I granted one. There are a lot of interview. I granted one. there are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria. Villa: Another element commander. That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a non-serious newspaper. Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published--a lot of lies. 210 Page Eleven EXCERPT C Use of Assassinations As a Political Weapon Castro:...................It was really something inconceivable - could have the idea of killing the President? First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution do not do crazy things and have always been extremely concerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out agression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 90 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take palce..I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the Bay of Pigs, the United States would have invaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the line that had been already traced. 211 Page Twelve There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. We are absolutely convinced of that. However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We were aware of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded..there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our guards away from the lines, from the fence. 212 Page Thirteen We never shot at them. Why? Because we made every possible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the perpetration of an invasion. We could have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They're willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history..nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give The United States the pretext..the possibility..for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek protection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (stategic) missiles, because undoubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the united States President. That was insane. From the 213 Page Fourteen ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane..absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The United States had U-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The women said that they called not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was demoralizing. So, there were, you know, those flights just fery close to the soil. Those kind of flights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let 214 Page Fifteen them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On the following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed that would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn't have been able even to play baseball here. Because those planes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really demoralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made that kind of insanity, and that I may assure you. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the President of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity. I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the 215 Page Sixteen leader does not change the system. It has never done that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things, but it never had the idea of physically eliminating Batista. Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement. We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds..we could have done it, very well, but we never thought about that, because it was different from our feelings. That is our position. That is why we are interested. That is why I was asking you whether you are really hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On your part, if there is something we could give you, we would, without any kind of precondition. The information we have offered you is not conditioned to anything. In spite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that doesn't stop this Committee here from giving the impression that we are being judged here, that we are being tried. 216 Page Seventeen EXCERPT D Statements Made By Fidel Castro At the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963 Castro:...................Then a journalist asked me...and the purpose I had...I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was to warn the government that we know about the (attempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or the other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent, a very serious one -- that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that..not in the least..but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent..something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never 217 Page Eighteen meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know, but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time..that I did make a statement in that sense...in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various principles in relation to.. 218 KENNEDY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Name: Fidel Castro Ruz Date: April 3, 1978 Time: 6:30 p.m. Address: Havana, Cuba Place: Presidential offices Interview: Present were President Fidel castro and his interpreter, Senorita Juanita Vera, Captain Felipe Villa, Senor Ricardo Escartin, Zenen Buergo, and Alfredo Ramirez (representing the Government of Cuba). Also present representing the Government of the United States were Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, Christopher Dodd and staff personnel of HSCA: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Gary Cornwell, Deputy Chief Counsel and Edwin Lopez, Researcher/Translator. The meeting opened and President Castro stated: Castro: Do you have the supposed statements that I have made? I have tried to remember. There is an individual who says that he interviewed me in a restaurant. That is very strange. I tried to recall him, you know. I tried to recall (the proposed) interview and on one occasion (he) said that it was in a (pizzeria). I just reached a conclusion not only because of the circumstances in which he says the interview was made, but also because of the content of the interview...or the alleged interview. I am absolutely certain that that Interviewer Signature___________________________ Typed Signature_________________________________ Date transcribed: Started July 10, 1978 219 Fidel Castro Interview Page two interview never took place. Now, I will have to check that about the (alleged interview at the Brazilian Embassy) because that is true. I mean it's true that I went to the Brazilian Embassy. I've been trying to remember, and I recall the following: It is not that I found out that an attempt was being plotted. Villa, when did the interview occur? Villa: On September the seventh, 1963. You spoke about the topic with Bill Moyers. castro: Then I had know for a long time. It was not recent because the attempt against our lives started to be planned here a long time before that. I could say that from 1959 that was known to us. We were constantly arresting people trained by the CIA and being provided equipment by the CIA that would come to the country with explosives, with the telescopic target rifles, even bazookas -- every kind of weapon. Here they organized, since very early, plots at Grantanamo base. So, that was very well known to us. Then a journalist asked me..and the purpose I had...I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was to warn the government that we know about the (attempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or t he other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. So, I said something like those lots start to set a very bad precedent, 220 Fidel Castro Interview Page three a very serious one--that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that..not in the least..but rather, like warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent..something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday like. I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time...that I did make a statement in that sense...in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various principles in relation to...I remember (another nefarious precedent) was that of the hijacking of planes. The first planes hijacked in this area were Cuban planes, and the hijacking of the planes was encouraged by the United Stated government. Even an amount of money was offered as a 221 Fidel Castro Interview Page four reward to the people that hijacked a Cuban plane. And later what happened? well, it was all the way around -- terrorist elements and insane elements and every kind of people. (Once) the precedent was established, these people started to hijack planes. And that is what I may tell you is part of that experience. And I repeat again that if a similar situation would come about, I could say just the same words -- I could say just just same. Now, I cannot guarantee because I don't have the exact recollection. I don't have the exact copy of what I said literally. And, of course, one always has to be careful with the versions even on a given statement. But that he had interviewed me in the restaurant, and writing the things he wrote? There was a deliberate purpose -- of creating confusion, of planting confusion and trying to have Cuba involved in these events. Stokes: Mr. President, as a result of the statements or the conversation you had with this gentleman at that time, did you ever hear from President Kennedy? Castro: I am trying to recall the date. I can tell you that in the period in which Kennedy's assassination took place Kennedy was changing his policy toward Cuba. I mean by that he was not adopting measures, not in fact. The whole style and aggressive measures against Cuba existed for many years. First of all, the Bay of Pigs; then the 222 Fidel Castro Interview Page five missile crisis; then the pirate attacks -- those attacks which were organized in central America and Miami, at a time at which they sent the mother boats to attack the refineries, the warehouses, boats, merchant ships, port installations and even the (innocent) population was also attacked in those days by these people. It has been known later - more or less - for how long these actions lasted. Now at that time, Kennedy was starting to question all these things. One of the facts, one of the events, was that an American official from the United Nations called my house. I don't speak English, so he spoke to one of my comrades who was with me there. After that, I've been able to go with more accuracy through those things. And, I think it was Atwood. I think it was Atwood because later he was appointed Ambassador to Guinea, and that was very significant because it was the first time such a thing happened - - the first time such a gesture came about. And, you could see undisputably that a new trend was coming (into) existence in the sense of established contacts. So, it was a sort of a change (in) policy. I don't recollect exactly what month it was. Have you been able to reconstruct the time at which Atwood (phoned me) at my house? Escartin: We have been able to reconstruct that date around (inaudible). Castro: Well, that was after the missile crisis, I think. That was after the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis. I was of the opinion that the only man who could change that policy was Kennedy himself, because it seemed to me that at 223 Fidel Castro Interview Page six that time it was not a time of the Bay of Pigs. At that time he had more experience. And, he had much more authority. Maybe after the missile crisis, he had much more influence. I was convinced that Kennedy was the man with enough talent and enough courage to question and change that policy. And, people started to (feel) about it. And I felt that a positive act was that famous speech he made at the American University. It was a speech about the need for peace, the need for prevention of war, the destructions that Hitler's invasion on the Soviet Union had caused. (He expressed this) in terms that he had not used for a long time -- that had not been used in the American theory for a long time. I have read all over that speech again. I cannot say that that's a perfect (speech), I feel that it had some gaps, but if you bear in mind what he said, at the moment he said it, in the midst of the cold war, there is no doubt that those statements were of a tremendous value. Now, in addition to that, the unfortunate circumstance happened that in the days previous to Kennedy's death a french journalist visited our country -- Jean Daniels. Then he told me..he said that he was interested in having a discussion about a special topic with me. I remember that I took him with me to Veradero. Then, in the morning -- it was the morning on the way to Verado and also at the beach he was explaining to me his purpose. We were taking about all this. 224 Fidel Castro Interview Page seven And, I would say that he was bringing a kind of message from Kennedy. In substance, as far as I remember now, he himself has spoken about this on several occasions. But, the most important thing was he told me that Kennedy had explained to him the great danger that existed during the missile crisis, and that Kennedy asked himself whether I (also) was aware of the whole danger that was announced at the time of the missile crisis. But, he was (somewhat) traumatized with all the remembrances of those days. When Kennedy found out that this journalist was coming to Cuba - he had a long talk with this journalist. (He asked the journalist to talk with me, and then return to Washington with a response). We were just talking in those terms. He had to finish explaining to me everything he had talked about with Kennedy and I had to give him an answer about all this. But then at lunchtime or after lunch -- I don't remember quite well -- the first news started to arrive by radio that an attempt against Kennedy had taken place and that he had been seriously wounded precisely at the moment that we were having that talk and that came to be another symptom, that Kennedy was questioning the policy that had been followed so far. Maybe he was elaborating some formula in order to have that policy changed. (From our) point of view, Mr. Kennedy was the only man that at that point had the authority and enough courage in order to bring about the change in that policy. 225 Fidel Castro Interview Page eight That was my opinion at that time. Stokes: Do you remember the name of the journalist? Castro: Jean daniel -- a french journalist -- very well known -- enjoys prestige. He (had) met with Kennedy for some time, and he was well impressed with Kennedy and he was precisely letting us know (about) the whole interview with Kennedy, and the things that he had talked about with Kennedy regarding Cuba. It was assumed that I had to tell him something so that he would go back and convey it to Kennedy. But, before we had just finished with our conversation, the news arrived of the attempt against Kennedy's life. Actually, we were very much concerned and immediately we suspected that an effort could be made in order to try to link us...to link that death attempt with the Cuban problems. Because immediately, you know, it seemed to (us that) also within that atmosphere of a cold war, some people could try to have us linked with Kennedy's death -- to the point that we were very concerned and we thought about the measures that we could take in the face of a danger of that sort. Stokes: Mr. President, I think perhaps in that respect that it might be good for you to tell us what your reaction and that of the Cuban people was to the assassination of President Kennedy. Castro: I have no objection in telling you my reaction. It was a natural and logical reaction. Actually, I felt sad about it. I received that news with bitterness. Reasons? 226 Fidelo Castro Interview Page nine First, I think an event of that nature always produces that reaction even when it is a political adversary. It's kind of a repulsion, a rejection. In the second place, I think I have said before that Kennedy was an adversary that we had sort of become used to. I mean that political, a strong political struggle existed. But, he was a known adversary. He was somebody we knew. We had (undergone) the Bay of Pigs, we had had the missile crisis -- so many things had happened. And, at least he was an adversary we knew about. And all of a sudden, you have the impression that something is missing...that something is missing. (Thirdly,) on the basis of very deep political feelings, I think the first thing I learned from Marxism was the idea that situations, societies and social processes do not depend on men, but rather that there is a system; and the system cannot be changed by changing the men even on the basis of an old controversy. For the very past century among revolutinaries, between these who thought that the Czar should be eliminated or that the emperor had to be eliminated because they were the chiefs. That was the theory of dictatorships. Marxists always have been opposed to the idea of killing or having a person killed. That was a very much debated topic among the Marxist (elements). That is one of the first things the Marxists learned; and that it doesn't make sense to kill the political leaders...to such an extent 227 Fidel Castro Interview Page ten that in our own experience here (in Cuba) it never came to our minds the idea that Batista's regime could be eliminated by eliminating the person. We attacked a regiment with 120 men...over 120 men...one of the strongest regiments of the country...in order to take hold of the weapons and to start a struggle against Batista. And, it never came to our minds the idea of killing Batista. If we had wanted to eliminate Batista, we would have been able to. Later 82 men came back to the country from Mexico in a boat that was barely 60 feet long. We traveled 1500 kilometers. We started a war in Sierra Maestra and it never came to our minds the idea of eliminating Batista physically. (Some) people thought that killing Batista would change the system. And finally, maybe one of the things that I regretted the most was that I was convinced that Kennedy was starting to change, himself. And, I was going by the (impression) that I was here talking to that man who was bringing a message from him. Actually, I was sad. I was very badly depressed. The impression I got was very bad. I was very sad about it. He was an adversary; a man with his personal characteristics..being intelligent..you may always have the adversaries, but you have an assessment of them as a person, as an intellectual, as political leaders. To a certain extent we were honored 228 Fidelo Castro Interview Page eleven in having such a rival. He was not mediocre. He was an outstanding man. And, that was my reaction. Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after that assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City? Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of The Minister of Fieign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an application there. But tens - or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applications realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the Consulate and filled out an application for the visa - that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And, 229 Fidel Castro Interview Page twelve then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and had protested in an irate manner because he could not receive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. The rest you know. Stokes: We were wondering your... Castro: There is something I would like to add in that connection. You see, it was always very much suspicious to me --that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa from Cuba. Because, I said to myself - what would have happened had by any chance that man come to Cuba - visited Cuba - gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation - a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm -- we rejected visa applications .. like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: Why does (this applicant) want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in cuba? Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you know, so it was very difficult for a North American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba -- because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into 230 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirteen Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to (travel to Cuba) were denied. No, if it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person..like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that person had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United States would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange. (The facts of the events) seemed very strange also. As it was published, Oswald would have shot several times at a car that was moving with a telescopic (rifle). (I remember) when he trained in Mexico in order to come to Cuba to make revolution we had 231 Fidel Castro Interview Page Fourteen several guns like that and it could be that we learned almost everything that could be learned about telescopic pistols, even the differences between different pistols; a normal pistol with a trigger, an automatic pistol and a telescopic (rifle). It is much more practical if you use a normal sight...when you try to focus a moving target and you (do it) more accurately..with that kind than with a telescopic sight. A telescopic sight view gun should be used against a fixed target -- not a moving one -- It is very difficult. And, I tell you it seemed very strange that he used that weapon and that those shots could have been made with that kind of weapon. Because, when you shoot the first charge you have to take the weapon away from your face to (focus) it again, to try to find the object again..the target..and you lose time -- it is quite difficult. I don't know whether later things were technical proof - technical tests were made to see whether - just a normal shooter at that distance and at that speed of the car could have (accurately made such shots). That was something else that was very suspicious to me. But, as far as we are concerned, what was most strange was Oswald's attempt to visit Cuba. Stokes: Realizing, Mr. President, the enormity of the appearance of Oswald at your Embassy and realizing the significance that it had relative to the assassination itself, was it 232 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifteen important enough that you summon individuals who would have knowledge about his appearance to talk with you or to submit written reports relative to this matter? Castro: I think what happened was the following: Nobody knew that. The comrades who had news of that, after the events took place, they reported it, I think, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So, the only thing we did was when the Warren Commission was created and it requested information bout this, it was agreed to send all the information we had at that time...I recall that we were consulted with something about the visa application and we were willing to offer all the information they wanted. Now it was assumed that they were conducting the investigation. If they had wanted some additional action on our part (material from us), they should have (requested) it. But, they did not request any other (information) since...as far as I have understood...here we spoke with the people (our people) who had been in Mexico and our people went into the details of what really happened. And, that was very well clarified. Beyond this, there was not much more that we could do. You can imagine there was not much that we could contribute. As far as I have understood, the Mexican lady who used to work at the Consulate was later the object of many pressures -- even some kind of persecution. Villa: She was arrested by the Mexican police with the purpose of finding out what he had said at the Consulate. Castro: All that they said -- it was assumed that they wanted her 233 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixteen to say that also while at the Embassy he had made reference to killing Kennedy. So the Mexican police had the purpose of having the Mexican declare that. Villa: Exactly. Castro: And, who were the people interested in that? Who could be the people interested in that? Villa: To us that is very clear. Castro: But, that is something worth to be taken into account. Why would that lady become the object of that oppression? What do you know about this lady now? Villa: She lives in Mexico at present. She used to work in the Consulate and she was sympathetic of the Cuban revolution. Castro: She, of course, has a very high meritand that after that, knowing how these things are, a person that did not enjoy the diplomatic immunity could have been coerced. She could have been blackmailed and she could have been submitted by fear, you know, in order to have her make a statement that would be against Cuba -- harmful to Cuba. So, it was a tremendous merit that this Mexican lady did behave the way she did because you know how the people are in some countries of the world. They take a helpless woman without any kind of protection and then she can be forced to say anything. One question I would like to raise with you because we are speaking about that topic about which we are very pleased to give you all the opinions and all the cooperation that you might request that is in our hands. Now, do you think you are going to be able to bring out something really clear on the whole work you're 234 Fidel Castro Interview Page seventeen doing? Do you think you are going to be able to reach a clear conclusion? Stokes: Mr. President, that is the precise reason why we are here in your country. One of the things we said to your top officials Friday morning at our first session was that we came to your country without any preconceived ideas or notions or conclusions of any type. We have tried to pursue the entire investigation in a fair and objective manner, searching only for the truth. The assassination of President Kennedy was a traumatic experience for the American people. And in addition to the trauma which was incurred by them, we found that a Gallup Poll in January of 1977 revealed that 81% of the American people believe that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. Only 19% believe that he was a lone assassin. Consequently, the mandate given this Committee by the House of Representatives was for us to investigate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Precisely, it is our job to ascertain who killed the President. Did such a person have help either before or after that assassination? And then to ascertain in that respect whether there was or was not a conspiracy to kill the President. Additionally, we are charged with the responsibility to ascertain the performance with the responsibility to ascertain the performance of our own agencies in the United States; that is, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, all of the American agencies 235 Fidel Castro Interview Page eighteen that participated in some way in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission. And then lastly, our mandate is to make recommendations to the United Stated congress based upon our findings as a result of the total investigation. So we have approached the investigation in that way -- hoping that we will be able to ascertain the truth of these facts and then be able to put to bed the theories, the rumors, the speculation that presently exists around the assassination of President Kennedy. Castro: Have you had a broad access to all the pollible sources of information? Stokes: Yes, we have. If you have reference to our own agencies and our own files, the answer is yes, we have. Castro: Are you optimistic about the fact that you'll be able to reach a sound conclusion on this problem? Are you optimistic about it? Stokes: We are optimistic that even though the job is an awesome responsibility for the eleven men and one woman who are members of this committee, along with the staff of 115 people, all of whom we feel are dedicated to this task, our final report will be one that will be a highly professional and competent job. Castro: Any other question that you would like to raise I would be pleased to answer. Stokes: Could we for a moment, Mr. President, go back to the moment you learned about Lee Harvey Oswald having been at your Embassy in Mexico City? Do you recall a speech that you made on the 23rd of November? 236 Fidel Castro Interview Page nineteen Castro: This is on the twenty...the speech on the 23rd. Did we have the data at that time that Oswald had been at the Embassy? Villa: No. No. Castro: So very likely we did not have it. I think I learned about that some days later and not immediately. Villa: You mentioned that in the speech on November the 27th. Stokes: 27th - all right. Then my question would be firstly in two parts. One, if he remembered the speech he made on November 27th, and then secondly.... Castro: But, you should not confuse the man with the system. Stokes: Yes, right, right. That's what you told us earlier, right. Castro; That would be a negative fact for the interest of humanity. These ideas I've always had about this. Stokes: And with reference to the second part of my question regarding the matters which occurred at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City which you referred to in the November 27th speech. Do you recall from whom you learned what had transpired at your Embassy? Castro: I cannot recall. It should have been through foreign Relations or maybe the Minister of the Interior. Somebody reported to me. We were just reported to about the facts -- that a gentleman had appeared at the Embassy requesting a visa by the same name as the man accused of having assassinated Kennedy. I don't remember how it was told to the American authorities. I remember the 237 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty Warren commission requested through the Swiss Interest Section all the information we had about it. And, immediately, we put at their disposal all the materials we had. Because of course, we were interested more than anyone else in those events being clarified. We were more interested than anyone. At the first moment we were somewhat, you know, uncertain about what was behind this -- whether there were some people that wanted to use that in order to promote an aggression against Cuba. We had many reasons to suspect that because tremendous things had happened in that sense. We thought that maybe some very reactionary element could have wanted to eliminate Kennedy and just on the way try to eliminate Cuba, you know. That's why we were observing the whole development of events. But, some days later it started to be clearly seen that it was not a campaign orchstrated against Cuba. But, I'm not - I have no doubt in the least that if they had had the least evidence to link Cuba, that would have been done. A tremendous campaign would have been made and a very dangerous situation would have been created for us. But, now you have to bear in mind, at least to the extent that we know, that the Warren Commission did not make any charge against Cuba, nor did it conduct any effort in that sense. We were under the impression though, that they were working objectively or that if they were able to discover something, they would handle it. They would expose it. But, we thought that the danger 238 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-one that we were concerned about in the very first moments were then no longer so bad. The fact that somebody went to the Embassy was what brought about the suspicion that somebody had tried to link Cuba. The other theory is that this individual decided himself just because of his initiative -- to visit Cuba - with what purpose? That nobody knows. You would have to have good doses of naivete to think that he was the one who planned the trip to Cuba -- that he planned the trip to the Soviet Union himself. Actually, all of that is very strange, you know, very rare -- that he tried to go to the Soviet Union; that he tried to go through Cuba -- no other place, but through Cuba; because to go to the Soviet Union you don't have to go to Cuba necessarily. And to this we could add the further event that this individual who could have been able to clarify all because who could have shed more light on this than he himself - Oswald - 24 or 48 hours later. How many hours after the event? Villa: 28 hours. Castro: He was killed 28 hours after the event. And the only explanation given by the assassin was a sentimental reason. As far as I recall from what I read at that time he said that he had seen Kennedy's widow crying and seen the whole drama. He decided to take revenge with his own hand. And later on it was known that he was not a kind of a sentimental man; I mean to say he's a psychotic character and in the very face of the policemen - 239 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-two killed the supposed author of Kennedy's death. Because, who could have verified that better? Why was this man killed? I do know that you have more information than I do -- much more information than I may have on Jack Ruby's personality..and, if Jack Ruby for a kind of strictly sentimental reason would have gone there to the very police station and in the face of the policemen killed the supposed author of Kennedy's death. All this seemed to us very strange. And that is why we have such importance to the effort he made in the Cuban Embassy. It was a kind of an attempt by somebody to have Cuba involved in the whole affair, in the whole issue. Another reasonable fact which I think deserves attention, a fact that deserves attention - and that is something that was known after wards when the Senate Committee conducted their investigations was that practically the same day that Kennedy was killed, a CIA agent was going to have an interview. I do not know whether he had planned that interview with an important agent (Cubela) in order to assassinate me. I felt that a poison was going to be given to that person who was supposed to kill me. So, that is another element which is very suspicious. The same day Kennedy is killed, well about those same days, I get an attempt, a very urgent attempt by an individual with a plan to assassinate me. The Senate (Intelligence Committee) did not give his name, but we know who he was. And, there is no doubt that if one 240 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-three person had the possibility to carry out that attempt, it was that person. Because, he was a man who came from the revolutionary ranks and he had very much good relations with us. So, I would say that among the very many attempts, plans, plots, collaboratins of the CIA, this was one that had many possibilities of success because that individual had access to us. And that visit practically coincided -- that's a very suspicious coincidence with the Kennedy assassination - very..We did not learn this until the Senate Committee investigation was conducted. Now, in connection with this Embassy, what were you interested in-- in connection with the Embassy and the visit? Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts; One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information 241 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-four available to you, would this be your opinion also -- that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter? Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't remember now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an idea on that. I've heard those comments before -- comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking -- if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for? from my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apply for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many conjectures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the passports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there? 242 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-five Where was Oswald's passport? what became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere. I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that possibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent? I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory. Villa: About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963. Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azcue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I may say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. I have not operated on a theory like that. I just see many strange things that are not logical. It started with the very attempt of the person to come to Cuba; the calibre of weapon used, the absolutely abnormal way in which those people behaved. I mean there have always 243 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-six been many strange things that made me (suspicious) about other people. I tell you, I read the book. I read that book "The death of the President" written by Manchester. Manchester had the theory that this man acted alone and he argues a lot. He makes a kind of psychoanalytical (study) of Oswald and he defends the (lone assassin theroy). Many people have a different theory. So, I have not been able to elaborate -- I wouldn't dare elaborate a theory -- for with me, everything would be speculation. On our account and because of our interest, some time ago we started gathering elements in order to have a better founded idea, you know. And, that is why our people started to gather materials and information. A group of comrades has been working in this direction. But, I am very much aware that we don't have access to (sources: of information which are fundamental. We have no access to the CIA archives or the FBI archives. We don't have access to the Warren Commission's files. How could we do something really well founded? When the Cuban government saw the senate Committee Report, it was something real and it was that that individual who was the man to be given the weapon to kill me in Paris. This man never spoke about that. He was tried and was sentenced on account of the attempts, the plots against our lives. Those plans (had been continuous) and he sent weapons to Cuba until he was discovered. He confessed and told us the truth, but he never spoke about 244 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-seven that interview in which he was going to be given the weapon to kill me and that was published by the Senate Committee. He never made reference to that. That person is alive because I had to request some leniency. I mean, because his crime was very serious. It was a tremendous betrayal. It was treason, and at that time to participate in such an action was very severely sanctioned. And, following a tradition with individuals that had participated in the revolution, whenever it has been possible to prevent drastic measures, we have done so. This gentleman had been a revolutionary leader. He had been a good revolutionary fighter, and the public opinion was very irritated about it. His crime was really very serious. I wrote a letter to the Cuban Tribunal morally condemning him (but asking for leniency). I did it for the public opinion...That is Cubela's case. We learned that later when the Senate committee report appeared. But, all these elements made us think about the advisability or organizing some investigation on our account. We had hoped that being in contact with your Committee could give us some elements of judgment for our own information. But, as far a I know, you don't contribute many elements of judgment because -- as I have been told -- you cannot make use of most of the information you possess. 245 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-eight I have been told that one of our hopes was to receive some information. We are giving as much information as we have and we are receiving nothing. Stokes: One thing I would like to say and I think you ought to know is that many Americans are ashamed of the CIA and the degrading attempts that they've made on your life. And, that's something that disturbs many, many decent Americans and I think you ought to know that. Mr. President, with your permission I'd like to defer to my other colleagues, if they have any questions, if that is agreeable to you. Castro: Yes, please. Stokes: Mr. Preyer? Preyer; Mr. President, you mentioned that you believe that you could transfer power of chains of government without killing the head of the government. That is the tradition of our country also. I speak personally and not forour government, but I join Chairman Stokes in saying that when I read about AMLASH, Cubela and the church Committee reports I was shocked and outraged. I am confident that is the overwhelming reaction of the American people. I am convinced that the President did not know about that; the head of the CIA, John McCone, did not know of that; or our other high officials; and that this was an aberration of small group and that it would have 246 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-nine shocked our high officials just as it shocks me if they had known of it. The fact that the Church Report on AMLASH came from the Agency -- from the government itself rather than being leaked through a newspaper story or something of that sort. Interpreter:Excuse me, I didn't get that last part--I am sorry. Preyer? Well, the fact that the information on AMLASH and Cubela was revealed by our government agencies themselves and was now brought out against their will through a leak or newspaper story, I think, indicates the strong feeling in our government that this kind of thing must never happen again. And, we have set up now a House Intelligence Committee and a Senate Intelligence Committee, both new, to insure that it does not. On the question of our not giving information, but receiving it, let me say we have a common interest in arriving at a final answer, a clear answer, to the question of the assassination of President Kennedy. We are seeking your help in that and your officials have indicated to us they are willing to continue working to help on that. Our Committee goes out of existence at the end of this year. When we file our final report, there will be a great deal of information in it. Castro: Is it going to be public? Preyer: It will be public -- which will be orf interest to you. Until that time, because of our different jurisdictional problems, there is some evidence which does not belong 247 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty to us which we cannot release. But in the final analysis, the full report will make available much information of interest to you and may answer many of the rumors. In the meantime, one reason we press so hard for information is that this is the last opportunity that will probably be made in our country to reach a final answer. The last chance where an official body of Congress -- an official governmental body -- will make a judgment on this question. That is why we hope that any information that bears on this subject that may come up in the next few months and any effort that could be made, even strenuous effort, would be justified because this opportunity may not come again. And I hope very much that we will be able to give clear answers to the questions. Your help will assist very much. Castro: I think you are right in what you are saying. When I spoke about the hope of obtaining some information, it was not but a hope. It is absolutely our curiosity, you know. But, it is absolutely evident that we have the duty of handling over all the information we may gather. We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. 248 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-one There is nothing so important as having your conscience clean -- absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified. It is also true that the fact that the United States has conducted an investigation on the (attempts on our people) and the fact that (it) has been made public is a very correct thing to do -- very right. Of course, I (hear) that in that publication many names were not disclosed -- on reasons of safety. When we conduct an investigation, in general, we publish everything because..anyway..but I would have liked for the Senate report to have been more complets. It should have not protected so many people in the interest of the national security because that, you know, diminishes its moral value. It diminishes the moral value of the publication. However, I coincide with you that the fact that the investigation had been conducted and that all those materials were released is something highly positive. Now, you see, I was recalling Bill Moyers' report. Bill Moyers made a very important report of all these attempts -- all these logs on terrorist groups. Now, then, there is one point in which an intimation is made that Kennedy's death could have been a result of all these attempts against our lives. It is to say to a certain extent -- 249 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-two -- Moyers' report -- which has many positive things -- can leave the doubt that Cuba could have had some participation in that because there is a Representative of Congress speaking -- I thing I spoke later, and at the end a senator spoke that said that he had no doubts about that topic. So, we are very much..we are highly interested in that party being satisfied. Because, even when the Senate Intelligence Report was released, in some people the idea could have become stronger that Kennedy's death could have been our revenge for all that had been planned against us. If Cuba had something to do with Kennedy's death, it would have been indirectly because many people were trained in hanling weapons and many things that were not normal were done, and under the shade of these irregularities, terrorism (arises and) develops, so (that) all these acts become the (norm). It was precisely in that sense that I said that it was a nefarious precedent. Can you imagine that in the (entire) world I was one of the naive people who thought that these things could not happen. Not in the Middle Ages, but now in this era in which the whole apparatus of the government can remain very quiet and promote the killing of leaders of other countries? What is to happen to the world in the nuclear era if that becomes a practice? Now we are lucky that all those plans were a failure. 250 Fidel Castro interview Page thirty-three We have not had to (regret the) death of any comrade leader of the revolution. Our attitude is not given that of hatred or resentment. On very rare occasions do we talk to visitors about these problems. That belongs in the past. It happened a long time ago and still the prints exist--still the poor things exist. You have to see he terrorist attack against a Cuban plane in flight -- a plane that exploded. Before that plane fell down, all the people got burned alive. Seventy-four people died. Who perpetrated that crime but people who ere trained by the CIA? We suspect that some CIA agent had to do with that terrorist act. It's very strange, because that happened after Angola. The United States had adopted a very violent attitude towards us and Nixon made forceful statements against us. One of the individuals who was recently arrested in Miami because he was involved in the preparation of terrorist activities was just declared non-guilty in a trial and he defended himself by saying simply that he had been in the White House. He said who he had spoken with and who gave him the weapons, and precisely those facts, those events, took place a week before the attempt -- before the sabotage on the cuban plane in flight. And, he is just defending himself by saying that in the trial. He is one of the persons that was in the group who perpetrated the 251 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-four sabotage. Now, I am going to tell you something. I think that now Carter is - I don't know what Party you belong to - and it is not interesting to the part of what I'm going ot say, if I hurt someone's sensitivity I apologize for that, but I would have not trused Johnson. I may say sincerely, I sincerely believe that Johnson would have followed that line, of the attempts against people's lives, terrorism, subversion. I have no doubt that Nixon was a man without scruples. I was always under a bad impression. I was convinced of that. But now, I see that this President of the United States would not be capable of resorting to that kind of action. There are two things in this connection: One, I think there is an attitude in the public opinion as to that Watergate affair, and the Senate investigations have contributed to create a sort of consciousness. I also think that the politicians have taken that into account, and I think also that personally Carter is a man of a differently mentality. If I am asked whether I think Carter would be capable of plainning these kinds of actions, I would say no. I would say I don't think him capable of doing such a thing. I am quite convinced. In that sense, we feel more relaxed. We had to defend ourselves from these actions for many years. You should not think that I like to be surrounded by people. I think you have to be alone. I would like to have a 252 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-five normal life. We have taken many measures in all these years preventing attempts with different kinds of explosives and weapons, attempts with poison, and actually we are not saying all. I will tell you something. I would even say that I underestimated the CIA somewhat because I thought them capable of many things, but when I read the Senate Committee Report, I confess that I had not thought so much. because, all that from bacterias, viruses, poisons, a shell with explosives, I don't know how many tremendous things. But it was not only that. I want you to know that if we would have been careless, they would have brought a microphone and put it over there in one of the ashtrays and one mike over there in that seat and everything. There were not only subversive activities, but also espionage. There were many activities related to espionage. I remember that around the day in which the sabotage against our plane took place, the CIA asked in a question, to one of their agents here, whether I was going to travel to Africa, whether he could find out what place I was going to visit, what means of transportation I was going to use, I mean, a whole set of investigation which was not political, but rather that could be used for anything else. Now, going back to this topic, one of the things I've gone into recently with some people, is why Cuba - it was realy something inconceivable - could have the idea of killing the President? 253 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-six First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution ot not do crazy things and have always been extremely concerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out aggression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 90 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take place. I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the bay of Pigs, the Unites States would have invaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the lined that had been already traced. There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to Land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. We are absolutely convinced of that. 254 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-seven However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We were aware of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded..there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our gruard away from the lines, from the fence. We never shot at them. Why? Because we made every possible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the perpetration of an invasion. We could 255 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-eight have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They're willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history..nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give the United States the pretext..the possibility.. for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek protection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (strategic) missiles, because undoubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the United States President. That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane..absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of 256 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-nine the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United states? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The United States had U-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The women said that they could not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was demoralizing. So, there were, you know, those flights just very close to the soil. Those kind of flights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On the following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed that would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn't have been able even to play baseball here. Because those planes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really demoralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, 257 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made that kind of insanity, and that I may asssure you. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the President of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity. I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things, but it never that the idea of physically eliminating Batista. Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement. We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds..we could have done it, very well, but we never thought about that, because it was different from our feelings. That is our position. That is why we are interested. That is why we are interested. That is why I was asking you whether you are really 258 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-one hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On our part, if there is something we could give you, we would, without any kind of precondition. The information we have offered you is not conditioned to anything. Inspite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that doesn't stop this Committee here from giving the impression that we are being judged here, that we are being tried. Stokes: We certainly don't want in any way to convey that, in fact, uh,... Castro: No, no, no. I mean not you. I am not thinking of you. I mean that some people could see it that way; that cuba has been investigated by the Committee. Stokes: Well, Mr. President, one thing we have done in that respect, we even said to your Cuban Interest Section in Washington when we first began that we wanted to come down here and do this part of the investigation very quietly without any fanfare, without any publicity, and this is the overall way we have tried to conduct our whole investigation.. everything is being done quietly in executive session until such time that we compile all he data so that we don't in any way declaim or degrade anyone. Then, hopefully, at the end we can come out with a report that everyone will respect. Castro: There is something which is not secret. 259 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-two If I may ask you, is there anything true, or how much could be true about those publications which state that many people who could have had a part in Kennedy's death have died in accidents and things like that? Stokes: This is one of the difficulties of attempting to conduct an investigation thirteen years after the event has occurred. Obviously, there are people who in the normal course of the investigation we would have wanted to talk with, we cannot talk with because they are now deceased. This is one of the difficulties that we face. I yield to Congressman Dodd. Dodd: Mr. President, I won't take much time. I think most of the questions have been asked. I wish we had... Castro: I have time. Please don't mind about my time. I made no other commitment today, so I would have time. Nobody is waiting for me. Dodd: I wish we had an evening just to talk about the Peace Corps, but we will save that for another time. A tape is played? There are a couple of things here. The question you asked of Chairman Stokes----the one regarding the optimism we have over reaching a final conclusion in regard to this effort is one that I think we all ask ourselves almost every day. It is the question that is very important in the minds of many, many people, not only in government, but also of course, the American 260 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-three people are concerned about our efforts. I said today in one of our meetings that I strongly suspected that your grandchildren and my grandchildren will be reading books about the assassination, just as we read them today about the assassination, just as we read them today about the assassination of Lincoln, another historical figure that had been assassinated, and where the suspicion of conspiracy has existed. I think we would be fooling ourselves if we tried to suggest that at the conclusion of our hearings we were going to end once and for all, all of the speculation for all time. I don't think that is possible. But, what we are going to try and do, and I think that what we have done successfully over the past year and a half, is to approach this case with an open mind and not prejudge the case. And, the temptations are great to do that. For every day we almost see a new theory. But, we are determined to proceed through this process listening to all sides and then using that evidence that we are able to collect, to reach as definitely as we can, regarding those points that have been nagging at the consciences and minds of the people all across the earth. Two other points: One is that we intend not only to publish our hearings and the conclusion that we reach. We also intend to use every available means of communication in the United States, hopefully television, radio, to conduct open public hearings, not only showing our conclusions, but how we arrived at 261 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-four those conclusion. We suspect that many, many people do not want to read a boring report, but would rather be better informed by radio and television and newspapers. We intend to hide nothing, to release all information without any fear whatsoever as to where that information leads or what our conclusions would be. I think, I know I can speak for myself, and I'm sure I can speak for everyone else on this Committee. I wouldn't serve on this committee if I didn't think in the end that I could say to my constituents that I had done an honest and thorough job and that I wasn't hiding anything from them. And, my last point is, Mr. President, that had some of your government officials not mentioned it today, we would have, but it was very encouraging to hear it come from them, that they would like to continue to keep the lines of communication open between themselves, your government and our Committee. And, as that old Chinese proverb goes - a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. And I think this is a good beginning and I want to just say here and now that I have been deeply impressed by your statements. I find your logic compelling and I gurantee you that we will do the very best job we can, including the final report. Castro: How many legislators do your have on this committee? Stokes: There are twelve in all, one lady and eleven men. 262 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-five Castro: Don't you all have to be involved in elections at the end of this year now? Stokes: Uh huh. Yes, we do. Castro: And how would you be able, how would you manage to carry out all this work, and take care of the election campagins at the same time? How would you? Dodd: He doesn't have any trouble at all. (About another Congressman.) (Laughter) Castro: And you work personally in the campaigns, don't you? I mean, with all this? The twelve, I mean the twelve people on the Committee work together, perticipate in all hearings and all the interviews and all that? Stokes: The committee...I have been in Congress ten years, Mr. President, and I serve on several other committees in the House. And, I know in general they are hard working committees. but, I have never seen twelve people who have worked together the way this committee has. We work extremely long hours, we have worked into the night when the occasion necessitated it. We have worked Saturdays and Sundays when it was necessary and remained in Washington to work on Committee matters. We just have twelve people who are dedicated to the fact that this is an opportunity to do something of historic nature and they are dedicated to devoting the time that it requires. In addition to the twelve Members of Congress, we have a staff of 115 people. The staff is 263 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-six headed up by Professor Blakey. You might be interested in knowing that we spent three months searching for a director of the staff. And, we were extremely concerned that we get a person of the highest professional ability, along with integrity that cannot be compromised in any respect, and one who would direct the staff in a way that we would let the chips fall where they may in the final analysis. And to that degree, I am sure... Castro: Now he as to continue working while you run the reelection campaign. (Laughter) Stokes: But, when we go home he has to keep on working right here. Castro: You would have to go to meet your constituents and then..that would be the most important moment of all these efforts, you know? The moments to draw the conclusions...Would it be possible for you to finish up the report when due? Don't you need more time? Stokes: We promised the House of Representatives (laughter) that there would be no further requests for time. I am not worried about time; it is the money part. The House is appropriating about five million dollars over the two-year period forus to complete this investigation...and Castro; And only 115 people? 264 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-seven Stokes: Well, Mr. Barber of Maryland who watches the purse strings of the House says it involves a lot of money. We have had to face that kind of opposition on the floor of the House of Representatives. Blakey: Mr. President, I have no questions to ask of you, but less we as guests only asked questions and did not respond to any of yours, let me answer at least in part that question you asked. You expressed some interest in what we call the mysterious death projects. The literature about the Kennedy assassination is filled with instances of people who have in some way been connected to the assassination and have themselves died under mysterious circumstances. We are looking into those deaths and seeing whether there are sinister explanations for them. Let me comment on one of them: Now, this is not from our investigation, but from my own information, and he may be a man of some interest ot you. Let me put it in context for you. I cannot comment on many of the facts in the investigation. As you put it, much of the information is limited by matters of national security. For example, in our country, it has never been officially acknowledged that AMLASH was Rolando Cubela and nothing that we say here today should be read as an indication on our part that that is true or not true. But to continue..Sam Giancana, who was a Mafia leader 265 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-eight in Chicago, who according to the Senate Intelligence Report, directly plotted on your life, was a person who was under investigation by myself in the department of Justice and ironically on November 22nd, 1963, I was with the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, in a meeting of the Organized Crime session and among the subjects taken up at that time was the Attorney General's personal interest in my work in seeking to prosecute Sam Giancana. I bring this to your attention for two reasons: First, to express to you the feeling of one who has spent a great deal of his life working to see to it that members of the Mafia in the united States consistent with due process receive justice. I know from personal knowledge that Robert Kennedy shared those concerns. He would never have been knowingly involved in using those people to plot an assassination of you. And, while I cannot speak of personal knowledge of the President of the United States, there was not difference between them. I say that to express my sense of shame and outrage that members, according to the Senate intelligence Report, of the CIA were involved in that. Those people who were in charge of our government at that level in my judgment had no knowledge. But to respond more particularly to your question, it is unlikely that Sam Giancana died be- 266 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-nine cause he testified before the Senate Intelligence committee. As I indicated to some of the members of your staff, Mr. Giancana was responsible for the death of hundreds of people in Chicago, and the remarkable thing is not that he died then, but that he had not been killed much earlier. Stokes: The last gentleman here, Mr. President, is Gary Cornwell. Gary is the deputy Chief Counsel for the Kennedy Subcommittee and he would have direct responsibility in terms of the final work product related to the Kennedy investigation. I separate out the Kennedy assassination because as you know we are investigating also the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Two murder investigations are going at the same time. Castro: The five million dollars is for both? Blakey: You ought to also know, Mr. President, that this is the budget attributable to the Committee itself. In fact, the United States Senate, particularly the people who were responsible for the Church Committee investigation, have been helping this Committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ahs a relatively large staff devoted to getting their foles made available to us. We have actually received cooperation form the Central Intelligence Agency. Some members of the staff would say not as fast and as full as we might like, but the final report is not in. The police departments in Dallas 267 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty and in Memphis have been helping us and if you consider the work that was done in 1963 and 1964, the actual available resources in the United States devoted to these investigations are considerable more than five million dollars. Castro: May I suggest something? Why don't you investigate also Oswald's personality in one sense, whether Oswald was also a member of any intelligence agency in the United States? Blakey: That is among the issues that we are looking into. Castro: I think that is a very important thing. Because, for me, Oswald's personality - it's a mystery..that first he was in the Army, the Navy, and later he appears in the Soviet Union. He married a Soviet citizen. He came back to the States. I still get the impression that this individual's personality is that of a spy. It is the typical way you recruit a spy and send him to another country. This seems to me very important. I think it is very important to go very deeply into his past, to see if at any time it was possible to really know about his personality. That would be very important. Blakey: Of all the questions I think we will answer, that I feel with a degree of certainty, we will. I should also add, Mr. President, that if you consider the resources that your staff has also devoted to this 268 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-one organization and the time and effort they have put into it, the five million dollars grows even more.(laughter) Castro: Sure, they have been working. But as you know, our contribution is very modest because I think that the fundamental things for the investigation could be conducted only in the United States. And, what we can do is very little, very little. But from the first moment we made the decision to make available anyone you wanted to talk with. I think that your task is a hard one. Hard, because your prestige is at stake with the investigation. You face a task of tremendous responsibility and in that sense I think avery hard job has been assigned to you. Stokes: We share your feelings on that, Mr. President. Blakey: Their job is harder. They are politicians. They must run for reelection. I can always go back and teach. Castro: Will the report be many volumes? (Laughter) How big is the Warren Committee Report? When will the Warren Committee Report be published? Blakey; The Warren Commission has already been published. Castro: Warren Commission? Blakey: Commission. Yes. Castro: Warren Commission, what was it? 269 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-two Villa: It was twenty-six volumes. We had two copies of the summary, but we have not seen the twenty-six volumes. Castro: Have you read all that? Villa: Yes, we have. Castro: We have to say that the Warren Commission was objective. They did not try to commit Cuba. You were a Federal Judge. Then, are you the man with the most experience in this kind of business. Preyer: Well, in the federal courts we didn't have to deal with anything as complex as this with so many remors and so many facets to it. Usually, we had a narrow question, so this is really a new experience for me. Castro: They would give their lives to discover something decisive, you know? (Laughter) Is there anyone else you would like to meet? Villa: Piniero. Piniero worked at the Ministry of Interior at that time. They are interested in speaking to Piniero because he met with Santo Trafficante in the early sixties and gave him 24 hours to leave the country, and also because he met with Ascue. Castro: We did not even have a Ministry of Interior at that time. He worked as some kind of investigator, but at that time we did not have a Minister of Interior. I think it was for the Army. Some things we have now that w e did not have then. They were created, you know, in the course 270 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-three of the years. The first year everybody did whatever they wanted. There was chaos, you know. The state was not organized, so the people came in and out, absolutely free. There were not the controls that existed later, that were created later, especially in the first year of the revolution. I recall a social problem. All the casinos were closed and thousands of people were unemployed without a solution to the problem. So, we had to take back that measure to gain time to find an economic solution for the people who would remain unemployed when the casinos were closed. So, the state had to cover the salaries of all the people who worked there. And, I want to tell you something else: As you know, recently there was a television conference where efforts were being made in order to have the Cuban government involved in drug traffic, smuggling drugs. That is very curious, you know. I don't know why that theory is expounded now. It is a very recent invention. It happens that we are the one country in this hemisphere that has cooperated the most with the United States without any purpose, I mean, we have no intention of doing the United States a disfavor. but, anyway, on the basis of Cuba's belief with regard to drugs, very severe measures were implemented to prevent them. We have become the number one cooperators of the United States in this area. You don't know how 271 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-four many boats we have captured here that come along Cuban coasts carrying drugs. You don't know how many planes we have taken here carrying drugs and, of course, over the past twenty years the individuals who have been involved in drug traffic have always been sentenced, always. These were not people that could affect us. They were just going and coming from South America and Central America to the Untied States. And, they just happened to come here by chance. Dozens of people have been searched on account of drug traffic, on account of the international drug traffic laws. We have eliminated drug use in cuba and I myself wonder why it is we have to cooperate with the United States if when the embargo was imposed on our country we could have planted ten thousand acres of marijuana and become the largest supplier of marijuana to the United States in combination with all those people. We did not do that since we were blockaded and knowing that in the United States there is a market for marijuana even though the government in this country has fought the most against drugs. Besides in Cuba we don't have drug problems, but we had to even uproot the last plants of marijuana planted in the mountains. And actually, look at how we're being paid back now; they pay us back by trying to link us into the drug traffic. It's incredible, you know. We can say it like that; this is the government that has fought the most against drug traffic in this hemisphere. No 272 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-five discussion about it. And, we are lucky that we don't have that problem ourselves because unless the State imported cocaine and marijuana, that problem has almost disappeared. Laughter. Translator left; said she would be around. Second translator arrives. Castro: Well, we have almost finished. Escartin: Who was the one who made that impeachment about the drug problem where Reprsetative Wolff participated? He was the head of the Committee. Castro: Why did he do that? Do you know the address, because I am going to write them a note. Laughter. Castro: And, I am going to ask a budget for stamps and paper. I'm going to sabotage the next election. Escartin? Even though he made some political statements with a certain prestige, he is deceitful. It seems that there are some statements made by him on the basis of an investigation and that this man used them as he wished trying to attain certain political objectives of propaganda because you have explained our stand regarding that. And, there is something strange there: A Cuban Counter-Revolutionary was mentioned who made an operation with Columbia which seems to have serious drug problems...and they tried 273 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-six link him with us. Afterwards, Hernandez-Cartaya who was a Counter-Revolutionary, particiated in the Bay of Pigs. He made some declaration saying that he was anti-Castro and that he had nothing to do with this. Castro: Just two old friends down there defended me. The President of Columbia defended me also, so I have to thank some two persons who defended me. Escartin: It is interesting that Hernandez-Caraya was retained there by the FBI. It seems that somebody is trying to solidify this story...that's the situation. Stokes; Mr. President, before we continue, Gary Cornwell, I think, has a couple of questions to ask you. Cornwell: Mr. President, there was a book published by Daniel Schorr called "Clearing the Air". If you haven't read the book, I would like to read one passage. Castro: I haven't read that. You know about that book? Villa: I haven't. Cornwell: One passage reads as follows: An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark..do you have the translation of it there? Villa: Yes. castro: Let me see it. Yes, I have it here. This is absurd. Pause: (approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.) Castro: This is absurd. I didn't say that. Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur? Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? 274 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-seven It's a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh...we would have denounced him..sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that..and that never happened..in no part, as far as I know. Villa: That refers to the interview you spoke about in the beginning. Castro: But how could they interview me in a pizzeria? I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented from the upper to the bottom because you asked me about the Brazilian Embassy and I have no obligation to that and never said it was true. That in the Brazilian Embassy I talked about this problem of the attempt. That was true. I could deny it, but I don't because it was strictly the truth. I didn't remember who the journalist was nor...but I 275 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-eight have the idea that something like that was discussed and that there was a declaration at the Brasilian Embassy. I can't assure it because I don't remember it, but it probably occurred...Later on they tried to present it as a threat and I didn't do it with that intention. Of course, I didn't do it with that intention. But, not that other interview. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why we wrote it, and with whom he is related....and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you. Castro: Let me tell you. Of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the inteviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. 276 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-nine I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview..just almost three years. And even that of Moyers..I didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria. Villa: Another element commander...That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a sensationalist newspaper. Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published. They are still being written. Yesterday I was reading an English paper, I don't remember its name, speaking about Angola, and saying that we in military operations against the blacks killed thousands of women and children and so forth. And, I also mentioned before the declaration of that Representative about the drug traffic. Previous to that incident they tried to implicate us in that. If there is somebody in this world that has accustomed himself to listen to the worst things without losing sleep, it is us. 277 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty The campaigns that were carried out, directed campaigns that were carried out throughout the world - in western continents and also in the United States - against Cuba and all of us had no precedents. There are a lot of people that are badly informed about Cuba, and we have nothing to hide, nothing. They have spoken about tortures in Cuba, and that was a tradition from the war..during the Revolutionary War. We never put a finger on another person because we created an awareness in our people. We condemned torture and I can assure you that this is a principal that knows not a single exception in our country, because it would have the repulsion of all the world..Why are our policemen so efficient..especially the security policemen who protected all of us? Do you know why? Because, it was precisely a police which did not carry out torture. There are a lot of countries where they apply torture and they never discover anything. They never became policement in themselves. Now our people couldn't be able to receive any information by means of torture, and they develop intelligence, and the technique of investigation and of prevention. There is a time in which we had more than one hundred counter-revolutionary organizations and all of them were penetrated. We knew more than the counter-revolution armies when a person was arrested because there were some things that he didn't 278 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-one remember: who he met, which places and so forth. I'm going to tell you, there was a time in which penetration of our people increased so much that in turn they became the heads of some of those counter-revolutionary organizations. The police wouldn't be able to develop a technique of investigation and they wouldn't have investigated anything if they just took one person and tried to destroy him. That tradition will never serve. A true police is one which is developed and that will seek intelligent ways of obtaining information. Batista's policement tortured and didn't discover anything. And, for us there is no problem. Security has a lot of advantages because all of the people are militants within the Revolution - country people, children, neighbors, students, peasants and the women. Everybody is organized and, that is why. Through the agents we know everything that is going on. Let me tell you something. One day a parrot was lost. In Havana, we told this to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution - about trying to find out where this parrot was, and they found the parrot. Some other time, a woman was at the hospital. She had a daughter. Her daughter was robbed from the hospital, so we had to find the girl. Everybody assumed that it was a mental case of somebody. Of course, that was not published in the newspapers. 279 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-two Why not? We did not want any panic. We called up all the CDRs and forty-eight hours later, the girl appeared. One person in one place had a child and they hadn't seen that she was pregnant. That woman was obsessed about having a child and she went to the hospital dressed up like a nurse and she took the girl. And, after forty-eight hours, they found her. There was something else: Here we never have a political kidnapping. Here we never have a terrorist activity. We find out earlier. There were some counter-revolutionaries. But, there is something. The greatest part of them went ot the United States, especially the wealthy people. The social base of the counter-revolution was transferred to the United States. The United States wanted to take from us the doctors and the professions - they got half of the doctors. Out of six thousand doctors, they got three thousand. But then that forced us to concentrate on a school of medicine. Now we have twelve thousand doctors - almost one thousand are abroad in different countries working. We have thirty-five hundred students at the Cuban Medicine School. By 1985 with the new facilities now in progress we will enroll some seven thousand students every year. We are going to train thirty-three thousand students at the University. Our doctors are distributed throughout the country, and before they 280 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-three were all located in the Captiol. So, if the United States wanted to take our professional personnel, they forced us to develop a new system. Fortunately, they didn't take only technical people, but also wealthy people, deliquents, pimps... (Laughter). and exploiters of vices such as drugs, gangsters and all that type of people. They went to the United States. They opened the doors because before the Revolution they had a limit. The United States couldn't receive more then ten thousand and there were a lot of people who wanted to go there trying to find some jobs or social programs. Then, when the Revolution triumphed, the United States opened its doors. Can they repeat that procedure with some other countries? No, they can't. What would happen if the United States opened the way for all those Mexicans who want to go to the United States trying to find jobs? What about all the Brazilians, Colombians, Peruvians..? They opened the doors and they took the social ground work of the Counter Revolution. So, they left the houses. Those houses were turned into schools and dwelling houses for humble people. You understand? And all those who left here, they left these houses for humble people..and, in the country, the most humble people stayed. You understand? What resources they need to carry on 281 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-four the Revolution and what social ground work they need for making Counter Revolution, they don't have. That is why the country is defending itself. And that is why we were able to depend on intelligence, and not torture. Thousands of times, they have sid that in Cuba we torture. It is like that, but people of all nations know how things were and are in Cuba. We never had any persons disappear. It wasn't a new invention. We would never have that. We never found a dead man in the street. We were forced to legisate tough laws, but nobody was ever sanctioned except through the courts and through previous law. Since we were in the Sierra Maestra, we started making the first law. We said to the people..Well, the assassins and torturers are going to be punished. Nobody will take revenge in their own hands. That was a promise we made to the people. The torturers were punished and also the criminals, who generally are not punished. You can see now that things are going on in Chile and in some other countries. They are doing unbelievable things. Sometimes I have heard some stories about things going on there, and they are unbelievable. That is why we are not in agreement with their thinking. We have been accused of denying a man his human rights; that is to say that things are worse here then in Chile, Brazil and so forth. Who are they going to tell that story in this case? But, in spite of it all, we have survived. And the campaigns did not manage to destroy us. REST OF INTERVIEW CONSISTS OF PERSONAL REMARKS 282 Mr. BLAKEY. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like now to play the recording of President Castro's answer to that first question. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. [Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the committee's next question was more specific. It dealt with an account published in 1967 in the National Enquirer claiming that Oswald while at the consulate had voiced an intention to assassinate President Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I note that JFK F-428 has already been displayed and ask that it be entered into the record. It is a reproduction of that National Enquirer article. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, so ordered. [JFK exhibit F-428 follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-428 Mr. BLAKEY. It is probably also appropriate to note that that article has had wide circulation. For example, Daniel Schorr repeats it in his book, "Clearing the Air." President Castro, according to the story in the National Enquirer, had admitted to being told of the threat, though he had taken no action in response to it. The tape of this portion of President Castro's remarks is not suitable for playing in a public room. Consequently, I will read his response. President Castro said: This is absurd. I didn't say that * * * It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? It's a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty 283 to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh * * * we would have denounced him * * * Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our Embassies saying that * * * And that never happened. No part, as far as I know . * * But how could they interview me in a pizzeria. I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? * * * You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related * * * and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Let me tell you. Of every 100 interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but 24 hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited 3 years for an interview * * * just almost 3 years. And even that of Moyers * * * l didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Mr. Chairman, the author-- Chairman STOKES. Would you suspend for just one moment? Mr. BLAKEY. Certainly. Chairman STOKES. I think I misunderstood you. There was some reason you explained for reading that. Mr. BLAKEY. Yes; the tape unfortunately, as has been my experience, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure yourself in trials, that any effort, when you have a mechanical device inevitably they fail at least once out of three, and while we made an effort to enhance the quality of that portion of the tape, in which President Castro responded to this particular question, we played it and it just simply was not suitable for playing in a public auditorium. It was not audible. Consequently, it was thought best to read it rather than to play the tape. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. Mr. BLAKEY. We really did the best we could. Mr. Chairman, the author of the National Enquirer story was a British freelance journalist named Comer Clark. He died in 1972. Nevertheless, the committee, while conducting other investigations in England, made an effort to explore Mr. Clark's background and reputation for veracity. Frankly, it was not good. Apparently, he wrote extensively for the sensationalist press in England. His articles include such items as "British Girls as Nazi Sex Slaves," "I Was Hitler's Secret Love," and "German Plans To Kidnap the Royal Family." On the other hand, even though there may be considerable doubt as to the fact of Clark's interview with President Castro, the committee has been informed that the substance of the Clark article is supported by highly confidential but reliable sources available to the U.S. Government. Apart from the reliability of the source, whether or not this source may have provided reliable information in this instance is of 284 course an issue that the committee will have to consider in December. In this connection the Cuban Government has suggested to the committee that the circulation of this story represents a disinfor- mation effort by the Central Intelligence Agency designed to discredit Cuba and to implicate her in the assassination. Mr. Chairman, President Castro also discussed the general subject of assassination as a means for achieving political change. His thoughts on it are pertinent to the investigation. It would be appropriate, then, to play his response to that question, which fortunately is clear enough to play in a public proceeding. Chairman STOKES. OK. [Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Finally, Mr. Chairman, President Castro commented on the specific so-called threat reported in the New Orleans Times Picayune of September 9. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to play the last excerpt. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. [Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that President Castro was of course speaking in Spanish, and the simultaneous English translation was provided by Juanita Vera. Mr. Chairman, in August, during the committee's second trip to Cuba, the Cuban Government made available to the committee one Rolanda Cubela, who identified himself to the committee as AMLASH, on the basis of his reading of the 1976 Senate report. It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record and to display JFK F-424, a photograph of Mr. Cubela. [The information follows:] 285 JFK EXHIBIT F-424 Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record and displayed accordingly. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Cubela indicated that he had been prosecuted and convicted by the Cuban Government for plotting against Premier Castro. He said that during that prosecution he did not inform the Cuban Government and the Cuban Government did not learn that his plot had the support of CIA personnel. The Cuban Government affirmed Mr. Cubela's assertion. He also indicated that he had no evidence on which he could say that any official of the U.S. Government or of the CIA higher than his case officer was aware of the assassination aspects of his plot. The Cuban Government suggested that the AMLASH plot in operation on November 22, 1963, as outlined in the Senate report, could not, therefore, have served as a provocation by the U.S. motivating Cuban retaliation against President Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, another aspect of the committee's investigation of Oswald's trip to Mexico had to do with any associations Oswald may have had while he was there other than those at the Cuban consulate and the Soviet Embassy. The Warren Commission concluded he had Done, that he kept to himself throughout his stay. It turns out, however, that 11 days after the Commission concluded its investigation and issued its report in September 1964, a Mexican woman came forward with quite a different version of Oswald's activities in Mexico City. Her name is Elena Garro de Paz. Though now divorced, she was at the time the wife of Octavio de Paz, the noted poet and Mexican diplomat. Elena Garro herself is an accomplished author. 286 Ultimately, Elena Garro's story came to the attention of American intelligence services. As far as it is known, no service initiated a full-scale followup investigation. One reason might be that Elena Garro's credibility is controversial. This committee has been told, on the one hand, that she is absolutely trustworthy, while others have claimed that the same vivid imagination that has made her a literary success has also tended to color her perception of actual events. That being said, Elena Garro's story is interesting, as is the way it has unfolded in this investigation. Elena Garro says that along with her daughter, Elenita, and her sister, Deba Galvan, she was invited to a party at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran Navarro, then the brother-in-law of Sylvia Tirado Duran. She first said that the party was in early October 1963, though, after inspection of her personal calendar for that period, she adjusted the time to late September. There were three young American men at the party, she says, the guests of Sylvia Duran, and one of the Americans was Lee Harvey Oswald. She describes one of his companions as tall and slender with long blond hair, a gaunt face, and a protruding chin. The other was tall also, with short, light brown hair. In 1964, Elena Garro became a friend of an American foreign service officer named Charles Thomas, and, over time, she related her story to him in detail. She explained that when she had gone to the American Embassy in October 1964 and told her story, the man she talked to seemed to believe little of it. She told Thomas that Oswald was wearing a black sweater at the party, and that he stared at the floor a lot. She said the three Americans stuck together rather than mix with the other guests. She said that Eusebio Azcue, the Cuban consul, was also at the party. Elena Garro told Thomas that on the day of the assassination, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted, "assassins." This she claimed was before she saw a newspaper photo identifying Oswald as the suspected assassin. After she and her daughter returned home on November 22, 1963, a man she thought was an agent of the Mexican Ministry of Government came to her house and told her and Elenita that they were in danger of being harmed by the Communists. He took them to a "sanctuary", a small hotel called the Vermont, where they remained for 8 days. It was after getting to the hotel that Elena Garro first saw a picture of Oswald and realized she had seen him at the Duran party. This man, who must be referred to here as Mr. X, advised Elena Garro to beware of the American Embassy, that it was staffed by Communists. Elena Garro also claimed that several months after the assassination she was visited by two Communists who warned her not to tell her story. Shortly after the assassination, Elena Garro told Thomas, an American woman came and spent several days at her home. This woman, who must be referred to here as Ms. Y, was told the story one evening by Elena Garro's sister, Deba Galvan, who had been 287 drinking. Ms. Y urged the two women to tell their story to American authorities in Texas, not in Mexico. Failing that, Ms. Y offered to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking American official in Mexico. It never transpired, because Elena Garro and Ms. Y had a falling out. Ms. Y did, however, send the first report on Elena Garro and her story to American authorities in 1964. Charles Thomas, the American service officer, was concerned about the Elena Garro story and reported her account in memoranda that were circulated in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Nevertheless, when the reports reached Washington, neither the CIA nor the FBI showed any interest. No investigation was ordered, even though, on October 10, 1966, it was learned an Elena Garro had indeed been registered at the Hotel Vermont over the period she claimed she was there in 1963. Charles Thomas returned to Washington in 1967 when his tour of duty in Mexico ended and he was "selected out" of the foreign service in 1969 for failure to be promoted. In 1971, having had some 2,000 job applications rejected, he committed suicide. In 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, having determined that his dismissal was a mistake, had through an act of Congress Mr. Thomas posthumously reinstated. Mr. Chairman, the committee on Friday of last week received permission from the State Department to make public a group of previously classified documents dealing with Mr. Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz' story. While they have been declassified, there are certain privacy aspects of them that would make it inappropriate to include it in this record now. Nevertheless, I would ask that they be marked as JFK F-403 and inserted in this record at this point after they have been duly edited. Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be done. [The information follows:] 288 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 289 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 290 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 291 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 292 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 293 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 294 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 295 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 296 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 297 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 298 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 299 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 300 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 301 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 302 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 303 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 304 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 305 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 306 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 307 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 308 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 309 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 310 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 311 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 312 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 313 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 314 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 315 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 316 Mr. BLAKEY. The committee has also tried to locate Mr. X and Ms. Y to no avail. The committee also sought to interview another individual who was employed in the Cuban Embassy in 1963. Although the interview had been prearranged, he left Mexico City suddenly the day committee investigators arrived, and returned the day they were scheduled to depart. The investigators, having decided to stay an extra day, contacted the former employee by phone, but he refused to speak with them. The committee has learned that Mexican authorities had been requested not to allow the committee investigators to interview the employee. Members of the Duran family were questioned about Elena Garro's allegations. They denied that they socialized with the people she said were at their party, although Sylvia Duran did recall that Elena herself may have been at one or two parties at her home in the fall of 1963. Sylvia Duran denied that Oswald had been there. Another Mexican has claimed to have been in contact with Oswald in Mexico City. Oscar Contreras Lartique told an American foreign service officer (not Charles Thomas) in 1967 that as a student at the University of Mexico in 1963 he had met Oswald as he was leaving a roundtable discussion at the School of Philosophy. Contreras, who described Oswald as "strange and introverted," said he spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the following day with Oswald and some other students. He said Oswald told them he had come to the university looking for Castro students who might help persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. Oswald told them, Contreras said, that he was from California and was a member of a pro Castro organization in New Orleans. Contreras was later reinterviewed by American authorities. He refused to identify other students who had met Oswald, because he said they were still active revolutionaries. Contreras stated that originally Oswald was suspected of being an American intelligence agent, that he never mentioned President Kennedy or assassination, and that he repeatedly expressed a wish to get to Cuba promptly. Mexican authorities have reported to the committee that there was indeed an Oscar Contreras Lartique registered at the University of Mexico in 1960, but not in 1963. They also reported that Oscar Contreras had once signed a manifesto written by a pro-Castro student group, but that the group ceased to function in 1962. Nevertheless, the committee placed some significance in Contreras' story because it has been learned that a professor from the University of Mexico held philosophy seminars at the Duran home. The philosophy professor, a close friend of the Durans, was a well known Marxist at the university. The committee tried to arrange an interview with Contreras through Mexican officials, but when its investigators arrived, Contreras disappeared. In summation, Mr. Chairman, I must frankly state that the committee has, with the exception of certain witnesses made available by the Cuban and Mexican Governments, largely been frus- 317 trated in its attempts to investigate the nature of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities and possible associates in Mexico City through personal interviews with those persons who purportedly have first hand knowledge of such matters. The only other theoretical possibility for resolving these issues was, of course, physical evidence, either documents or photographs. In this regard, the Cuban Government has suggested that photographic evidence should exist, at least as to Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Such photographs might well include, of course, the identities to the companions, if any, who were with him on those occasions. In fact, the Cuban Government has provided several photos to the committee. They are reflected in JFK F-438 which, Mr. Chairman, I ask be displayed and entered into the record at this point. Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 318 JFK EXHIBIT F-438 Mr. BLAKEY. To support its claim that there was a photographic surveillance site across the street from the Cuban consulate in 1963, the Cuban Government, Mr. Chairman, has indicated that the top left of the photograph represents a diagram of the Cuban consulate on the left and on the right of the building that is displayed immediately to the right of that diagram. It is from that building that they suggest that photographic surveillance took place. 319 The three bottom photographs on the exhibit illustrate examples of their ability to photograph the photographer, during the course of his surveillance of the Cuban consulate. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate that the committee has conducted an extensive investigation to determine who, if anyone, was responsible for the surveillance outlined in this exhibit in the periods of time during which that surveillance was in operation. It has also sought to identify and personally interview those individuals who may have conducted the surveillance and to obtain, if possible, all relevant photographs. Once again, however, I have to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the committee's efforts have met with frustration. No photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald or of any other person who can be said to be an associate of his have been located. Mr. Chairman, that ends today's presentation on Cuba, Mexico and the assassination. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Professor Blakey. Before you proceed to the next section, once again I think it appropriate for me to indicate for the record the kind of cooperation that was necessary for this committee to obtain in order to do the extensive type of investigation that we have done in this particular area. I acknowledged in the latter part of yesterday's hearings the kind of cooperation we had gotten from Cuban Government officials. But I might appropriately note at this time that to my knowledge and to the knowledge of the members of this committee, it is unprecedented for a head of a foreign nation to subject himself to interrogation by a congressional committee. Not only did President Castro spend in excess of 4 1/2 hours with this committee, but he made it clear and apparent to us that in every respect his officials were to give us complete cooperation. I think the final record in this case will indicate the voluminous documents and witnesses that we interviewed in this area and virtually every request made by this committee was complied with, even to the extent of the fact that the committee when it went there conducted itself in the same way we have attempted to do our work here and that is to work quietly and without any type of fanfare. And for that reason, we made the same type of request in Cuba that our work there not be announced, that we be accorded the opportunity to work privately and quietly and to that extent the President and his officials afforded us the kind of housing that we needed in order to remain out of public view. So I think that the record ought to appropriately acknowledge the fact that this committee was given extensive cooperation by President Castro and his officials and we are grateful for that cooperation. Professor Blakey? Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate now to shift the focus of the hearing somewhat from Cuba, Mexico City and the assassination, and begin today and in the days that follow an examination of the performance of the agencies. The first agency whose performance in 1963 and 1964 will be examined is the Secret Service. 320 Of all of the Federal agencies that were in any way involved in protecting President Kennedy or investigating his assassination, the Secret Service has come in for the most scathing criticism. Within hours of the tragedy in Dallas, press accounts were pointedly suggesting that the agency had been derelict in its duty to provide Presidential security. The more obvious questions were first raised. Why had the motorcade been routed through Dealey Plaza, an open, park-like area surrounded by tall buildings? Why wasn't there more physical protection for the President--why, for example, were there no agents in the limousine itself, forming a human shield? Why was the limousine moving at such a slow speed? And why were agents in an open car directly behind the limousine so slow to respond at the sound of the first shot? The Warren Commission was quite blunt in its admonishment of the Secret Service: The Commission has concluded that at the time of the assassination the arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function were seriously deficient. And, the Commission adds in its final report: The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate. The approach of the Warren Commission seems to have been (a) to document the conduct of Secret Service agents physically present at the assassination scene; and (b) to record the perceptions of supervisory personnel as to Secret Service performance on the trip to Dallas and to reforms called for to improve the protective operations of the agency. The select committee, while not disregarding the performance of the Secret Service on November 22, 1963, has attempted to go one step farther. It has assembled data on threats against President Kennedy from Secret Service files, in an effort to establish a basis for a fair, objective analysis. This has enabled the committee to scrutinize the extent to which Secret Service protective measures reflected the agency's grasp of potential danger to the President during the Kennedy years. In other words, was the Secret Service in part to blame for the assassination because it failed to gather sufficient information on security problems in Dallas, or because it failed to analyze that information for its full significance? The questions this committee posed for itself were these: 1. How skillfully did the Secret Service acquire information about threat activitity around the country? 2. What was the quality of the insight used to analyze the information? 3. Did protective operations in the field reflect a thorough awareness of threat activity? Before we get to testimony bearing on these questions, it would seem useful to consider for a moment the historic background of the Secret Service and its evolving role in Federal law enforcement. It is worth noting that the Kennedy assassination was the first and only event of its kind since the Secret Service was assigned to full-time protection of the President in 1901, as a result of the 321 assassination of William McKinley. Originally, when it was formed in 1865, the Secret Service was not given responsibility for Presidential protection, even though that was the year Lincoln was murdered. The primary purpose of the Secret Service at the outset was to deal with counterfeiting which had become a national outrage in the period before 1862 when a standardized national currency was adopted. By the end of the 1860's the new agency had all but eliminated the problem. For the balance of the 19th century, the Secret Service engaged in various criminal detection activities. It investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870's, Spanish espionage in the 1890's, organized crime in New York City in the eighties and nineties, and syndicated gambling in Louisiana at the turn of the century. Even with the assignment of Presidential protection as its primary role, the Secret Service was not guaranteed, however, necessary annual appropriation to carry out the task. It wasn't until 1908 that the agency's mission was clarified, and, at that, for an ironic reason. When the Secret Service exposed the participation in land fraud schemes by Members of Congress from several Western States, legislation was passed restricting the operations of the agency and creating a new Federal law enforcement body which ultimately became the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So, the original FBI men were eight agents transferred from the Secret Service. The law limiting the Secret Service's responsibilities left it with two concerns: Treasury matters, or counterfeiting, and protection of the President. On occasion, however, it was given exceptional assignments. During World War I, for example, it went after German saboteurs, and in 1921 it was the body that investigated the roles of Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall and Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty in the Teapot Dome Scandal. From about 1930 on, the Secret Service was an anticounterfeiting agency with the additional assignment of protecting the President. For the latter function, on only two occasions before November 22, 1963, was the agency tested by an actual assault on a President: In February 1932, the car in which President Roosevelt was riding was fired on in Miami, killing the mayor of Chicago, Aaron Cermak. In November 1950, members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party tried to force their way into Blair House, the temporary home of President Truman. It ought to be clear, therefore, that the best way to evaluate the performance of the Secret Service at the time of the Kennedy assassination is to look at it not so much in the context of history, but rather in the context of the climate in 1963 and how well the Secret Service appreciated that climate, especially as it might have been evident in Texas. President Kennedy posed a problem for the Secret Service from the start. As a policymaker, he was liberal and innovative, perhaps startlingly so in comparison with the cautious approach of President Eisenhower. His personal style was known to cause agents assigned to him to tear their hair. He traveled more frequently than any of his predecessors, and he relished contact with crowds 322 of well wishers. He scoffed at many of the measures designed to protect him and treated the danger of an assault philosophically, if someone wanted to kill him, he reasoned, it would not be very difficult to stop him. On at least one occasion, President Kennedy was literally "lost" by the Secret Service detail guarding his hotel room. Indeed, on the very day of the assassination, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell is reported to have told a Secret Service agent, "you are not at fault. You can't mix security and politics. We chose politics." The core of the Presidential security arm of the Secret Service is the White House detail, which in 1963 was composed of 36 special agents. In addition, there were six special agent drivers, eight special agents assigned to the Kennedy family, and five special officers detailed to the Kennedy home in Hyannisport, Mass. On the trip to Texas, there were 28 special agents in the Presidential entourage. In all, out of 552 employees in November 1963, there were 70 special agents and 8 clerks--17 percent of the total Secret Service work force--assigned to protecting the President and Vice President directly or to the Protective Research Service, a preventive intelligence division charged with gathering and evaluating threat information and seeing that it is usefully disseminated. In addition, there were 30 employees in the office of the Chief of the Secret Service, plus 313 agents and 131 clerks in 66 field offices, all of whom were on call to assist in Presidential protection. The time of need for the most manpower was in 1963, as it is now, when the President traveled and was exposed to crowds of people in open spaces. Then, the Secret Service called on municipal, county, and State law enforcement agencies for personnel who assisted in the preparation of large-scale protective plans. In planning a Presidential trip, a set of procedures was customarily followed. It is expected that they will be detailed in testimony today, along with answers to certain specific issues stemming from the Kennedy assassination, such as securing buildings along a parade route and liaison between the Secret Service and other agencies, Federal as well as State, county, and local. From the beginning of its investigation of the Secret Service, the committee realized the great importance of the Protective Research Service. PRS is the memory of the agency, and it is responsible for analyzing threat data. By reviewing PRS files and interviewing its personnel, the committee has sought to clarify just how much the Secret Service, as an agency, knew about the sort and degree of the dangers the President faced in the fall of 1963, and to learn what protective tactics had been devised in response to them. The committee was at pains to make a valid distinction between major and minor threats to the President in order that it could concentrate on the followup action to the significant ones. A threat was considered major if (a) it was verbal or communicated by a threatening act, and (b) if it created a danger great enough to require an in-depth and intense investigation by the Secret Service or other law enforcement agency. The committee examined all threat profile investigations from March to December 1963, 313 of them in all, and it incorporated 323 into its analysis information on some major threat activity back to December 1962. The committee also considered the following questions in its investigation of Secret Service threat activity files, questions raised by the Kennedy assassination itself: One: Was there an indication of a conspiracy to harm Secret Service protectees? Two: Was there information developed in investigations of earlier threats that might be useful in the investigation of the assassination? Three: Was the pertinent information in the Secret Service files made available to the Warren Commission? The first witness today will be Inspector Thomas J. Kelley. Inspector Kelley was assigned to represent the Secret Service in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. Inspector Kelley served as Secret Service liaison to the Warren Commission. Inspector Kelley received a B.A. from Providence College and an LL.B. from Georgetown University Law School. He has been the special agent in charge of the Philadelphia Field Office, an Inspector in the Washington office, the Assistant Director of Protective Intelligence and Investigations in Washington, D.C., and he currently is the Assistant Director of Protective Operations in Washington, D.C. Inspector Kelley is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and he has served as consultant to several Far Eastern police agencies, as well as consultant to the Dominican Republic on protective matters. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Inspector Kelley. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Inspector Kelley. Sir, would you raise your right hand and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? TESTIMONY OF INSPECTOR THOMAS J. KELLEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. Inspector KELLEY. I do. Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Leodis Matthews. Mr. MATTHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelley, at this time are you retired from the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, in February 1978. Mr. MATTHEWS. In 1963 you were a member of the Secret Service inspection detail? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your duties and responsibilities? Inspector KELLEY. The duties of the inspector from the Chiefs office at that time were to conduct the field investigations of the activities of the Secret Service both in the field, at headquarters, and on the protective details, to make periodic inspections of the offices. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you concerned about the performance of the agents in those investigations? 324 Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of inspection did you conduct of the agents' performance? Inspector KELLEY. In the field office? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. Inspector KELLEY. Their productivity, the manner in which they conducted their cases, the number of arrests, the kind of investigations they conducted, their relationship with outsiders, their relationship to their own people, and generally the conduct of the requirements of the job. Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to an exhibit, JFK F-423. Are you able to see the exhibit from where you are, Mr. Kelley? Inspector KELLEy. Generally, yes I can. Mr. MATTHEWS. This exhibit purports to be an organizational chart of the Secret Service as of November 13, 1964. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge would that have been basical- ly the same organization of the Secret Service in 1963? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. [The above referred to exhibit follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-423 Mr. MATTHEWS. In your position as inspector would you report to the Director of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir, report to the Chief Inspector who reported to the Director or the Chief. Mr. MATTHEWS. In the chart there is an indication about halfway down at the righthand side of the White House detail? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. 325 Mr. MATTHEWS. As an inspector, did you also have occasion to inspect the performance of the White House detail? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, during an inspection of the White House detail we would review the performance of the detail. Mr. MATTHEWS. What considerations would you give in evaluating their performance? Inspector KELLEY. The general conduct of the people on the detail, the carrying out of their assignment, the connection they had with their superiors and their fellow agents. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you also have conducted performance reviews of the Protective Research Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you focus on the quality of investigation by the field offices in the Protective Research Service, whether they complied with the guidelines and procedures of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, that was part of the inspection procedure. Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to November 22, 1963. At that time you were in Louisville, Ky.? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you received a communique from Chief Rowley? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were the contents of that message? Inspector KELLEY. The chiefs office directed me to proceed to Dallas, Tex., to assist Mr. Sorrels, the agent in charge of the Dallas office, to assist him in finding out what had happened at Dallas, what were the events surrounding the assassination, and to coordinate any investigation that might be conducted by the Secret Service concerning the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you arrived in Dallas, Tex., that evening? Inspector KELLEY. That evening. Mr. MATTHEWS. Upon your arrival, did you understand that your responsibility was to conduct a criminal conspiracy investigation? Inspector KELLEY. No. Actually, at that time it was to find out exactly what happened and what the role of the Secret Service had been in that tragedy there. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your first actions? Inspector KELLEY. I first met with Mr. Sorrels and we went to the police department where Oswald was being interrogated. I sat in on, I think it was the second interrogation of Oswald. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now in total you were present for at least four interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you feel it was necessary to be there? Inspector KELLEY. We were, of course, attempting to find out what had happened, whether he was the assassin, whether he had accomplices, whether there were other problems that the Secret Service might be facing in connection with assassination of other people. It was just generally to find out what had happened. Mr. MATTHEWS. The Warren Commission has indicated that there were several people present at the time. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. In my opinion, there were too many present at the time of the interrogation of Oswald. The interroga- 326 tion of Oswald by Captain Fritz of the Dallas Police Department was conducted under something less than ideal circumstances. Mr. MATTHEWS. What effect would those circumstances have had upon the interrogation itself? Inspector KELLEY. In my opinion, it made the interrogation of Oswald by Captain Fritz, who at that time had the primary jurisdiction of handling Oswald, made it very difficult for him to conduct the kind of interrogation that should have been conducted. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you engage in any conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of that conversation? Inspector KELLEY. I had asked Oswald if he had assassinated the President. I told him who I was. I said that the Secret Service had the responsibility for protecting the President, that he was in custody accused of assassinating the President, and we wanted to know whether he had done it, and if he hadn't done it, to let us know; if he had done it, to admit it. He indicated that he would talk to me later on. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you also present at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was shot. Inspector KELLEY. I wasn't in the immediate vicinity. I was upstairs in the police office. We had just left Oswald in the police headquarters. The police took him down to the basement to transport him. Mr. Sorrels and I remained upstairs. When we heard that he had been shot, we immediately went down to the basement. Oswald was still in the basement. The ambulance had been backed in to take him to the hospital. I attempted to enter the ambulance with Oswald to go to the hospital. I was prevented from getting into the ambulance by the Dallas policemen who got into the ambulance with him. Mr. MATTHEWS. During the time between your first conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald and the time the shooting occurred, did you make any attempt to ascertain what his background had been? Inspector KELLEY. Let me have the question again. Mr. MATTHEWS. What investigation did you conduct into the background of Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. The investigation that the Secret Service conducted personally was, the interviews with Mrs. Oswald, with Marina. We had put a detail with Marina after Lee Harvey's assassination and we attempted to get as much background as we could on Oswald from her. There was a great deal of information coming to us in the Dallas office at that time from the other agencies who had information on Oswald. The FBI had information on him. The agency apparently had some information on him and had furnished it to our headquarters. The Dallas police had some information on him and the State Department had some information on him in connection with his trips to Russia. The military was supplying information to our headquarters and it was being provided to me at Dallas. All of this information was coming down to Dallas to me. 327 Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any attempts personally to obtain information from the Secret Service files about Lee Harvey Oswald's background in connection with the Cuban organizations? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the inquiry we made of the Secret Service files was whether the Secret Service had anything on Oswald prior to the assassination, and we had none. Mr. MATTHEWS. Based upon your investigation in Dallas in the few days right after the assassination, did you develop a background in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald which you communicated to the field offices of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Not an entire background. We were putting all the information together, but I don't know that we put it in any one document. It was in the series of documents that accompanied records we were preparing. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, when you were in Dallas conducting the investigation, were you the person in charge of the assassina- tion investigation on behalf of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request the field offices conduct investigations of suspects who they thought may have a connection with the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the assassination? No; I don't know that we sent any requests, that I sent any requests like that out. You must remember, that there was a coordinated investigation being conducted by the protective research section in Washington and our offices were furnishing us information that came to their attention from other agencies subsequent to the assassination and furnishing that to us at headquarters and to me in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request that the Chicago field office conduct an investigation in connection with the rifle found in the Texas School Book Depository? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. Who did you talk with in the Chicago office? Inspector KELLEY. I don't recall now who I talked to, but I talked to someone in the Chicago office and asked them to run this lead out that we had. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, you were aware of an investigation concerning special agents who were alleged to have been drinking the night before and the morning before the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. I am aware of the inquiry; yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge, were any of those agents found in violation of the Secret Service rules? Inspector KELLEY. I don't think they were found in violation of any Secret Service rules warranting any action. It was an area of poor judgment, I presume, but there was no specific violation of any rule. Of course, the inquiry indicated that their action the night before had nothing, no bearing, on what happened in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have occasion to review the performance of the agents at the time of the Kennedy assassination, the shooting episode in Dealey Plaza? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; the agents that were in Dallas. 328 Mr. MATTHEWS. What conclusion did you reach with respect to their behavior? Inspector KELLEY. Well, I felt that none of the agents could be charged with any dereliction of duty in connection with the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have any conversation with the driver of the Presidential vehicle? Inspector KELLEY. No; I did not. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review his conduct? Inspector KELLEY. I reviewed his conduct. Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you understand his instructions were? Inspector KELLEY. Well, his instructions were, to see that the car was driven safely, that the safety of his passengers was paramount, that he was to assure himself that the car was in condition to move properly, just to keep in mind the safety of the passengers. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he have any specific instructions that he was to take in anticipation of harm to the President? Inspector KELLEY. The general instruction, to the agents in a situation where the President is considered to be in danger is to get the President out of there, to evacuate the President. The Secret Service does not consider it necessary for the Secret Service to stand and fight in any situation. That our primary duty is the security of the President and to remove him from any dangerous situation. So that generally the instructions to the drivers of the cars are to be prepared to get the President away from any dangerous situation. Mr. MATTHEWS. Had the driver of the vehicle received any training in defensive driving or evasive driving? Inspector KELLEY. Not in a formal sense. However, Mr. Greer who was driving the President's car at that time and the other agents who were assigned as drivers had long practice and history of driving the Presidential vehicles and the security vehicles. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any tests available at the time to gage or measure the reactions of those persons who were responsible for the close physical protection of President Kennedy? Inspector KELLEY. I presume there were tests available. I am not certain that any were given to the particular agents that were involved at the time of the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. You reviewed their performance? Inspector KELLEY. But I reviewed their performance? Mr. MATTHEWS. You did review their performance? Inspector KELLEY. I did review their performance. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have a recollection that any such tests were available to give them? Inspector KELLEY. I have no recollection that any tests were given. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, the special agent in charge of the White House detail testified before this committee that he had been removed from his position, that he had considered his conduct a demotion. Did you have occasion to review his performance? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; that man, of course, was not at Dallas. I had occasion to review his performance at other times, but he was not present in Dallas. 329 Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review his performance in connection with selecting agents to go to Dallas and making the arrangements for the trip? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What, if any, conclusions did you draw with respect to his performance? Inspector KELLEY. His performance was normal under those circumstances. The selection of agents was a rather routine performance at that time. Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you remain in Dallas? Inspector KELLEY. I can't tell you the exact date, but I returned to Washington some time before December 15, probably the first week or 10 days of December. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now in the week following the assassination, did you receive any reports from the field offices, reporting results of their investigation or whether there were any subjects, or other agents connected with the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; we received several reports. At that time there were several rumors going around that Oswald had been seen in various places and Oswald had connections in various cities. And these reports were coming to us and being evaluated. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of those reports generally? Did they identify any particular organization? Inspector KELLEY. They were generally running out rumors concerning Oswald being seen with certain people in other cities. There was a report coming to us from New Orleans that Oswald had been seen in New Orleans, had been arrested in New Orleans, and had been participating in some pamphleteering activities in New Orleans. Mr. MATTHEWS. You were aware during the time you were in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the FPCC, Fair Play for Cuba Committee? Inspector KELLEY. That came out of New Orleans. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you were also aware of the fact that one of the Secret Service agents had interviewed Marina Oswald shortly after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. During the course of that interview she had indicated to him that she was a strong Castro supporter? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any requests to any of the field offices to determine if there were any Cuban organizations or groups which had threatened, or presented a threat to, the President? Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't make any particular requests on that matter, but there were at that time, prior to the assassination, several investigations going on in the Secret Service office concerning groups that had in their rhetoric indicated that they were a danger to the President or had threatened the President or had been reported to threaten the President. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, I call your attention to a report that was written by a special agent in Chicago, a synopsis of which indicates that an informant advises that he had been in touch with 330 a group of Chicago Cubans who may be involved in the assassina- tion of the late President Kennedy. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Can you state whether or not you were aware of that investigation while you were in Dallas? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I was. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you file a report in connection with that matter? Inspector KELLEY. No; I didn't file any report that I recall. It was information coming to us. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive any other information that tended to support or corroborate that investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Not that I recall. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall receiving any reports from the Miami area focusing in on an investigation connected with the Chicago investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, there were several reports coming out of the Miami area. The Secret Service had been very interested in the Cuban activity in the Florida area, the Miami area particularly, prior to the assassination because of the visits of President Kennedy to Miami and to his home in Florida. We had frequent trips to Miami with our protectees. And we were concerned with the Cuban activities in Miami and we received several reports concerning them. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall receiving a report from a special agent in Miami, a Miami investigation, mentioning a person by the name of Quentin Pina Machado? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your recollection about that report? Inspector KELLEY. That report was one of a series of reports that we received concerning the activities of the pro-Castro and antiCastro groups in Miami. He was alleged to be an activist, a radical and a dangerous man. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, I refer to JFKF-419, the report that I have discussed with you previously, a synopsis of which indicates that information had been received from an informant indicating that if the assassination of the President involved an international plot or conspiracy and that if there was evidence connecting Fidel Castro, the person who would have been responsible for carrying out any action on the part of Fidel would be Quentin Pina Machado, a Cuban terrorist used by Castro to carry out any Castro action. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any determination to investigate the authenticity of that information? Inspector KELLEY. We did not make a separate investigation by the Secret Service. This matter was under investigation by the FBI and by the agency. We were receiving information and exchanging information with the two agencies in connection with Machado and several other Cuban radicals in the Miami area. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now with the exception of the memorandums you received from Miami, the memorandums you received from Chicago indicating the possibility of Cuban involvement in the 331 assassination, was there any other evidence of a conspiracy that you were concerned with? Inspector KELLEY. There were other memoranda coming and information coming into headquarters concerning the activities of other groups, some of whom had been alleged prior to the assassination as having an interest in the President, having threatened the President actually. Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of groups would those have been, what affiliations? Inspector KELLEY. These were some of the white rightist groups, the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan, several of the right wing groups. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you read all the reports that the Secret Service generated in connection with your investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you have been the only person reviewing those reports? Inspector KELLEY. No, there were several people reviewing the reports; the Protective Research Division, Mr. Sorrels was reviewing some of them in Dallas, several people. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the Secret Service actively become involved in determining whether or not there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy soon after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. We were interested and we were certainly involved in attempting to answer that question. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any restrictions on the scope of what areas you were to investigate? Inspector KELLEY. The research that was done was done by the Protective Research Section in connection with what information we had and then asking for what information any other of the agencies had, the intelligence-gathering information. The Secret Service was not in the business of gathering intelligence. We were in the business and are still in the business of evaluating the intelligence we receive. So we were dependent and depending a great deal on the other intelligence agencies to furnish us information. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, the FBI was in Dallas at the same time conducting an investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. At some point you received an indication that the FBI would conduct the conspiracy investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. When was that? Inspector KELLEY. That was shortly after I got down there, probably 2 or 3 days after I got down there. I received information from our headquarters that the Government had indicated that the FBI would be in charge of the investigation of the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. As near as you can remember, what date would that have been? Inspector KELLEY. I would say it would have been about the 24th or 25th. I really can't be certain after this length of time. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any effort to discuss with the FBI what areas that the investigation should focus on? 332 Inspector KELLEY. Not really. I had several discussions with Jim Malley who was my counterpart from the FBI in the Dallas office. There was an occasional question from Malley as to what we were doing in this area or that. We resolved those inquiries among ourselves. I was there to see what had happened in connection with the Secret Service's responsibility, to see what this assassination meant to us in connection with our other protectees whether this was an ongoing conspiracy where President Johnson might be assassinated or some other Government official. We were interested in that in those few days where there was a great deal of confusion as to what had happened. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you formulate any plan or course of investigation to determine whether, in fact, there was a conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. No, except the general plan to find out what happened, what went on. Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you do with the information that you received from Chicago and Miami? Inspector KELLEY. I merely read it and, of course, a copy of that information went to the protective research section who, of course, would evaluate it as to what it meant to us, along with myself. Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of evaluation would they conduct? What were they trying to find out? Inspector KELLEY. They would ascertain whether--their original request, of course, was to ascertain whether this had anything to do with the assassination in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did they have the responsibility of drawing connections between the various information that was coming in from the field office? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And they were to apprise you of what connections, if any, there were? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, and, of course, I was free to make my own judgment down there, too. Mr. MATTHEWS. What person in the intelligence division did you talk with in connection with that? Inspector KELLEY. Bob B-o-u-c-k. Mr. MATTHEWS. And he was aware of all the reports that you had? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now how was your liaison process with the FBI working? Was there a free exchange of information? Inspector KELLEY. At that time in Dallas? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I felt there was a free exchange of information. We were getting some information that was not available to them through our contacts with Marina. Of course, our agents were picking up information on the street as they do. People were coming to us at the local level in Dallas. I felt there was a free exchange of information. There certainly was between myself and Mr. Malley. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, when you were in Dallas, you received information from an Agent Patterson that he had talked with an 333 FBI agent regarding some top secret information in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And he indicated to that agent that he could not tell him what the information was, but that it would be exchanged at the Washington level? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Specifically, he mentioned the fact that the agent had had contact with Marina Oswald some 10 days before the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you later learned that that agent was James P. Hosty? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever find out what top secret information he was referring to? Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't find out any top secret information he was referring to, but, of course, the information came to us shortly thereafter, perhaps at the same time, that the FBI had contacts with Oswald and had contact with Marina to find Oswald and to talk to him. In discussing what this information was later, I think that it referred to the fact that Oswald had been in Russia. Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you say you think; did you ever discuss that with Inspector Malley? Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever find that the agent who, in fact, had contact with Marina had been special agent James Hosty? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I learned that as a general piece of information, that Hosty was the control agent for Lee Harvey Oswald and that in that connection he had contacted Marina. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever learn about what has become known as the Hosty note? Inspector KELLEY. No; that never came to my attention. Mr. MATTHEWS. When did that first come to your attention? Inspector KELLEY. I think I read that in the press a year or so ago or whenever it became public. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you were receiving information from the FBI in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you learned that while Lee Harvey Oswald was in New Orleans he had contact with Carlos Bringuir, a member of the Cuban group known as the DRE? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you send that information on to Mr. Bouck in the intelligence section? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. Bouck got that information about the same time I did in the reports that came from New Orleans. Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there ever anything developed from the Secret Service file in regard to whether there was an assassination attempt or plot involved? Inspector KELLEY. A plot? Whether there was a plot involved in the assassination of President Kennedy? 334 Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes; based upon the Secret Service investigation after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. No; there was not. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review all that information? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, you have become aware of a September 7 speech given in 1963 by Fidel Castro at which time he indicated that he was aware of the CIA attempt to cause the Cuban leaders to be assassinated? Inspector KELLEY. I have heard of it; yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And that he would respond in kind. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you hear that? Did you know about that during the course of the Secret Service investigation in 1963? Inspector KELLEY. I am not too sure when I became aware of that. I really don't know. I don't think so. I think this information was brought to my attention later after I had returned to Washington. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would that have been a type of information that the Secret Service would be interested in. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS [continuing]. For intelligence purposes? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. It didn't come to my attention until later, since the thing happened before the assassination. It is not the sort of thing that would come directly to my attention anyway. It would come to the protective research section. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now later when you returned to Washington, you became the liaison person with the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you the principal person in the Secret Service responsible to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your responsibilities? Inspector KELLEY. I had a responsibility to assist the Warren Commission in any way we could, to furnish them any information we have in connection with the assassination, and to generally see that the Commission got everything it needed from the Secret Service. Mr. MATTHEWS. Who would make the determination of which and what type of information was supplied to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. That would come from--well, Mr. Rankin would request what information he wanted. I would make the determination as to what information I thought the Commission would want from it. But generally what happened was that if the Commission heard something from some other agency that perhaps they thought the Secret Service might have something on, they would ask us for it. If we had it, we would give it to them. If we didn't, we would tell them. When the Commission was formed, we sent up a great deal of documents, which included everything we had done in Dallas, all the information that had come to the Dallas office while I was there, all the reports and the statements made by the people which were involved. So it was one massive turning over to the Commission of everything that they thought they 335 wanted at that time, and then subsequently, as their deliberations went on, they asked for other material. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any independent suggestions to the Warren Commission of what areas they should or ought to investigate? Inspector KELLEY. Not really; no. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss with them concepts of conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. Oh, yes, I have discussed with some of the staff the things that we had going at the time of the assassination, the kinds of threats we have. Mr. MATTHEWS. You discussed with them the information that you have received from the field offices? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you supply them all the reports in connection with that? Inspector KELLEY. We supplied them with all the reports that we thought were pertinent to the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you also became involved in examining certain parts of the Secret Service operation and performance before the assassination with the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. You considered, for instance, whether it was feasible to establish certain buildings on the motorcade route, if there is any more danger than others? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we furnished the Warren Commission with the kind of procedures we were going through at that time. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now subsequent to that, you were involved in investigating and determining whether or not there were certain things on the motorcade route that should be particularly noted by the advance agents? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. You considered warehouses as being a building of particular concern? Inspector KELLEY. Empty buildings, empty warehouses, or warehouses that were partially occupied, yes. Every building is a security risk, but there are certain types of buildings in which there is a lot less control than there are in others. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you also became aware of the threat made by Joseph Milteer? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I was aware of that investigation. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was that investigation? Inspector KELLEY. That was an investigation of members of the Ku Klux Klan and white rightists, wherein information had been received that one of the people had made a threat against the life of the President, against President Kennedy. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you specifically remember the nature of that threat? Was it that the President would be in the Miami area on November 18, and that it would be possible to assassinate him from a high building with a rifle? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What, if anything, did the Secret Service do to respond to that? 336 Inspector KELLEY. These organizations that were involved, these people involved were continuing investigations that had been going on by the FBI, we exchanged information with the FBI as to where these people were, what they were doing, and there was just an attempt to evaluate this threat which was a similar threat, we had received others like it throughout the year, whether it really meant something that the Secret Service would have to take some action on, specific action on. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now the threat was for November 18, 1963, and it was that there would be an attempt to assassinate the President from a high building with a rifle. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there any effort made in Dallas to check any of the buildings? Inspector KELLEY. Whatever effort was made was a request by the advance man with the Dallas police to see what they could do about a route survey. Now in those days, the Secret Service's resources were extremely limited. We depended a great deal upon the local police departments for this type of backing and I don't know specifically what the Dallas police were asked to do or what they did on the survey route. I can recall what the advance report suggested they do. Mr. MATTHEWS. When you reviewed the performance of the advance agents, did you give any special consideration to the Milteer threat, whether or not they knew about it? Inspector KELLEY. The information coming at that time on a threat like that would go from the Protective Research Section to the White House detail. They were furnished with this kind of information. I can't say what they did with this particular piece of information. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether the advance agents who went into Dallas were aware of that particular threat? Inspector KELLEY. I don't know personally whether they were. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, we have reviewed a series of reports that have been identified as JFK F-414 through JFK F-418, the caption of which reads Cuban Plot to Assassinate the President. The details of the investigation began in November of 1962 until August of 1963. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you had occasion to review those reports? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you give the committee a brief summary primarily of what those reports contain and what the investigation was? Inspector KELLEY. This was an investigation of Cuban activity in the Miami area. It resulted from the interception of two letters to an address in Miami. The letters contained information of a threatening tenor to the President, against President Kennedy. I don't recall the exact text of the letters, but they were of sufficient importance to us to conduct an investigation and to ask information from the FBI and the agency as to what they knew about the particular people involved. Mr. MATTHEWS. And the letters were mailed from where? 337 Inspector KELLEY. I don't recall. They were from outside the country. Mr. MATTHEWS. Havana, Cuba? Inspector KELLEY. From Cuba, yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. According to the exhibit, the investigation established that the address and the person who mailed the letter was authentic. Inspector KELLEY. Was what? Mr. MATTHEWS. Was authentic. Inspector KELLEY. The person who mailed the letter, the name was authentic, yes. However, there was an opinion by the intelligence people that these letters were perhaps sent to be intercepted. There was an indication by the intelligence analysts in our own shop and in the other agencies that perhaps the way these letters were addressed they were meant to be intercepted. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now Quentin Pino Machado was mentioned as one of the persons involved in that investigation. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there ever any attempt made to connect this information to the later information you received about Quentin Machado? Inspector KELLEY. Not by us, and I am not familiar with what followed in the investigation, mostly because we never made any connection between this investigation and this threat with the Oswald matter, with the assassination in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now during your time that you were with the Warren Commission, did you ever personally review this material in connection with the assassination investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we sent some of this information up to the Warren Commission. They were aware of this investigation. Some of their staff people, of course, were in Miami and followed up something of that. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time. Mr. FITHIAN. At this time the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume. Following that, we will proceed to the 5-minute rule. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to ask counsel, Mr. Matthews, if copies of the different exhibits have been given to the witness, specifically JFK F-420, also F-415 and F-418. Would you give that to the witness at this time? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Mr. FORD. We will get back to that in a few minutes, Mr. Kelley. Mr. Kelley, your position as an inspector included evaluating the performance of the agents; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Did you evaluate the reaction of agents in Dealey Plaza to the sound of gunfire? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I considered it and thought about it. Mr. FORD. You thought about it? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Governor Connally testified before this committee that as an experienced hunter, there was no question in his mind that 338 the first sound was rifle fire. The evidence before this committee so far has indicated that in all probability the first shot missed. The medical and autopsy testimony has indicated that the third shot was definitely the fatal blow. We have had experts to establish that time between the first and the third shot was over 7 seconds. I want to ask you, Mr. Kelley, what consideration did you give to the reaction between the first, second and third shot of the two agents riding the Presidential limousine? And also the agents immediately behind the limousine? Inspector KELLEY. It is very difficult to second-guess what a person should have done in a crisis like that or just what he knew had happened. I think from talking to the agents, I don't think that any of them knew they were under fire until they saw the President so badly wounded. The agents, of course, in the follow-up car were some distance away from the action. Their training and what their responsibility was, of course, was to look at the crowd. They were not looking at the President. Their instructions are that they ought to be looking away from him, to see what was going on. The two people in the car, of course, were facing the other way. I don't think any of them realized at the time the first shot went off that they were under fire. We had a parade situation with motorcycles alongside of you, the crowd cheering, people making a great deal of noise, as is usual in a political motorcade of that type, and in summary, I just don't think the agents knew they were under fire until much too late to do anything about it. Mr. FORD. Yes, but what training did the agents receive? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the training, the agent had extensive training as to how to handle a crowd and how to attempt to keep themselves, between danger and the President's body. They have a great deal more training now than they had then, but even in those days there was specific training procedures that the agents went through, the recognition of gunfire, a very difficult problem for anyone I think in those situations. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, Mr. Maurice Martineau, the special agent in charge of the Chicago field office, testified before this committee that before the assassination, the field offices did not call on other Federal agencies for assistance. Would you tell us why, the Secret Service never contacted law enforcement agencies for assistance in those areas where threats had been received, for instance, Dallas, Miami of other areas? Inspector KELLEY. Well, we could call on any of the local police agencies for assistance and not only could but did. There was some restriction on us about calling on FBI agents for physical protection, to assist in the physical protection of the President. We had access to any government agency for information, for intelligence information. We were not prohibited from calling on other Federal agencies, if we considered it necessary. We could get assistance and bodies. It was not easy but it could be done if we had a situation where we thought we needed them. Mr. FORD. Well, Mr. Martineau said in his testimony: "I think it was a matter that tragically and unfortunately took an assassination to bring it into sharp focus the need for further steps which the Secret Service previously did not authorize." 339 My question: During your tenure with the Secret Service, did you find that to be true before the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. I think that the Secret Service did not have all the resources it needed to conduct this important protective responsibility. We were shorthanded. We did not have the number and kinds of people and training that this serious responsibility called for. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, soon after you arrived in Dallas, you requested that the Chicago office determine whether Alex Hidell had purchased a rifle from the Klein's Sporting Goods Store; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. If you will recall, when the Secret Service agents arrived, FBI agents had already been there; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. And in fact instructed the manager not to talk to anyone else; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Were the Secret Service and the FBI investigating the case independently, and, what, if any, attempts did you make to prevent this duplication of investigation? Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't think we were investigating the matter independently. I think at that time, in those very early days of the investigation, we were attempting to investigate it jointly. The rifle had been identified as having been used, the alcohol and tobacco people had identified it as having been purchased in Chicago by Oswald using his alias of Hidell. We got that information and I just sent it out to Chicago to ask that it be verified. The Bureau apparently had the same information a little earlier than we had and did the same thing. I saw no problems with the duplication of effort in the first few days of Dallas. There was a great deal of confusion going on. We just did what we thought we had to do to get the information that we were trying to seek as to what was happening, what the assassination meant to us in our protective efforts. Mr. FORD. Were you in contact with the FBI--- Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD [continuing]. During this period? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Were there any recommendations, Mr. Kelley, to the Warren Commission that they focus upon the conspiracies which the Secret Service at one time were concerned about? Inspector KELLEY. I don't think there had been a special focusing on any one particular activity that we were doing. I think they focused on the entire range of possibilities. Mr. FORD. Were you aware that there were significant questions of Oswald's connection and association with Castro's government and the Cuban groups in the United States during this investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, well, we were aware of Oswald's trip to Mexico. It became known to us after the assassination. We were aware of his activities in Dallas with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We received no indication of any link with Oswald 340 with organized radical groups among the Cubans except the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Mr. FORD. But you did have information of his involvement with the pro-Castro---- Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. What reasons did you have for not thoroughly reviewing all the files in the Secret Service to supply the Warren Commission with any reference that would assist the Commission in the investigation, Mr. Kelley? Inspector KELLEY. Oh, I think we supplied the Warren Commission with anything that was pertinent to the assassination, anything they asked for, and anything that we, in our opinion, thought would be interesting to them. We held nothing back from the Warren Commission that I know of. It was my job to see that we didn't, and I don't think we did. Mr. FORD. When the FBI began to focus its investigation on Lee Harvey Oswald, did you gain any impression that the conspiracy investigations conducted by the Secret Service was being ignored at that time? Inspector KELLEY. No, no, sir. Mr. FORD. Were you aware of what other information was? Inspector KELLEY. I was aware of the information we had, I was also aware that much of the information contained in our files concerning these Cuban activities was coming from the Bureau, and there was a free exchange of information between the Bureau and ourselves in Miami and at headquarters concerning these alleged plots. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, there was a group of Secret Service personnel who reviewed the assassination investigation conducted by the various field offices of the Secret Service; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, in the Protective Research Section. Mr. FORD. Who were the people in that group, Mr. Kelley? Inspector KELLEY. There were people in the Protective Research Section and some others who were brought in from the field who had been in the protective research area, and of course I was involved in it. Mr. FORD. During the meetings, did you ever discuss whether there were any credible investigations to be done in the conspiracy area? Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the Oswald matter? Mr. FORD. The Oswald what? Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the assassination, you mean, or generally in the threat area? Mr. FORD. Well, in connection with the assassination, prior to the assassination, or the assassination itself--- Inspector KELLEY. Prior to the assassination it would have been done by the Protective Research Section, by Mr. Bouck, who has discussed these matters with the head of the White House detail, with the Deputy Director, the Deputy Chief at the time, and the Chief of the Secret Service concerning important, what we considered important plots that came to our attention, either came to our 341 attention directly or perhaps came to our attention through the FBI or the agency. Mr. FORD. Did this group determine what files should or should not be given to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. No, I think the decision as to what files should be given to the Warren Commission was pretty well handled by myself. Mr. FORD. Were any recommendations given to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Recommendations by the Secret Service? Mr. FORD. No, by this group, from this group we are discussing. Inspector KELLEY. No. Mr. FORD. As far as conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. No, we made no recommendation to the Warren Commission. Mr. FORD. No recommendation? Inspector KELLEY. No. We merely supplied them with information we had. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, the agent in charge of the intelligence function for the Secret Service testified before this committee that he had no knowledge of the substance of Fidel Castro's September 7, 1963, speech in which Castro voiced what had been interpreted as a direct threat to the Kennedys. What consideration was this threat given in deciding to investigate any persons who were strong pro-Castro supporters? Inspector KELLEY. I don't think any consideration was given to investigating pro-Castro supporters. With the resources we had at that time, we were pretty well confining ourselves to threats made against the President. Domestic security was the responsibility of the Bureau. Mr. FORD. Did it occur to you at that time to investigate all pro-Castro persons that would have been in the Secret Service intelligence files? Inspector KELLEY. If they were in the Secret Service intelligence files, of course they did get a periodic review. Mr. FORD. They did? Inspector KELLEY. They got a periodic review as the matters in the Protective Research Section were reviewed. Mr. FORD. I mean during, right after the assassination of President Kennedy? Inspector KELLEY. Right after that, all the information we had in the Protective Research Section was pretty thoroughly reviewed. We were looking for some information that we had that might go back to Oswald. Mr. FORD. When the FBI took control of the assassination after December 9 I think you said, you mentioned earlier that you were contacted through a White House order, did you release all of that information at that time to the FBI, including the intelligence files? Inspector KELLEY. No, we didn't release it to them. The information, we reviewed the information, and the information we had on the Cuban conspiracies and the Cuban groups we found was all information that the FBI had. As a result of the assassination and the review, we received a great deal more information that the 342 Bureau had on these groups than we had had heretofore which the Bureau previously did not think that we were concerned with. Mr. FORD. But do you recall whether you went through the files to investigate all of the pro-Castro persons immediately after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Not for the purpose of investigation, merely for the purpose of whether we had them, how many we had and that had any relationship to Oswald. Mr. FORD. Would Castro's statement together with Marina's statement to the Secret Service agent, shortly after the assassination, have strongly indicated that such persons should have been investigated? Inspector KELLEY. Not by the Secret Service, we don't feel. The Secret Service out of necessity, because of their resources, confined themselves to direct threats that we had received. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, Quentin Machado was known to the Secret Service even before John F. Kennedy's assassination--Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. [continuing]. As being an associate of a person who had threatened the President and was investigated as part of a Cuban plot to assassinate President Kennedy? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Yet all of the information in the Secret Service files were not supplied to the Warren Commission stating this? Inspector KELLEY. No, that isn't quite true, Mr. Congressman. In the first group of reports that we sent to the Warren Commission, a report on Quentin Machado was sent to the Warren Commission. That report had a file number on it reflecting that there was a great deal more information in the Secret Service files on this particular situation. We have, since this matter came up with us in the investigation, we have been attempting to ascertain whether this group of papers, which is F-415, ever went to the commission, and we cannot say that it did or did not, but we can definitely say that the report on Quentin Pino Machado containing the same file number as this information did go to the commission, so the commission had access to this file and had access to the information. I also know that the commission, did an intensive inquiry concerning the activities of the Cubans in the Miami area, which involved this investigation. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, let me get to my real question here. I am concerned. Were you of the opinion that the Warren Commission was open to the possibility of the conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Did you consider this information pertinent and rele- vant to their inquiry during this time? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, I have just a few other questions here. I would like to call your attention to JFK F-415 through F-418. Do you have it there? Inspector KELLEY. I have F-415 and F-416. Mr. FORD. As I understand it, these reports contain information regarding the Secret Service's investigation into a Cuban plot to assassinate President Kennedy; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. 343 Mr. FORD. The Secret Service was aware of this information during the course of the Warren Commission; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. But never actually gave the commission these reports during their investigation; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Not these particular reports, but we did give the Warren Commission information concerning these plots, and it was the Secret Service Report No. 206 that we sent to the commission, and it is in the commission file, mentioning Quentin Machado, containing the file number under which these reports are filed. Mr. FORD. At the time, Mr. Kelley, were these reports considered by the Secret Service to be secret documents? Inspector KELLEY. They were so classified, yes. Mr. FORD. Sir? Inspector KELLEY. They were classified as secret. Mr. FORD. Is that a rationale for not giving them to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. No. We gave other secret documents to the Warren Commission. That wasn't the rationale why they were not given. As a matter of fact, I don't have it before me, but I think the memorandum we also gave to the Warren Commission was classified. Mr. FORD. You know earlier, it might have been when Mr. Matthews was talking with you, you mentioned that you were to supply them with relevant and pertinent reports. Did you consider the investigation of this plot a concern of the work of the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Not really. In hindsight and with what happened during the Warren Commission recommendation there, in my opinion this investigation that was conducted in Miami had no relationship to the Oswald assassination. It was, however, one of the things that the Warren Commission was reviewing, Oswald's connection with pro-Castro groups, and I just feel that this information was available to the Warren Commission; that so much of it came from other agencies that they probably had the same information from the Bureau and the CIA in connection with it. It may very well have been that some of the staff people in the Warren Commission came and reviewed these reports that we had since they had a referenced file number, knowing that we had information on these plots. But our records do not show that we transmitted these to the Warren Commission. Mr. FORD. But you are saying that you reported to them a file number; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Would there have been anything in the reports you provided to the Warren Commission which would have given them a clue as to what information the number might have referred to as a file number? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I think the memorandum we sent to them, Memorandum 206 that we sent to them, would have supplied that information. Mr. FORD. It would have? Inspector KELLEY. It would have. 344 Mr. FORD. The FPCC, Mr. Kelley, or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, is mentioned in the reports, and a member of that organization is alleged to be a part of the plot to kill the President. Would there have been anything in the files and reports you provided the commission to indicate the presence of this group in that investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Not in the report, not in the particular two-page report we sent to them in connection with this case. That report dealt mostly with Machado. Mr. FoRD. The two-page report? Inspector KELLEY. I referred that we did send to the commission in this area. Mr. FORD. And the Warren Commission had the two-page report? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Let me ask you this: Were you aware at the time that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the same organization in the New Orleans area, the pro--anti-Castro----- Inspector KELLEY. Subsequent to the assassination? Mr. FORD. Yes. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we learned of that subsequent to the assassination. We didn't have anything on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Kelley, earlier today counsel for the committee Matthews asked you about the conduct of the Secret Service prior to the assassination. Relative to that, he asked you whether they had broken any rules or regulations of the Secret Service, and your answer was that they had not. Knowing, however, of their conduct on the previous evening, was it ever evaluated in terms of performance? Inspector KELLEY. We would have preferred that they had stayed away from the places they were at. We would have preferred they had gone to bed earlier. But in the whole review of what had happened, there was no indication that that activity the night before had any effect on their performance the next day or that it had any effect on the assassination that happened. Chairman STOKES. Well, have you ever had a chance to review the Zapruder film? Inspector KELLEY. The Zapruder film? Yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. And referring back to the question posed to you by Congressman Ford with reference to reaction time, did you study the film from the viewpoint of whether the reaction time the of agents was in accordance with what you felt would be top performance? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and it was reviewed, we reviewed it very thoroughly with the agents who were involved. The motorcade was moving. You can recall in the Zapruder film the very great difficulty Clint Hill had in even reaching the car to assist Mrs. Kennedy, and the agents were just not able to get up to that car in time. 345 Chairman STOKES. When you review the film, you can clearly see the reaction that Governor Connally had, with reference to the first shot. What reaction do you see in terms of the Secret Service agents? Inspector KELLEY. Well, in the film, of course, there is no apparent action that is being taken by Mr. Kellerman, who is in the front seat. The driver at that time apparently was unaware of anything that happened, apparently through the concentration of his responsibility of driving the car, and there is no apparent reaction on the part of the agents. Chairman STOKES. But doesn't your investigation reveal that in the Vice Presidential car there is a reaction on the part of Agent Youngblood immediately? Inspector KELLEY. When the caravan in the motorcade begins to move out, there is, when it was apparent that the motorcade had been fired on, and it was apparent that the motorcade had been hit, and the motorcade begins to move out from the area is when there is the reaction. Chairman STOKES. Well, the apparent real first reaction we see on the part of agents then is at the point where someone says "Let's get out of here." Inspector KELLEY. "Let's get out of here." That was Mr. Kellerman's instructions to the driver, "Let's get out." Chairman STOKES. That is only after the third shot. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Chairman STOKES. What did your investigation reveal in terms of the activities of the agents the night before? Inspector KELLEY. The night before? Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir. Inspector KELLEY. It is a long time ago. This was an after-hours club where they had apparently--where drinks could be served. It was also a place, the only place open at the time in the area where the agents could go and have something to eat, and they went to this place for that purpose. Chairman STOKES. Do you recall what place you are talking about? Inspector KELLEY. I beg your pardon? Chairman STOKES. Do you recall what place you are talking of? Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't recall it. Chairman STOKES. How late were these agents about, that night? Inspector KELLEY. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman. I don't recall. It was late in the morning. It was after midnight. Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us how late after midnight? Inspector KELLEY. No, I am sorry I can't. I don't recall the details of that investigation. It was done by another inspector. Although I reviewed it, my memory on it isn't that good now. Chairman STOKES. Would the time 2 a.m. refresh your recollection? Inspector KELLEY. It was in that area, yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. So that we understand, so far as you are concerned, with all that you know about their activities the previous evening, in terms of relating it to their performance the following day, you don't find that it in any way affected their performance? 346 Inspector KELLEY. No, sir. Chairman STOKES. Now one other question: I am not an expert in security, but it would seem to me that common sense would dictate that high buildings would afford an assassin a greater opportunity than a lower spot, if I were planning an assassination. Can you tell me to what degree the Secret Service covered the high buildings in the area or made any kind of investigation as to whether or not this could afford someone the kind of opportunity that was afforded that day? Inspector KELLEY. At that time, in that time period? Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir. Inspector KELLEY. The Secret Service had to depend upon the local authorities to assist them in this kind of a route survey. We have a parade route. There are hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows that a parade route goes down in a political situation as it was in Dallas. It is usual to go to the police and find out what buildings along the route are not occupied and then who occupied them. If possible, the police put somebody at the particular buildings that perhaps are not occupied. Then they ask for the cooperation of the people who occupy the buildings to look out for strangers and to see that the people who are asked to get into the buildings are people that are known to them. That is about the extent of the route survey that could be conducted in those days. A building like the Depository, the same thing would apply, that you would go to the manager and ask him to be concerned about strangers coming into the building. There would be no, for instance, review of every employee in the building to find out who he was. Chairman STOKES. You don't place any agents in those buildings or anything of that sort? Inspector KELLEY. We do now, depending upon our resources, or police are asked to do it. But in those days there weren't that many people available. Chairman STOKES. DO you do it now as a result of the fact that it occurred then? Inspector KELLEY. Well, we do it now because we have the resources to do it. The Congress has given us the resources to do it. We do it now whenever we can. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. My time has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Inspector Kelley, you served how many years in the Secret Service before you retired? Inspector KELLEY. I came in in July of 1942. Mr. DEVINE. You retired when? Inspector KELLEY. February 28 of this year. Mr. DEVINE. You were a special agent in charge of the Philadelphia office and an inspector at the time of your resignation? Inspector KELLEY. No, sir, I was the Assistant Director for the Protective Forces at the time of my retirement. Mr. DEVINE. But you were an inspector at the time of the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. 347 Mr. DEVINE. One of the mandates of this select committee is, after having conducted the investigation hearing, to make recommendations to the Congress. You will recall that at the time of the assassination the offense apparently was against the peace and dignity of the State of Texas and not a matter necessarily of Federal jurisdiction. Do you in your capacity as a long time Secret Service employee have any suggestions or recommendations as it relates to an offense of this nature? Inspector KELLEY. Well, as you know, that deficiency has been taken care of by the Congress. It is now a Federal crime to assassinate the President, that is S: 1751, title 18 U.S.C. Hopefully, it will never happen again, but if it does, the jurisdictional lines have been a lot better drawn now. Mr. DEVINE. Yes. Well, again, at that time it was an offense against the laws of the State of Texas and the FBI intervened at the specific direction of the then President Lyndon Johnson? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. I guess the degree of cooperation then between your agency and the Bureau was satisfactory, was it not? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. And your primary responsibility was to protect the life of the President and the President's family? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. Who makes the decision prior to a motorcade on whether or not the motorcade route will be publicized? Is that by the Secret Service or--- Inspector KELLEY. Usually it is by the staff. Mr. DEVINE. Whose staff?. Inspector KELLEY. The President's staff. Mr. DEVINE. The Presidential staff? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Does the Secret Service have the right of veto of that decision? Inspector KELLEY. We have the right to suggest that perhaps it is not a good idea or that we have no problem with it. Usually in these areas where there is a political connotation to the motorcade the route will be published and usually has to be published. As a matter of fact, there is activity to get a crowd out so it has to be published. Mr. DEVINE. Apparently the Secret Service was not overly concerned in this instance, but had you received information that the President's life was in danger, did you have an absolute right of veto of publicizing a motorcade route or canceling a motorcade? Inspector KELLEY. We have no legal right to veto them, but with the cooperation we have with the staff and the rapport that we had with the President's staff, if we had a serious consideration that the President's life was in danger, I feel sure we can persuade the President's staff to accept our recommendation. Mr. DEVINE. You in response to a question from Congressman Ford said that on that date and at that time that the Secret Service was "shorthanded," that you did not have the resources available that were needed. 348 Now why was this, because of lack of funds, lack of personnel, or poor planning? Inspector KELLEY. Well, we like to think it was merely the lack of funds. The ability to do many of the things that we have now was not present at that time. We didn't have the numbers of people to do the proper route surveys. We didn't have the number of people to access and evaluate the kinds of information we should have been getting. There just was not enough people to do the job. Mr. DEVINE. I think you said you felt it was probably due to lack of funds? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Of course, it is easy for this select committee and everyone else to second-guess a situation like this and I think we all recognize that it is just totally impossible and impractical to expect that any agency such as the Secret Service or any other can totally guarantee that they can protect the life of a President when he is exposed to large crowds in a downtown area; isn't that accurate? Inspector KELLEY. That is true, Mr. Devine. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. PREYER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Inspector, I wanted to pursue additionally Mr. Devine's line of questioning. Now, taking advantage of your 36 years of experience and the fact that the assassination of President Kennedy was not the last nor the most recent attempt on the life of a President, we have the example recently of President Ford and others. What can be done in your estimation, if you were writing the law, what can be done legislatively to improve the protection of the President of the United States? Inspector KELLEY. Legislatively, I am not too sure I have the answer to that, Mr. Fithian. We have been, of course, supported by the Congress ever since the 1963 incident. We have additional resources now. The requests for resources that we get are now being handled. Mr. Devine suggests, you know, another pile of money isn't going to do it. In the kind of society we have and the kind of contact that our President and the other people that we protect have with the public, it is very difficult to isolate them from the public. And, of course, the contacts with the public is where the danger lies, as we saw with Mr. Ford. There are an awful lot of disturbed people on the streets that I don't think we can do very much about. Mr. FITHIAN. Some have suggested that the requirement be put into the law that in motorcades such as this that you have to have a bubbletop vehicle or something of that nature. Others have said that the President speaking from a podium, the crowd of people that have not been prescreened or selected, that some kind of glass shield be a requirement. Realizing that you cannot insulate and totally remove the danger, are there things that you would recommend if you didn't 349 have to satisfy anybody else and your job was to safeguard the President of the United States and you wrote all the rules and regulations for that? Do you have any recommendations to make to this panel? Inspector KELLEY. Strictly on security grounds, of course, the riding of the President or a dignitary in an open car down a parade route is a very dangerous procedure. Walking along a fence at an airport shaking hands with a campaign crowd is a dangerous procedure. There may be someone in the crowd who thought he would never get a chance to get that close to the President, but when he finds he is that close, he does something to him. The people who have assassinated Presidents of the United States have a characteristic running through them. They are all these loners, these people who have a grudge, with a mental history. Oswald fit that category exactly. The closest thing we had to a political assassination was, of course, the attack on Blair House, but there, again, the people that attacked it had mental problems. The isolation of the President in our society I just don't think is feasible. If he is going to do a parade route for a political purpose, he wants to be seen and, of course, this was the objection you get by some of the protectees with the people standing around him, the agents who surround him. You get complaints about that that they come out to see the President and all they can see is a group of agents standing around, they never get to see the President, either in a standing situation or in a motorcade. The cars are equipped to give him that kind of protection, to furnish him that shield between himself and the crowd, but frequently we were not able to use them. Mr. FITHIAN. It could be made a law, though, that that is the only car. That is just the way you build the car, I suppose. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, that is the way we build the car. Mr. FITHIAN. I mean, it could be made a law that the bubbletop, the glass protection is required. Would you recommend that? Inspector KELLEY. On strictly security grounds I would recommend it. I have very little faith that that could be or would be provided to the President or that the President would accept it. Of course, he would accept it if it was the law, but not that he would want it. Mr. FITHIAN. One other question: Do you have any recommendations to make as to ways to improve the coordination between the law enforcement and security personnel, not only the Secret Service and the FBI but the Secret Service and local police departments? Do you have any recommendations in that area? Inspector KELLEY. The Warren Commission made some recommendations concerning the kinds of information that the Secret Service should ask these organizations to furnish them. We, of course, were and are in the business of protection. These people are in the business of gathering intelligence. They made recommendations that we followed. And I think the arrangements we have with the local and the Federal agencies who are assisting us in this gathering of intelligence are first rate. There is, of course, in the last number of years, 350 and I was--I had some experience with it in the last 2 years of my years with the Secret Service since I was in charge of the Protective Forces, and that is in the kind and the amount of intelligence that we are now getting from the intelligence-gathering agencies, the guidelines to the Bureau, for instance, concerning the kinds of activities they will engage in now in connection with radical groups has cut down tremendously the flow of information we have from the Bureau about groups. There has been a very significant decline in the amount of information we receive since those guidelines. They are having problems with the Freedom of Information Act, they are having problems with the Privacy Act, as to just what kinds of information they can collect. It has cut down considerably the amount of information available to the Secret Service for evaluation, it is our job, not their job, to evaluate this information and how it affects the safety of the President. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Kelley, I was riding in a Presidential limousine in Hartford, Conn. with President Ford when we were hit by a car. I am sure you read about it, everybody did. A Hartford policeman just simply forgot to block off a street. If you look at this picture over here, you see the President's limousine wide open and the only protection on either side is a policeman on a motorcycle, the very same situation we encountered in Hartford. Do you feel that the Secret Service should be given more men and more equipment and should they be doing the side running rather than the local police in a community? Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't think, Mr. McKinney, that would solve too many problems. I think the kinds of activities that the police engage in everyday are not the kinds of activities that the Secret Service engage in and that it is not necessary for us to have our own motorcycle people, our own crowd control people. The uniformed presence, of course, in a crowd is a great deterrent. Trying to quantify what prevention does is, of course, very difficult. We don't know how many assassins we have discouraged by the fact that we have people around the President or whether if we didn't have any around him, whether it would make a difference. So I think the resources we have been given when we requested them have been adequate for it. Mr. MCKINNEY. I would agree with you. I guess they are great at that. But when they are not standing in front of a green light, they are not too good. The bubbletop was not bulletproof, as I understand it it was simply plexiglass. Inspector KELLEY. At that time, that is right. Mr. MCKINNEY. But there is a possibility that it could have deflected the bullet or a possibility that the smashing of the bubbletop by a bullet would have brought about a faster reaction. Who made the decision whether or not that top was going to be 351 Inspector KELLEY. I am not the best witness on that I think. I think Mr. Rowley will appear before you later and I think perhaps he is the best witness on that. I have heard various interpretations of why. Of course, what you say is perfectly true, if we had a bubbletop there would have been some obfuscation of the assassin's view. It is a deterrent. Mr. McKINNEY. The other question I would ask is: Even though the bubbletop was not on, I assume it had to be there in case it rained so it could be put on in speedy notice? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, it was in the back of the car. Mr. McKINNEY. Since the bubbletop was not on, why was no one assigned to riding the back of that car? It seems that two men standing on the back of the car holding on to those hand grips would not have obstructed the view of the President from either side of the parade, but they certainly would have obstructed the assassin's clear line into the rear of the car. Inspector KELLEY. Well, the information 1 was given on that subject was the President didn't want them there. Mr. McKINNEY. OK, that is all the questions I have. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelley, I notice from some briefing materials that we have in our booklets that you were present during several interviews by Captain Will Fritz of Lee Harvey Oswald; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. EDGAR. Can you indicate for us why none of those interviews were taped? Inspector KELLEY. The Dallas police didn't have a tape recorder and I didn't have one with me, and apparently no one else had one. They didn't have a tape recorder for Captain Fritz anyway. Mr. EDGAR. Wouldn't it have been a logical thing in 1963 for-- Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. EDGAR [continuing]. For an investigative person like yourself from the Secret Service to demand or request or require a tape recorder be present when interrogating such a sensitive witness? Inspector KELLEY. Well, I didn't feel when I was allowed to come into the interrogation room that I had the right to insist on a recordation of it. I was there as a guest of the Dallas Police Department and Captain Fritz was handling it. On hindsight, I should have wired myself before I went in there. But it was just my own position that I did not think I should insist on a recording of it. Mr. EDGAR. You used the phrase "you didn't think you were allowed", or you were given permission to go in and listen in on the interview. Was there a breakdown in lines and chains of command that made you feel as though you didn't have full or equal opportunity with the captain of the Dallas Police Department to interrogate this witness? Inspector KELLEY. No, there was certainly no lack of cooperation between the Dallas Police Department and ourselves and Captain Fritz and me. As a matter of fact, when we first went in to do the interviews, I didn't know whether they had a recording or not. I 352 guess I just assumed they had, but I did find out later that the interview was not being recorded. Mr. EDGAR. In your conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald, what did he say to you? Inspector KELLEY. He indicated to me that he was a Communist but not a Marxist. The only other things he talked to me about, or I talked to him about, was the fact that he had been accused by the police department as being the assassin and we were concerned about whether he was or whether there was somebody else that assassinated President Kennedy and I would like to talk to him about it, and he indicated, I will talk to you later. Mr. EDGAR. Did he indicate to you at that time that you were the first Secret Service agent to talk with him? Inspector KELLEY. No; I don't recall that conversation with him. Mr. EDGAR. Had he encountered any other Secret Service agents prior to your conversation with him? Inspector KELLEY. No; he hadn't. Mr. EDGAR. In his alleged leaving of the Texas Book Depository, did he run into any agents at all? Inspector KELLEY. No; he did not. We didn't have any agents there. Mr. EDGAR. It also indicates in our briefing material that you were placed in charge of the protective detail around the Oswald family; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Well, I was not in charge of it. I formed it. I selected the people and supervised it. Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever have occasion to talk with Marina Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I had several discussions with her. Mr. EDGAR. And that was through a Russian-speaking Secret Service interpreter? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; Agent Gopadze. Mr. EDGAR. What were your impressions of Marina Oswald in the few days and weeks after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. My impression of her was that she was terribly frightened that something would happen to her, either that the U.S. Government was going to do something to her or that people would. She was frightened of being assaulted and attacked. Mr. EDGAR. Did she indicate to you who she was frightened of specifically? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the government, the U.S. Government would retaliate against her. Mr. EDGAR. Did she indicate whether that was the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Dallas Police Department? Inspector KELLEY. She didn't indicate specifically anybody. She did not get along with the FBI agents that had previously contacted her. Mr. EDGAR. I have a great many additional questions in that area, but because of the time, let me just ask one final question: When we were putting together the Select Committee on Assassinations after its rocky history, one of the first things that we did under our new chief counsel was put together an investigative plan for both the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. 353 Was there at any time a sit-down discussion with the FBI, the Secret Service, and/or including the Dallas Police Department, of an investigative plan along the lines of, gentlemen and ladies, let's sit down and decide where we go from here in investigating each of the aspects of this tragic assassination? Inspector KELLEY. No; not to my knowledge, and I certainly did not participate in any such plan. I did have several discussions with Mr. Malley as to what we were doing and why we were doing it, the kinds of things we were interested in and the kinds of things that were coming to our attention, either from the streets in Dallas or from our field offices. Mr. EDGAR. As a non-policeman and a non-lawyer and someone who comes to this kind of experience in kind of a new way, it seems to me that that was an oversight on the part of the investigative agencies or that that was not a practice--- Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired, but the Chair will let the witness answer. You may proceed. Inspector KELLEY. The order had come down that the FBI would take full responsibility for the investigation of the assassination, so there was really no problem then concerning ourselves and the FBI. The Dallas Police Department also understood that their role in the investigation of Kennedy's assassination had been taken over by the Bureau. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Yes. Did, at that time, the Secret Service have specific contingency plans, like the military does, on hypothetical things happening, a specific plan to be put into effect by the agents on the scene? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the specific plan, of course, in all the protective procedures was that if something untoward happened in a protective situation, the only plan was to get the protectee out of there, out of the dangerous situation. Mr. SAWYER. Was there any specific plan of how to do that that was laid out in advance? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; the agents, of course, were to surround the President if he was in a vehicle. The vehicle was to be moved out directly regardless of convoys or motorcycle and to merely remove the President from the dangerous area. Mr. SAWYER. Is it presently just as vague as that or do they lay out specifics? On a parade route, let's say, if things happen, where they go, what they do, and with how they get there? Inspector KELLEY. It is much more improved now and there are practice runs of what to do in a specific area of attack. Mr. SAWYER. So that the agents know specifically if they are in a certain area of a parade route where they are going to go and how they get there? Inspector KELLEY. Exactly. Mr. SAWYER. They didn't do that then? Inspector KELLEY. Well, it was not a practice to practice these situations in getting out of them. There was a lot less sophistica- 354 tion in those days as to how to handle an emergency than there is today. Mostly because of resources. Mr. SAWYER. I presume, then, at that time that individual agents didn't know specifically what they, themselves, were supposed to do and where they were supposed to take a position or this kind of thing? Inspector KELLEY. Oh no. I think the positions in a parade and the positions of who will stand where when the car stops or what each agent will do when the car is moving is spelled out and was spelled out at that time. Mr. SAWYER. I see. I don't mean that there was no arrangement made for this sort of thing, but it was a lot less sophisticated than it is today and the agents did not have the opportunity to practice in those situations that they have today. Also, along the line of the questioning of Chairman Stokes, I, too, was impressed in watching the Zapruder film at how rapidly Governor Connally reacted to that first shot and all through the series of three shots there was no visible reaction by any of the agents that were in the pictures. Do they receive any training in recognizing by sounds the sound of rifle shots or pistol shots? Inspector KELLEY. They do now. They receive formal training in it. In those days, the young agents that were on the detail, the trained agents that were on it, all had a great deal of physical attributes. There was no formal training in the recognition of shots before that. Mr. SAWYER. There is now? Inspector KELLEY. Agents are always qualified with pistols. They were qualified with their firearms and the use of shoulder arms, but there was no specific training on the recognition of pistol shots or rifle shots. Mr. SAWYER. What also surprised me about that reaction by Governor Connally and the nonreaction by the agents through that time frame of say 7 or 8 seconds is that the agents, I would think, would be alert for exactly that kind of thing, be concentrating on it much as a sprinter might concentrate on listening to the starting gun, whereas Governor Connally would have had other things on his mind. And yet their reaction, for being there for that real purpose, is surprising, their total lack of reaction to it for such a long time frame. Inspector KELLEY. Mr. Congressman, you know, Governor Connally was hit with a bullet. Mr. SAWYER. Not at that first shot. He turned to see where the shot came from and testified here and it is perfectly obvious in the picture that he recognized this rifle shot and spotted pretty much where it came from and he was hit by the next shot. Well, anyway, aside from that, one other thing that impressed me when I was in Dallas and looking at this was the so-called grassy knoll location, that we were told no one had either checked out or even stationed as much as a Dallas policeman there. If you are familiar with that situation, the fence runs along the top of the grassy knoll, a solid fence with trees overhanging, and 355 there is nothing behind it at all but a big, unoccupied gravel parking lot and railroad tracks and a perfect escape situation. Apparently, it was somewhat of a hangout for bums since there are wine bottles and everything else laying around back there. I am just amazed that the Secret Service would not have been alert to that kind of a situation because you could have killed the President from there with a handgun. Inspector KELLEY. Well, along that parade route, from the airport there were a number of those same hazardous situations on a parade route of that length. There were, of course, some police in the area. There was nobody on the grassy knoll. There were some police in the area of Dealey Plaza as it went into the underpass. Mr. SAWYER. Today would the Secret Service check out places like that and insist that there be some policeman behind that fence or somebody to cover that kind of a situation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we do a great deal more of that than we did before. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Kelley, I just have one question: Do you feel that the Secret Service and/or the FBI failed in its pre-assassination investigation? Inspector KELLEY. No, Mr. Devine. When you look at the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, a number of government agencies had information on him. No one government agency had it all and the Secret Service had none. However, if we had, if we knew the totality of his background and if we knew that he was working in the bookstore at that time, I feel that the Secret Service would have done something to insure that we knew what Lee Harvey Oswald was doing at the time of the parade. We would have seen that he was at work or we would have seen what he was doing in the bookstore if we knew the totality of it. He turned out to be the kind, as I say, of the typical assassin, the typical assassin of Presidents, a loner, a man with a history of mental problems, a bitter man, a man who felt himself a failure. In talking to Marina, he was a very disturbed man. To predict human behavior to that extent, I think was just an impossibility. We have a great many people in this country who have these same tendencies who never turn out to be assassins. I think the ability to predict that kind of human behavior is still beyond us. Mr. DEVINE. So it gets right back, then, to the impossibility to totally protect any President isn't that right? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Kelley, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may comment upon or explain or in any way amplify or expand upon the testimony he has given before this committee. On behalf of the committee, at this time I extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire. 356 Inspector KELLEY. Just a minute Mr. Chairman, to expand on some of the discussion we had with Mr. Edgar as to the kinds of information we are now getting or not getting from the intelligence agencies that are responsible for the gathering of intelligence. We have found, or I have found just before I retired, a very serious declination in the number of reports we get from the Bureau and the kind of reports that we get from the Bureau that I think we should have. We got after the W